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Abstract 
 
Resources are a key to innovative actions -not only, but also- in nonprofit organizations 
(NPOs). With the societal obligation of NPOs to create innovative and effective approaches in 
responding to a variety of concerns such as poverty, human rights, social services, 
environmental protection etc. this study examines the resource foundations that make NPOs 
innovative. NPOs are known to show a considerable degree of pioneer work and 
innovativeness in responding to societal concerns (Salamon et al., 2004). To have NPOs 
maintain their innovative behavior it is of the utmost interest to identify those requirements 
and needs that support their specific functions. Organizational slack is suggested to be a very 
influential factor in determining the innovative behavior of NPOs. Organizational slack are 
these resources in or available to the organization that are in excess of the minimum necessary 
to produce a given level of organizational output (Geiger & Cashen, 2002). Innovation is the 
outcome of a creative process involving different actors which results in a qualitatively new 
means-end combination that is new to the market or the firm (Gemünden & Salomo, 2004). 
The question whether or not organizational slack fosters innovation, has not been answered 
unambiguously so far, since researchers deliver convincing arguments for both standpoints.  
Against this backdrop, the study seeks to explain the relationship between organizational 
slack and innovation in nonprofit organizations. More precisely it is of interest to find out 
how these two concepts are related, positively, negatively, or inversely U-shaped.  
A sample of 250 randomly selected Austrian NPOs is the data basis for the investigation and 
was generated in cooperation with Statistik Austria. Through questionnaires the data for the 
study was collected. To test the proposed hypotheses the data is analyzed through inferential 
statistics. 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Ressourcen spielen für Innovationen in Organisationen eine sehr wichtige Rolle. Das gilt 
sowohl für gewinnorientierte Unternehmen, als auch für Nonprofit Organisationen (NPO). 
Dies ist aber gerade auch für NPO von Bedeutung, denn NPO sind besonders innovative im 
Entwickeln neuer Lösungsansätze zur Bekämpfung sozialer Problemstellungen (Salamon et 
al., 2004). Daher untersucht die vorliegenden Arbeit die Ressourcenbasis, die dazu beiträgt, 
dass NPO ihrer innovativen Rolle gerecht werden können. Organizational slack scheint ein 
wichtiger Einflußfaktor zu sein, der auf die Innovationstätigkeit von NPO wirkt. Unter 
organizational slack werden diejenigen Ressourcen verstanden, die entweder bereits in der 
Organisation vorhanden, oder dieser aber sehr einfach zugänglich sind, und über dem mindest 
notwendigen Niveau liegen, um ein bestimmtes Maß an organisationalem Output zu 
produzieren(Geiger et al., 2002). Innovation ist das Ergebnis eines kreativen Prozesses, an 
dem mehrere Akteure beteiligt sind, und in einer für den Markt oder die Organisation 
qualitativ neuen Faktorkombination mündet (Gemünden et al., 2004).  
Die Frage, ob Organizational slack innovation tatsächlich fördert, ist bis heute nicht eindeutig 
beantwortet. Sowohl die Literatur, die einen positiven Einfluss postuliert, als auch Autoren, 
die einen negativen Einfluss zeigen, argumentieren jeweils anhand überzeugender 
theoretischer und empirischer Indizien. Aufbauend auf dem Wissensstand zu der 
Themenstellung von Organizational slack und Innovation versucht diese Arbeit aufzudecken, 
ob ein Zusammenhang zwischen Organizational slack und Innovation bei NPO besteht, und 
wenn ein solcher besteht, wie dieser beschaffen ist, positive, negative, oder umgekehrt U-
förmig. Anhand einer Zufallsstichprobe von 250 österreichischen NPO, die gemeinsam mit 
der Statistik Austria erhoben wurde, wurden mittels Fragebögen die relevanten Informationen 
erhoben und statistisch ausgewertet. 
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Instead of a Preface 
 
 
“Was ich weiß, was sicher ist, was ich nicht leugnen kann, was ich nicht verwerfen kann – 
das zählt. Ich kann von diesem neuen Standpunkt aus alles leugnen, was von ungewissen 
Sehnsüchten lebt, nur nicht das Verlangen nach Einheit, den Wunsch, Entscheidungen zu 
treffen, den Anspruch auf Klarheit und Zusammenhang. Ich kann in dieser Welt alles 
widerlegen, was mich umgibt, mich vor den Kopf stößt oder begeistert, nur nicht dieses 
Chaos, diesen König Zufall und diese göttliche Gleichwertigkeit, die aus der Anarchie 
erwächst. Ich weiß nicht, ob diese Welt einen Sinn hat, der über mich hinausgeht. Aber ich 
weiß, daß ich diesen Sinn nicht kenne und daß ich ihn zunächst unmöglich erkennen kann. 
Was bedeutet mir ein Sinn, der außerhalb meiner Situation liegt? Ich kann nur innerhalb 
menschlicher Grenzen etwas begreifen. Was ich berühre, was mir Widerstand leistet – das 
begreife ich. Und ich weiß außerdem: diese beiden Gewißheiten – mein Verlangen nach 
Absolutem und nach Einheit und das Unvermögen, diese Welt auf ein rationales, 
vernunftmäßiges Prinzip zurückzuführen – kann ich nicht miteinander vereinigen. Was für 
eine andere Wahrheit kann ich erkennen, ohne zu lügen, ohne eine Hoffnung einzuschalten, 
die ich nicht habe und die innerhalb meiner Situation nichts besagt?”  
Albert Camus (1956: 47) 
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1. The Case of Organizational Slack and Innovation 
 
At the core of this thesis is the concept of organizational slack. Organizational slack refers to 
resources that are in excess of what the organization actually needs to fulfill its operations  
(Cyert & March, 1963). However, the focus here is not at all limited to organizational slack 
alone, but expands to the impact it exerts on innovation. The question of organizational slack 
and its effects on innovation is as old as the concept of slack itself, and roots back to the 
1950s. Nevertheless, unambiguous research results are still pending and the literature is still 
divided between advocates of and opponents to slack, since the first group holds that slack 
impacts positively on innovation, while the latter is convinced that slack inhibits innovation. 
While the case of slack in profit-seeking organizations has been part of the academic 
discussion for more than sixty years, organizational slack in nonprofit organizations (NPOs) 
is a hardly researched area. To counteract this research gap, the empirical study focuses on 
Austrian NPOs and investigates how organizational slack impacts innovation in these 
organizations. Apart from academic considerations, there are also striking practical reasons 
which make this study highly relevant. 
In pursuing legitimacy, NPOs increasingly introduce and apply managerial techniques and 
instruments such as controlling, marketing, or human resource management. Legitimacy in 
this thesis is “a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 574). A mechanism that is known as mimetic 
isomorphism funnels managerialism into the nonprofit sector (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
With the market sector as the role model for organizational efficiency and managerial state-
of-the-art know-how (Ball & Carter, 2002), NPOs tend to adopt management approaches and 
management logics developed for market-sector organizations when pursuing legitimacy. But  
for-profit organizations are different. Profit maximizing frequently follows a logic that favors 
short-run efficiency over long-run effectiveness. Nonprofits in contrast are organizations 
operating in between the market and the state sector and successfully fail when it comes to 
reaching efficiency (Seibel, 1992). NPOs are successful in that they continue their existence 
in spite of their lack of efficiency. Organizational slack (Cyert et al., 1963) is one potential 
indicator of organizational inefficiency that, instead of provoking organizational failure, is the 
prerequisite for organizational survival (Seibel, 1992: 281). Following this argument the 
thesis  focuses on the relation between organizational slack and innovation in NPOs. 
Innovation is (i) supposed to be a vital ingredient for organizational survival (Kanter, 1984), 
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and (ii) NPOs are supposed to act very innovatively when it comes to designing new 
approaches and programs in counteracting societal needs (Habermas, 1998; Salamon et al., 
2004).  
Since NPOs frequently get active in areas where neither the political system (government 
failure) nor the economic system (market failure) offers the goods and services demanded by 
either a political or economic minority, NPOs have developed skills and know-how to 
counteract innovatively these societal shortcomings1.  
To have NPOs maintain their innovative behavior, it will be of the utmost interest to identify 
those requirements and needs that support their specific functions. Organizational slack, as 
mentioned above, is suggested to be a very influential factor in determining the innovative 
behavior of NPOs but under threat through increasing rationalization stemming from 
legitimacy requirements. The final question therefore is to unveil whether organizational slack 
positively impacts innovation in nonprofits or not in order to determine the influence of 
increasing rationalization requirements of NPOs’ innovative function. 
 
Against the above arguments it is intended to answer the research question how 
organizational slack impacts on innovation in NPOs. 
 
To provide a transparent, comprehensible and detailed way of answering the research 
question, the study is organized as follows: In an initial theory chapter (chapter 2) five major 
organization theories are introduced and examined for their respective contributions towards 
understanding, capturing and explaining organizational slack and its influence on innovation. 
Included are organizational behavior theory, agency theory,  resources dependency theory, and 
the two concepts of Weick, loose coupling and sensemaking.  
Subsequently, a literature review discusses the empirical state-of-the-art in organizational 
slack research (chapter 3) and innovation research (chapter 4), which is the background for 
the hypotheses discerned (chapter 5). Methodological challenges are dealt with in chapter 6, 
which is followed by the empirical study described in chapter 7. Finally, a discussion (chapter 
8) links the empirical results of the study with prior findings and leads to the conclusion and 
outlook of chapter 9.  
 
                                                 
1 For details on failure performance theories see: Steinberg, R. 2006. Economic Theories of Nonprofit 
Organizations. In W. W. Powell & R. Steinberg (Eds.), The Nonprofit Sector. A Research Handbook. New 
Haven & London: Yale University Press. Badelt, C. 2007. Zwischen Marktversagen und Staatsversagen? In C. 
Badelt & M. Meyer & R. Simsa (Eds.), Handbuch der Nonprofit Organisation. Strukturen und Management. 
Stuttgart: Schäffer-Poeschl. 
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1.1. It’s the Organization, Not the Individual 
 
Innovation as a dependent variable has a rich tradition of empirical research (Damanpour, 
1991). And certainly, organization slack is neither the only, nor the most researched, 
determinant of innovation. Alternative concepts investigate the impact on innovation on 
different levels of analysis. Accordingly, innovation has been researched at the individual 
level by examining a range of different characteristics such as personality, motivation, 
cognitive ability, job characteristics, or mood states. On a group level, team structures, team 
climate, team member characteristics, processes, and leadership styles have been researched. 
Finally, on the organizational level, structure, strategy, size, (slack) resources, and culture 
have been looked at (Anderson, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2004). Somewhat as a revival, the 
entrepreneurship literature has been gaining momentum recently especially in the fields of 
social entrepreneurship.  
However, at the organizational level of analysis, theoretical as well as empirical literature has 
brought forward promising results concerning the relation between organizational slack and 
innovation. Since these findings have primarily been tested for profit-seeking organizations, 
the intention of this research is to investigate the relation within a nonprofit framework.  
 
1.2. What is a Nonprofit Organization? 
 
Having already discussed economic considerations explaining the existence of a nonprofit 
sector in democratic, market economies, another question asks for a clear understanding of 
what a nonprofit organization is. Since the term “nonprofit” delineates these organizations 
only from for profit enterprises, there are still a number of institutional arrangements which 
could be mistakenly referred to as nonprofits. For instance the whole area of public 
organizations is not excluded through the expression “nonprofit”.  
Therefore, a more precise description is provided to clarify which organizations are included 
in the empirical study. 
 
In the literature dealing with organizations that are active between the state and the market, a 
number of different labels exist. Besides “nonprofit”, these organizations are also referred to 
as “voluntary organizations”, “civil society organizations”, “independent sector 
organizations”, or “third sector organizations”, “nonmarket institutions”, or 
“nongovernmental organizations” (Steinberg & Powell, 2006: 3). While each of these 
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different labels emphasizes one particular component of what they are altogether, a definition 
is provided that includes all the terms given above.  
 
For this research the structural-operational definition from Salamon, Anheier, et al. (Salamon 
et al., 2004: 465) is a well-suited framework. Its comprehensive yet flexible approach makes 
it a highly valuable contribution and better applicable than other definitions. Flexible means 
that the definition consists of a set of five components. Certainly, to be classified as an NPO 
these criteria have to apply, but if one out of the five is not clearly applicable for whatever 
reasons, there is still room to argue why it should still be considered a nonprofit organization.  
 
These five defining components are the following (cf. Salamon et al., 2004: 465p.): 
 
· Organized: Since this study deals with organizations, the first crucial attribute is that 
these entities have to show some degree of formal organization. A persistent goal-oriented 
structure, a legal charter of incorporation, etc. could be indicators for this criterion.  
· Private: this criterion focuses on the independence from government. However, it does 
not at all mean that nonprofit organizations may not receive considerable public-sector 
funding. Nor does it mean that public-sector officials may be parts of nonprofit boards. 
Instead, nonprofits must not be part of the governmental body and nonprofits must not 
exercise governmental authority.  
· Non-profit-distributing : a common misunderstanding relates to the role financial profit 
plays in nonprofit organizations. It is definitely not the case that nonprofits must not 
generate any financial profits. Who could deny an organization to operate efficiently? 
However, the important question refers to how these profits have to be used. And here the 
major difference to for-profit organizations can be found. Because nonprofit organizations 
have to stick to the “non-distribution constraint”, they are not permitted to distribute their 
profits among their members, board, etc. The financial surplus needs to be plowed back 
into the organization’s procedures in order to support the mission achievement. This is the 
only legal way to handle profits, otherwise these organizations would not be treated as 
nonprofits.  
· Self-governing : A nonprofit organization must show the capacity to determine its own 
decisions and control its own activities. This criterion is fulfilled when the organization 
has its own internal governance procedures, and enjoys a certain degree of autonomy in its 
decisions and actions. Nevertheless, there may be nonprofits which are, despite being 
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separated from governmental bodies, are so much controlled by governments or business 
institutions that they actually function as a part of them.  
· Voluntary : Finally, a last criterion refers to the degree of voluntary contributions which 
are compulsory for nonprofits. Voluntary contribution can appear in various forms, 
however. For instance, these voluntary contributions may appear in the form of labor 
through volunteering, or in the form of financial contributions through donations. 
Volunteering can either comprise volunteers in the organization’s operations, and/or on its 
board. On the other hand, a minimum threshold in this respect is that membership must be 
“non-compulsory”, meaning that organizations are excluded from the definition if their 
membership is stipulated by law, which is the case for certain professional associations. In 
Austria, typical examples are Arbeiterkammer (Chamber of Labor), or Wirtschaftskammer 
(Austrian Federal Economic Chamber), where membership is compulsory.  
 
The flexibility of this approach can also be seen in that it embraces a wide range of societal 
institutions, from trade associations, charitable associations, foundations, to grassroots 
organizations. This reflects the heterogeneous character of most nonprofit sectors (Salamon et 
al., 2004), and certainly of the Austrian nonprofit sector (Schneider, Badelt, & Hagleitner, 
2007).  
 
1.3. Relevant Specifics of Nonprofit Organizations 
 
As compared to the archetype of organizations in the management and business 
administration –nomen est omen- literature, which certainly is the profit-seeking business 
organization, there do exist some peculiarities that have to be considered when researching 
and managing nonprofit organizations. However, here only those specifics are being referred 
to which are especially relevant for studying organizational slack.  
 
· Volunteers  (Badelt & More-Hollerweger, 2007; Simsa, 2007): A major and almost 
unique resource for nonprofit organizations is volunteering. Volunteers may either be 
active on boards and/or participate on the operational level of the organization. 
Volunteering on the one hand is a very cheap and effective resource though not 
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necessarily without any cost2. On the other hand, volunteers are not as easy to manage 
since they typically demand a high degree of autonomy in their activities.  
· Goal ambiguity (Horak, Matul, & Scheuch, 2007; Simsa, 2007): Ambiguous goal 
structures are a typical phenomenon in nonprofits. Goal ambiguity does not emerge due to 
a lack of managerial competence but is a consequence of a diverse stakeholder pool which 
makes NPOs link organizational goals with societal goals. The latter of which are difficult 
to measure and implement, and sometimes societal goals directly contradict organizational 
goals.  
· Performance measurement (Matul & Scharitzer, 2007; Simsa, 2007): Nonprofit 
organizations typically do not follow a simple one-dimensional profit goal but pursue a 
complex goal structure consisting of qualitative and quantitative indicators. Consequently, 
performance measurement systems have to tackle a number of problems since qualitative 
goals are usually difficult to operationalize, hence difficult to measure. Attempting to 
downscale qualitative goals to simple quantitative goals sometimes seems to be the only 
solution, though at the cost of lo sing the “immeasurable” out of sight, which might narrow 
the scope of the organization’s activities. What you measure is what you get.  
· Human resources (Akingbola, 2006; Brown & Yoshioka, 2003): In contrast to other 
sectors, for the nonprofit sector, human resources are a unique resource which is of utmost 
importance to an organization. Two arguments support this notion: (i) Personal services 
offered by NPOs imply that employees cannot be substituted by any other means of 
resource, i.e. investments in physical capital. Consequently, employees often are the most 
important asset of a nonprofit organization (Akingbola, 2006: 1708). (ii) Employees in 
NPOs draw a great part of their motivation from the organization’s mission, which often 
makes them stay in the organization despite non-market levels of remuneration or even 
without receiving any monetary compensation in the case of volunteers (Brown et al., 
2003: 14). 
                                                 
2 Volunteering may generate costs through marketing, recruiting, infrastructure, non-monetary but material 
compensation, etc. 
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2. Theoretical Approaches 
 
The following theories revolve around the research question and will subsequently be 
examined sequentially according to their potential to contribute answers and clarifications for 
it. Organizational slack as a hypothetical construct was introduced by Cyert & March (1963) 
when establishing their behavioral theory of the firm. The intention was to deliver a construct 
that helped explain a number of organizational phenomena (e.g. innovation, adaptation, 
political behavior) that had been observed but still were not well understood by organizational 
researchers. Therefore, organizational slack was originally designed under the framework of 
organizational behavior theory, but was developed and advanced either through other 
organizational theories such as agency theory, or was empirically studied often without any 
specific organizational theory background.  
 
In contrast to organizational behavior theory as outlined above, agency theory questions 
the positive approaches to slack and rather assumes that organizational slack leads to 
inefficient organizations. Resource dependence theory  is expected to provide answers to the 
questions how and particularly why organizations accumulate organizational slack. Finally, 
loose coupling might as well be a consequence of and a trigger for organizational slack while 
sensemaking captures the subjective sphere in constructing organizational slack.  
 
Since the concept or organizational slack can be approached from different theoretical angles, 
the following sections aim to describe slack from the perspective of organizational behavior 
theory, agency theory, resource dependence theory and Weick’s organization theory.  
 
2.1. Inauguration of Organizational Slack: Behavioral Theory 
 
In their seminal book “A behavioral theory of the firm“, Cyert and March (1963) introduced 
the term organizational slack into organizational theory literature. Even though the concept of 
organizational slack had not been named as such until Cyert and March (1963), other authors 
such as Barnard (1938) or March and Simon (1958) delivered important ideas that influenced 
the work of Cyert and March. Barnard, in his book “The functions of the Executive”, was one 
of the first to design organizations not as a goal-oriented system reflecting the preferences 
from one top decision maker, but as a system of “consciously coordinated activities or forces 
Organizational Slack and Innovation  From Theory to Empirics 
 
 8 
of two or more persons” (1938: 73). The consequence was the necessity to consider new 
variables such as motives, expectations, values etc. when describing organizations  (Simon, 
1967), and it is also these variables that are relevant for drafting organizational slack.  
 
To provide a better understanding of how organizational slack was developed and where the 
concept’s roots are, a look back into history and into behavioral theory of the firm, which is 
the foundation of organizational slack, is provided. 
 
2.1.1. Organizational Slack 
 
The rather outdated concept of the organization as a coalition of individuals is not a major 
argument in my work but mentioned here to clarify the roots of the organizational slack 
concept.  
 
To overcome the dichotomy between organizational and individual goals, Cyert and March 
(1963: 33pp) propose approaching organizations as a coalition of individuals. This conception 
fits well to prior theories en vogue at that time, such as inducement-contributions theory, or 
theory of the teams, all of which analyze phenomena stemming from people participating and 
teaming to pursue collective action. Members of such coalitions within an organization, often 
also pooling into subcoalitions, could be managers, stockholders, lawyers, customers, etc. in 
business organizations. For nonprofits, these coalitions could include volunteers, 
beneficiaries, donors, politicians, and so forth. Since this approach is a quite dynamic one 
which does not allow for drawing exact borders of the coalition in both dimensions, temporal 
and functional, simultaneously, one restriction is to take a snapshot of the organizational 
coalition and determine either which (sub-) coalitions exist for a specified timeframe, or 
alternatively, examine which coalition members are involved in a certain decision. This 
simplification might have severe consequences for the predicting power of the model in the 
long run; nevertheless these risks are not relevant for the purpose of historically constructing 
organizational slack. This is because organizational slack –as will be shown later- is a 
construct to explain organizational phenomena that emerge in the short-run.  
 
The idea to model organizations as a coalition of individuals also implies the assumption of 
coalition members showing heterogeneous preferences, the potential for goal ambiguity and 
internal group conflicts. Cyert and March (1963: 30p) argue that each individual has his or her 
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own preference orderings which do not necessarily comply with the goals set by the 
organization, i.e. the coalition which might cause the coalition to dissolve. Classic approaches 
dealing with organization goal formulation processes do not consider discord. Entrepreneurial 
theory assumes any organization to consist of an entrepreneur, a top management or powerful 
external stakeholders (e.g. stockholders) who define the goals to be pursued by the 
organization. Staff compliance with these organization goals is purchased through monetary 
and non-monetary remuneration.  Another classic approach is to assume an a priori or an a 
posteriori consensual goal-defining process with the relevant participants agreeing on a 
commonly shared goal (Cyert et al., 1963: 32).  
Consequently a new idea was needed that could help clarify why coalitions do not dissolve 
even though the probability of goal dissent is fairly high. To prevent the coalition from 
disintegrating, Cyert and March (1963: 41) build on inducement-contributions theory and 
state that each participant has to be offered an appealing compensation package which makes 
him/her willing to remain in the present coalition and contribute accordingly. Since demands 
set by the coalition members are determined through (i) actual payments and (ii) alternatives 
external to the coalition, there is a long-run tendency towards alignment between payments 
and demands. In the short-run, however, the alignment depends substantially on the resources 
available to the organization and its capacity to meet the demands of its participants. From the 
long-run perspective, coalition demands are equal to the classic economic model of factor 
prices. Two important differences between economic and behavioral theory have to be 
considered: (i) the behavioral approach focuses on the short-run relation between demands 
and payments, and (ii) the behavioral model views factor markets within the organization as 
imperfect markets which exert strong influence on the behavior of coalition members. The 
imperfection of the factor markets can again be traced back to three reasons : (i) payments and 
demands consist of such different components as financial contributions, perquisites, time 
regulations, policies etc., with the consequence that obtaining information about the actual 
factor price is not easily possible, subject to misinterpretation, and frequently arguable; (ii) 
generating information about the market requires active research which is typically not sought 
for by organization members unless stimulated through inducements; (iii) adaptations of 
demands show a high degree of inertia even under conditions of high pressure. For these three 
reasons there normally is a disparity between the resources available to the organization and 
the payments demanded by the participants of the coalition.  
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Cyert and March (1963) refer exactly to this difference between total resources and total 
necessary payments when drafting the concept of organizational slack and define slack as 
consisting in “payments to the members of the coalition in excess of what is required to 
maintain the organization” (Cyert et al., 1963: 42).  
 
2.1.2. Insight into and Advancements of Cyert and March’s Approach 
 
In contrast to conventional wisdom at that time, Cyert and March claim organizational slack 
to be typically not zero and criticize classic economic theory for considering only one 
dimension of slack, which is the payments to owners, while neglecting slack dividend 
payments, slack wages, slack services and amenities for executives, or slack growth of 
subunit budgets (Cyert et al., 1963: 42). Cyert and March intended to apply the concept of 
organizational slack to explain organizational phenomena that could be observed empirically 
but not be explained theoretically. The most striking phenomenon is organizational adaptation 
to environmental shifts, where organizational slack functions as a (i) cushion from 
environmental changes, (ii) stabilizing factor for the coalition, and as a (iii) means to foster 
adaptation. The underlying mechanism is based on organizational inertia, which allows for 
slack resources to be accumulated and spent. To describe the process in more detail, Cyert 
and March assume that in the case of a favorable business environment profits rise at a faster 
pace than do the demand aspirations of the staff, leaving room for accumulating resources that 
surpass the organization’s demands, i.e. slack resources. Parts of these additional resources 
are spent on meeting adjusted demands of the staff, accepting greater budgets, purchasing 
renewed equipment and so forth, and some parts are simply not used. In times of unfavorable 
environmental conditions, organizational slack serves as a cushion which buffers the 
organization from adverse effects. Through bargaining processes the organization searches for 
possibilities to cut spending by reducing excess payments and other contributions  which grew 
excessively during boom times. In that the organization cuts slack resources first, it still has 
the capacity to adapt to new environmental demands and simultaneously being able to fulfill 
the needs of the coalition members and therefore stabilizing the coalition. Organizations 
without any slack resources would be much more endangered to terminate their existence 
since they would face greater difficulties to meet the coalition members’ demands (Cyert et 
al., 1963: 42pp). Weiderman (1984: 28pp) paraphrases these ideas from a more abstract 
perspective and attributes the accumulation of slack resources to three reasons:  
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(i) Compromises guised as quasi-solutions are agreed upon to settle 
conflicts among organization members. Linked to these compromises 
are side payments such as monetary and non-monetary concessions 
which are not subject to economic considerations but are determined 
through the relative influence and bargaining power of the respective 
organizational participant.  
(ii) To avoid insecurity and uncertainty provoked through an unstable 
environment, managers tend to respond in two ways. First, instead of 
optimizing, managers accept satisficing when setting performance 
targets. In other words, only those targets are followed that can quite 
probably be reached. Second, under unstable conditions standard 
operating procedures instead of problem-oriented solutions are applied 
that might very likely lead to sub-optimal outcomes. 
(iii) Individual motives, preferences, expectations and motivations shape the 
resource allocation decisions in an organization, especially when it 
comes to information processing and searching for alternatives. Due to 
different individual perceptions and expectations, information gets 
consciously biased to manipulate subsequent decisions that are based 
on this information.  
 
Through organizational slack the impacts of environmental insecurities and instabilities can 
be buffered, which helps on the one hand stabilize the organization and on the other hand to 
leave the organization flexible enough to respond accordingly to these changes3. Otherwise, 
organizations would be permanently forced to go through immediate adaptation processes and 
never come to rest.  
 
However, Cyert and March (1963: 44) emphasize that the accumulation of slack resources is 
not a rational and consciously intended organizational process directed to seize the above-
mentioned advantages of organizational slack. Rather, slack is the result of bargaining and 
decision-making processes among the participants of a coalition and serves primarily to fulfill 
individual aspirations. Still, positive aspects of organizational slack are assumed which 
support the organization in its existence.  
 
                                                 
3 Weick with his concept of loose coupling argues accordingly. See chapter 2.4.1. 
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One basic focus of behavioral theory is how decisions are made in organizations (Berger & 
Bernhard-Mehlich, 2006). In advancing the theory, a specific emphasis was put on decision 
making under ambiguity and bounded rationality (March, 1978, 1981, 1988a), culminating in 
the garbage can model of organizational choice (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972). The 
processes of the garbage can model are very similar to features of organizational slack. 
Decision processes understood according to the garbage can model function as a buffer from 
inconsistencies, from conflicts and discussions among the decision makers (Berger et al., 
2006: 191). From this perspective, the garbage can decision-making process itself can be 
viewed as some kind of slack because it allows for redundancies, and more resources than 
necessary when finding decisions which lead to the above-mentioned buffering effects that 
finally shield the organization from adverse effects (Berger et al., 2006 191). Subsequently, 
the mechanisms of the garbage can concept are discussed in greater detail.  
 
The garbage can model was developed to describe decision-making for “organized anarchies” 
(Cohen et al., 1972: 1). Organized anarchies are situations that can be characterized by three 
distinctive features: (i) unclear and unstable preferences that vary over time; (ii) organization 
members have no exact idea of how internal processes work, operations are characterized 
through trial and error techniques; (iii) fluid participation, which means that organizational 
members dedicate differing amounts of attention and time to different problem areas. These 
decision situations are supposed to be typical for universities or schools but partly exist in all 
organizations. Some authors see processes of reorganization as a good example where these 
prerequisites apply (Kieser, Hegele, & Klimmer, 1998; Kreuter, 1996). The important 
difference to earlier, rational models of decision-making is that the elements of decision 
making are loosely coupled. This means that it is not clear from the beginning, which solution 
will solve which problem and where solution and problems will meet. These elements of 
decision-making comprise the following: 
 
Problems: Problems are conveyed into the organization by people from inside and outside the 
organization and refer to issues as diverse as working conditions, careers, family, lifestyle, 
money, status, and other topics currently aired by the mass media.  
Solutions: Solutions are multifaceted in that they are not only the answer to a problem but can 
also be an answer actively seeking for questions, problems and demands. Since organizational 
problems are often ill defined and diffuse, it happens that decision makers did not know the 
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question before the answer to it was detected. It might occur that solutions are found before 
the problem which they could be a solution for. 
Participants: Participants are not constantly occupied with decision-making but their time, 
efforts, and energy are differently distributed over different decisions. The time resources a 
participant devotes to a certain decision depend considerably on competing and alternative 
time demands stemming from other decision opportunities.  
Choice opportunities: In an organization there are numerous occasions where decision 
making behavior is expected. These situations occur when new staff has to be hired, contracts 
signed, money allocated, budgets discussed, and new equipment acquired.  
 
When conceiving decision-making processes as a garbage can, where solutions, problems, 
participants and opportunities are put into and have to find each other, it might be possible 
that some problems never get solved simply because they do not find their corresponding 
elements. For instance, if a certain problem does not find an appropriate decision-making 
opportunity, where participants are present that devote energy to this problem it might not get 
solved. When developing the garbage can model, three typical decision-making styles were 
unveiled: 
 
(i) Decision by resolution: This would be the classic way of dealing with a problem 
and is known by most of the earlier decision-making models. Depending on the 
number of problems and on the resources available, the problem will be solved the 
earlier or the later after having spent time and energy on it.  
(ii) Decision by oversight: In the case of decision by oversight, choices are made very 
quickly and with a minimum of energy because difficulties or severe problems that 
could be attached to the actual solution are not realized by the decision makers, i.e. 
‘overseen’. Issues such as gender mainstreaming, environmental protection, 
legitimacy, and so forth are parts of decisions which can under certain 
circumstances be easily overseen.  
(iii) Decision by flight: When problems are sought to be solved for an extensive time 
period already but still are subject to decision, it sometimes happens that the 
problem that is attached to a choice switches to another emerging problem. 
Therefore, the decision that is finally made does not solve the problem anymore 
since it migrated to another choice.  
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The crucial characteristic of the garbage can model lies in its loose coupling of the different 
elements which are inherent in decision-making. These detached elements allow for the buffer 
and cushion functions which protect the organization from negative effects through conflicts 
und long lasting discussions. These slack procedures in decision-making are also congruent 
with March’s “technology of foolishness” (March, 1988a: 254pp). Again, opposing classic 
rational choice making which leads to similar and imitated solutions, components of irrational 
behavior and foolish elements that are disconnected from rational thoughts, should be 
introduced. These foolish elements are assumed to support find creative and innovative ideas 
and solutions which would not be conceivable without leaving the paths paved by rationality.  
 
2.1.3. Innovation 
 
The impact of organizational slack is not at all limited to aspects of compensation. In the 
framework of behavioral theory, Cyert and his colleagues (Cyert, Feigenbaum, & March, 
1959; Cyert et al., 1963) also elaborated on the concepts of problemistic and slack search in 
order to model organizational search and innovative behavior. Corresponding to the enduring 
discussion of innovation and the role of slack, Cyert and March (1963: 169) and March (1989: 
4p) propose to differentiate between two modes of innovation or search, which are 
problemistic search on the one hand and slack search on the other hand. Problemistic search is 
short-run oriented whereas slack search tends to be only loosely linked to a particular problem 
and is merely long-run oriented. 
 
1. Problemistic search is search behavior dedicated to a specific problem or provoked 
through perceived shortcomings when seeking to reach a certain aspiration level. 
Problemistic search is supposed to last until the problem is solved either by finding the 
appropriate means or by adjusting the goal. Aiming at enhancing performance, it is 
carried out in those organizational units that are either closely attached to the 
recognized problem or problem solving is assigned to those units that are known to 
have tackled comparable challenges previously. Problemistic search might result in 
increased R&D expenditures when the management believes that updating 
technologies and processes is key to solving the performance deficiencies (Greve, 
2003: 687). Three general approaches are described which make the management 
judge in favor of increasing R&D activities. (i) Positive experience with prior R&D 
projects makes decision makers repeatedly rely on R&D (Kelly & Amburgey, 1991; 
Organizational Slack and Innovation  From Theory to Empirics 
 
 15 
Miller & Friesen, 1982); (ii) Organizations that show an influencing position of R&D 
in its decision-making structures allocate favorable budgets to R&D (Greve, 2003: 
687); Finally (iii) organizations confronted with declining performance in reduced 
market demands count on R&D to boost sales again (Ramrattan, 1998). Low 
performance, however, does not automatically lead to rising R&D activities; it 
additionally depends on the reasons to which the performance decrease is attributed. If 
decision makers attribute performance problems to temporary external reasons, 
increased R&D is much less likely than if managers attribute problems to enduring 
internal deficiencies. Advancing from the logic of problemistic search, predictions 
would suppose relatively unsuccessful organizations to show higher propensity to 
innovation –defined as searching for new solutions for a perceived deficiency- than 
relatively well performing organizations. Here, again, slack comes into play as the 
trigger for another search mode. 
2. Slack search, in contrast to problemistic search, is not an answer to a specific problem 
but is dedicated to organizational long-run, strategic considerations and frequently 
serves a subunit’s short run goal (prestige, professional status etc.). Cyert and March 
(1963: 189) report that in their sample of surveyed organizations most major 
technological improvements were based in slack search activities. In the case of slack 
search, organizational slack serves to relax control mechanisms and leads to earlier 
satisficing, thus accepting innovation projects more easily than under conditions of 
scarce resources. Levinthal and March (1988) comment that slack search equals 
“irresponsible” (Levinthal et al., 1988: 190) search because slack search cannot be 
justified by means of expected positive returns at the point of time when it is initiated.  
 
2.1.4. Organizational Learning with Slack 
 
In section 2.1.2 it has already been pointed out that organizational slack was intended to 
theoretically explain organizational phenomena such as adaptation to external shifts. Here, the 
proposed mechanism that links slack with adaptation will be examined more intensively, with 
a focus on theoretical considerations on sticking to outdated strategies under slack lacking 
conditions.  
 
Denrell and March (2001) summarize in their article about organizational adaptation that the 
process of adaptation knows two alternative mechanisms. One is experiential learning and the 
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second is competitive selection and reproduction (Denrell et al., 2001: 523), and both 
mechanisms have been discussed as appropriate means for improving the fit between 
organizations and their respective environment. Experiential learning as well as competitive 
selection and reproduction were traditionally treated as confirmations of the rational choice 
theory4, an argument which Denrell and March (2001) doubt very much and they come up 
with a counterargument that models the adaptation process as one of sequential sampling. 
This means that at each stage in the process one alternative is picked out of a pool of 
alternatives. The probability of sampling a particular alternative depends on the history, i.e. 
the alternatives with relatively good prior outcomes are favored over those with relatively bad 
past outcomes. From this perspective the concept seems promising and guarantees 
advancements and improvements in performance due to self-enhancing effects, as the 
alternatives with initially good outcomes are chosen and worse alternatives are neglected. The 
important point in the argument of Denrell and March (2001: 524) is that the described 
mechanism does not only lead to reelecting one supposedly contributing alternative, but also 
helps accumulate additional information about this alternative, which serves to correct 
potential prior errors inherent to initially positive appearing alternatives. Solutions that appear 
unpromising from the beginning will probably never be considered again. Consequently less 
information will be available for these alternatives. Therefore the correction mechanism does 
not work in the case of sequential adaptation processes because sampling is biased against 
initially unpromising alternatives and towards initially promising alternatives. The 
“competency trap” (Denrell et al., 2001: 524) finally leads to risk-averse decisions because 
new alternatives frequently lack practice which would be necessary to unfold the true and full 
capacity of a new alternative. Since improved performance comes with repeated experience, 
innovation is at a disadvantage. The probability of implementing new and innovative 
alternatives rises with “…ineffective adaptation, and several forms of organizational 
ineffectiveness…” (Denrell et al., 2001: 532), which very much points to organizational slack 
that allows the organization waste resources on experiencing new alternatives. Otherwise, 
innovative projects are likely to quickly be abandoned in favor of more appealing –often 
acquainted- solutions (Denrell et al., 2001; March, 1981, 2006).  
 
 
                                                 
4 For an introduction see: Friedman, M. 1953. The methodology of positive economics. . In M. Friedman (Ed.), 
Essays in positive economics: 3-47. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
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2.2. Opposition: Principal Agency Theory 
 
In contrast to behavioral theory of the firm, which attributes positive characteristics to 
organizational slack, agency theory seems to be more critical on that issue. To learn more, the 
subsequent sections deliver details about the theory. Agency theory seeks to answer questions 
that revolve around the problem of separating ownership and control in organizations, a factor 
that is crucial for organizational slack as well because agency scholars view slack as an 
adverse consequence of deficient monitoring (Child, 1972; Dunk & Nouri, 1998; Jensen, 
1993; Schiff & Lewin, 1970; Williamson, 1974). Nonprofit Organizations are certainly no 
exception to the issues tackled by agency theorists and a number of researchers applied the 
agency framework to NPOs (cf. Caers, Bois, Jegers, De Gieter, & et al., 2006; Gazley, 2008; 
Miller, 2002; Steinberg, 2008; Theuvsen, 2004; Van Slyke, 2007).  
 
2.2.1. Mechanisms Leading to Slack 
 
The roots of agency theory describe the relationship between the management of an 
organization and the shareholders. But, to put it more generally, agency relationships are 
applicable whenever authority is delegated from the principal, i.e. the owner of the 
organization,  to another person in charge of carrying out daily business with the principal 
being immediately affected by the agent’s decisions and actions (Barney & Hesterly, 2006: 
123; Ebers & Gotsch, 2006: 266; Eisenhardt, 1989: 58). More specifically, two problems arise 
in an agency relationship, with the first being the agency problem (i) occurring when the goal 
preferences between the principal and the agent diverge, and (ii) monitoring might be difficult 
or expensive so the principal suffers information shortages on what the agent is actually 
doing. The second problem is related to ris- taking preferences and arises when the principal 
and the agent show different risk-taking behaviors resulting in different actions which could 
lead to conflicts between the two  (Eisenhardt, 1989: 58). Agency theory was developed along 
two different paths, with the (i) positivist agency theory on the one hand and the (ii) principal-
agent research on the other hand. While the positivist approach investigates situations that are 
likely to produce diverging goals between the principal and the agent and offers suggestions 
for governance mechanisms that aim at controlling the agent’s selfish behavior, the principal-
agent research focuses on establishing a general theory of the principal-agent relationship 
which can broadly be applied to any such relationships, e.g. employer-employee, lawyer-
client, buyer-supplier (Eisenhardt, 1989: 59p). Since this research is very much concerned 
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with organizational slack as a result of deficient monitoring within a principal agent 
relationship, the positivist stream will be referred to in more detail even though both streams 
do not contradict but complement each other in their findings. Positivist researchers identify 
and analyze alternative contract options and the principal-agent scholars investigate which of 
these options is the most efficient under which conditions (Eisenhardt, 1989: 60). The 
positivist research, however, is represented by three major articles by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), by Fama (1980), and Fama and Jensen (1983b) which are introduced subsequently. 
 
In their piece of research Jensen and Meckling (1976) depart from property rights theory, 
agency, and finance to integrate them in a theory of ownership structure for the firm. The 
authors define an agency relationship as a “contract, under which one or more persons (the 
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some of the service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent” (Jensen et al., 1976: 
308). Moreover, they assume that all participants are utility maximizers, with the consequence 
that the agent is very likely to no t always act according to the principal’s interest. The latter 
might curb the selfish behavior of the agent if (i) appropriate incentives are offered that make 
the agent act in the principal’s interest and (ii) monitoring costs are incurred by the principal 
to limit information shortages about the agent’s actual actions. Agents are sometimes willing 
to incur costs (opportunity costs) for not taking certain actions that might hurt the principal or 
to make sure that these actions do not harm the principal (security costs) which are referred to 
as bonding costs. Finally, the principal suffers welfare losses through inadequate behavior of 
the agent, also referred to as residual loss (Jensen et al., 1976: 308). Since it is assumed that 
achieving a satisfactory situation for both the principal and the agent at zero cost is not 
conceivable, agency costs are the sum of three costs: (i) monitoring costs; (ii) bond ing costs; 
(iii) residual loss. Although their article focuses on agency relationships within a corporation, 
Jensen and Meckling point out that the separation of ownership and control is a widely 
applicable situation and happens in all sorts of organizations but also in all cooperative efforts 
(shirking) (1976: 309). From the perspective of agency theory, one argument is specifically 
central to the creation of organizational slack in the form of budgetary slack: Discretionary 
behavior (Williamson, 1974) is enabled under an agency relationship due to the existence of 
monitoring and bonding costs which leave the manager i.e. the agent, with control over 
certain recourses he can use to satisfy his own preferences (Jensen et al., 1976: 309).  
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Fama (1980) with his paper “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm” intends to 
provide a rationale why the separation of ownership and control can be an efficient alternative 
of organizing despite the agency costs that have to be born. His arguments circulate around a 
number of assumptions, the first of which is that the separation of ownership and control can 
be modeled as an efficient way of organizing within the framework of contracts as the nexus 
of organizations. Second, the firm itself is in permanent competition with other firms, which 
in turn disciplines each individual firm and makes monitoring the performance of teams and 
team-members important. Third, additionally to internal monitoring, each participant is 
disciplined by the internal and external labor markets where they appear more appealing the 
better they offer their services (Fama, 1980: 289). Since managers are prone to gathering 
information on how their performance is evaluated by the labor markets, and expect these 
mechanisms to be responsive to their actual performance, there is pressure from both sides: 
On the one hand, the labor markets discipline the managers, on the other hand managers 
discipline the firms because –competitive labor markets assumed- managers would leave the 
organization if the reward system does not approve the manager’s performance. This model 
resembles the coalition theory and the arguments for organizational slack, because according 
to behavioral theory these labor markets would be treated as factor markets with imperfect 
information (see section 2.1.1.). Coming back to Fama’s approach, he also claims that 
managers in a firm monitor each other, being aware of the fact that the individual 
performance to a considerable extent depends on the performance of the colleagues as well 
and, finally, that each individual market price on the labor market depends on the overall 
performance of the firm the manager currently is a participant of (Fama, 1980: 293). 
Concluding his article, Fama maintains that the division of ownership and control does not 
induce shirking or divergent behaviors of the agents as long as they can reckon on labor 
markets and reward mechanisms that perfectly compensate the agents for their performance, 
meaning rewards for positive and financial punishment for negative behavior (1980: 369).  
 
Fama and Jensen (1983a) argue in their work “Separation of Ownership and Control” that 
contract structures separating “the ratification and monitoring of decisions from initiation and 
implementation of the decisions” (1983a: 302) survive because it allows (i) for exploiting 
specialization rents through the division of management and risk bearing, but also (ii) for an 
effective control of agency problems inherent to agency relations. Contracts are the force 
holding an organization together by specifying the rights of participants, the criteria upon 
which evaluation of the agent’s performance takes place and remuneration issues. Besides, 
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contracts in an organization determine at least two points, (i) the residual claims, i.e. the 
difference between the total amount available dedicated to payments and the promised fixed 
payoffs to agents, and (ii) the definition of who is involved in which step in the decision-
making process. The decision-making process is designed as consisting of four steps which 
are (1.) initiation – collecting ideas and suggestions for resource allocation, (2.) ratification – 
electing the alternative to be implemented, (3.) implementation – carrying out the alternative 
elected, and finally (4.) monitoring – evaluating the agent’s performance and designing 
appropriate reward packages (Fama et al., 1983a: 303). Next, it is important to recognize that 
the initiation and implementation steps are combined under decision management, which is 
carried out by the agents, and the combination of ratification and monitoring under decision 
control, usually carried out by the residual claimant. Assuming that the decision manager and 
the decision controller have conflicting interests, only effective control mechanisms assure the 
alignment of the first according to the interests of the latter.  
From the perspective of agency theory in most organizations, the division of ownership and 
control is a rational thing to do (Fama et al., 1983a: 311pp); the challenge is to counteract the 
selfish behavior by the agents.  
 
2.2.2. Organizational Slack as a Consequence of Agency Problems 
 
Organizations were historically treated as a ‘black box’ in economic theory, a deficiency 
agency theory could be a cure for (Eisenhardt, 1989: 58). Departing from Coase’s (1960, 
1980) theoretical construction of the firm from an economics perspective, which views the 
firm as the area where market exchange mechanisms do not work and authority instead directs 
resource allocation, Alchian (1977) and Demsetz (1995) bring contracts into the game by 
claiming that contractual relations are the core of any firm and regulate all processes inside 
and outside the firm. They also introduced the idea of agency and monitoring costs which are 
inherent to such relationships. Advancing from this knowledge, Jensen and Meckling (1976: 
310) maintain that “most organizations are simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a 
set of contracting relationships among individuals”, explicitly stating nonprofit institutions 
such as universities, hospitals, foundations etc. to be no exception. “The firm is not an 
individual. It is a legal fiction which serves as a focus for a complex process in which the 
conflicting objectives of individuals (some of whom may ‘represent’ other organizations) are 
brought into equilibrium within a framework of contractual relations” (Jensen et al., 1976: 
311). Here, the problem is analyzed similarly to behavioral theory (see section 2.1.) which 
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views organizations as coalitions of individuals with conflicting goals. The answers, however, 
are different in that Cyert and March (1963) refer to incentives as the key to holding the 
coalition together whereas agency theorists trust in contracts. 
 
Agency problems normally stem from asymmetric information, with the agent being in the 
advantageous position of enjoying more information than the principal. Four specific problem 
situations are known in the agency theory which derive from this information asymmetry 
(Ebers et al., 2006: 263p): 
 
(1) Hidden characteristic refers to a situation where the principal is to recruit an 
appropriate agent with the principal suffering from information shortages about the 
applicant. The agent could exploit this information asymmetry by pretending to have 
knowledge, capacities etc which he actually does not have.  
(2) Hidden intention refers to the potential behavior of an agent to follow goals that are 
not part of the contract and could be to the disadvantage of the principal. Since the 
agent did not mention these goals or intentions before signing the contract, this is 
called hidden intention.  
(3) Hidden knowledge means that the agent could abuse his information and knowledge 
advantage about processes and other areas of the organization for selfish behavior 
which the principal is not able to detect.  
(4) Hidden action refers to a situation in which the principal is in the position to evaluate 
the final results of the agent’s actions but is not able to observe his actual 
contributions to the results. This situation is also referred to as moral hazard.  
 
Agency theory advances from economic theory, which believes that slack resources must not 
exist as they are a violation against the concept of efficiency. Leibenstein (1966) introduced 
the concept of slack to the economic literature and referred to it as a component of X-
inefficiency. X-inefficiency is a term used by economists to describe the difference, i.e. waste, 
between the theoretically possible maximum output with a given set of input and the actual 
output reached by a specific firm. “The simple fact is that neither individuals nor firms work 
as hard, nor do they search for information as effectively, as they could” (Leibenstein, 1966 
407). Leibenstein (1966) concludes that four reasons are to explain why the maximum 
possible output is hardly ever reached. (i) Contracts for labor are incomplete, which leaves 
ample opportunities to management for discretionary behavior, (ii) not all factors of 
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production are marketed, therefore imperfect factor markets exist that lead to difficulties in 
pricing, (iii) the production function is not entirely specified, and (iv) interdependence and 
uncertainty lead competing firms to cooperate, and to imitate the techniques applied.  
 
Still a violation against the paradigm of efficiency, other authors (eg. Antle & Eppen, 1985; 
Antle & Fellingham, 1990, 1995, 1997) derive organizational slack from the presence of 
information asymmetry in organizational settings, i.e. organizational slack is a consequence of 
information asymmetry. Antle and Eppen (1985) calculated a model and exemplified that 
organizational slack emerges due to information asymmetries among the members of an 
organization. Interestingly, they also show that, under the above circumstances, slack may 
occur in an efficient organizational design if the manager enjoys an informa tion advantage 
regarding the rate of return on capital and if there is a moral hazard problem.  
 
Even though it is acknowledged that slack resources do exist in organizations, they are not 
attributed any positive functions. Rather, it is assumed that these resources are misused for 
selfish and unproductive means by managers (Williamson, 1974). This view is framed best in 
agency theory, which constructs organizations as a network of contracts between principals 
and agents (Fama, 1980). Additionally, managers are supposed to follow a set of goals that 
does not necessarily comply with the principal’s goals, such as job security, money, prestige 
etc. Accordingly, as soon as organizations grow and the owner, i.e. principal, cannot anymore 
exert direct control over the management, i.e. agents, the latter start first accumulating and 
second using slack resources to engage in excessive diversification, empire-building, and on-
the-job shirking (Dunk et al., 1998; Schiff et al., 1970).  
 
In contrast to authors arguing a positive relation between organizational slack and innovation, 
its opponents advocate that slack resources even impede innovation because it leads 
companies to follow dubious projects, unrelated acquisitions or pet R&D projects (Jensen, 
1993). The basic argument is that through slack resources control mechanisms are so much 
relaxed that managers tend to follow projects that rather align with their own interests than 
with economic considerations (Child, 1972). Also, there is empirical evidence that 
organizationa l slack does not allow for risk-taking but even reduces risk-taking (Bromiley, 
1991 50, 54). 
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2.2.3. Conclusion 
 
Agency theory again points to the important influence of incentives and selfish behavior of 
the proponents in organizations and establishes the idea that much of the actions carried out in 
organizations are motivated by self- interest. In addition to reemphasizing selfish behavior, 
two further contributions to organizational theory come from agency theory. First, 
information is a central topic of the theory, and the way this issue is approached is very 
specific. Information is treated as a commodity that is traded on a market; therefore it has a 
certain price, and those in need for information can simply purchase it for the agreed cost 
(Eisenhardt, 1989: 64). According to agency theory, information systems such as budgeting, 
controlling, boards, etc. become explicitly important as they are the devices to curb selfish 
agent behavior. A good example in place to explain organizational behavior with agency 
theory is in the fields of executive compensation. Eisenhardt (1989: 64) explains that there are 
fewer performance-based compensation packages for executives than researchers would 
expect because powerful and comprehensive information systems control managerial 
opportunism and result in less performance oriented pay schemes. One of the most relevant 
information systems for controlling managerial behavior is the board of directors which can 
be used as monitoring facility for the interests of the principals, or shareholders (Fama et al., 
1983a). The more information is provided by the board, the less likely executive payment is 
based on performance-related criteria. Instead, compensation is based on evaluation of top 
executives’ decisions taken and behaviors shown. Positively recognized actions, even with 
negative outcomes, would be rewarded by the principals. It is also suggested that richer 
information about the managers’ behavior does foster actions that align well with the 
shareholders’ interests. Accordingly, agency theory would predict fewer actions that are more 
advantageous for the managers than for the shareholders, such as golden parachutes and 
greenmailing.  
 
Another very relevant issue treated prominently in agency theory is risk-taking. Organizations 
are permanently confronted with uncertain futures, oscillating between bankruptcy and market 
leadership. Unlike usual approaches to uncertainty with its inherent problem of preplanning, 
agency theory views uncertainty as a risk-reward trade-off, resulting in recommendations to 
link outcome uncertainty with differences in the propensity to take risks when designing 
contracts between principals and agents. The idea can be demonstrated with examples of 
make or buy decisions. Assuming a huge corporation that has to decide under uncertainty 
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whether to make or buy a small component, principals are not much affected by demand or 
technological uncertainty when making their decisions. In contrast principals of a little start 
up, suffering from resource shortages, would be very sensitive to demand and technological 
uncertainties when deciding, because their resource buffer is not as big as to compensate for a 
risky project to go bust. Risk-neutral managers, being compensated on an action-based 
package would act risk neutrally and make the component, whereas risk-averse managers, 
being compensated on an outcome-based contract would buy the component and leave the 
risk with the supplying firm (Eisenhardt, 1989: 65).  
 
2.3. Striving for Resources: Resource Dependence Theory 
 
One particular turning point in the study of organizations came along with resource 
dependence theory, which was one of the first to focus not only on the internal aspects of 
organizational survival such as motivation, leadership, competencies etc. but emphasized the 
importance of the organization’s environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003: xiii). Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1974) frame organizations similarly to behavioral theory (Cyert et al., 1963) as 
coalitions of individuals or subgroups within the organization and assume that power is the 
critical factor in decision making. Those departments, units or individuals in the organization 
enjoying higher degrees of power are more influential in shaping decisions according to their 
preferences. Power is defined as “the definition of social reality created by participants as 
well as by their control over resources” (Pfeffer et al., 2003: 259). Concerning the discussion 
about organizational slack, this theory might deliver arguments for explaining why an 
organization seeks to accumulate more resources than actually necessary. 
 
With this definition the nexus between power and resources is established, because in 
resource dependence theory organizations are viewed as power maximizers to secure a 
sustainable inflow of external resources (Ulrich & Barney, 1984: 472). To guarantee this 
resource stream two strategies are applied, which decrease the dependence of the organization 
from others and/or strengthen its relative own position against other organizations, therefore 
increasing the dependence of other organizations on it. In either strategy power relations are 
the central concept of change and resource dependence theory rests on three assumptions that 
explain how organizations act to gain power (Ulrich et al., 1984: 472): (1.) Organizations are 
viewed as consisting of internal and external coalitions which are built through social 
exchanges that aim to influence and control behavior. (2.) The scarce resources vital for 
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organizational survival, are to be found in the organization’s environment. Consequently, 
organizations are confronted with uncertainty, i.e. variability and complexity concerning the 
acquisition of resources from other institutions. (3.) Organizations are supposed to follow two 
main strategies in order to counteract the variability and complexity of resource inflows, first 
to gain control over resources that decrease their dependence on other organizations, and 
second to acquire power over resources that maximize the dependence of other organizations 
on themselves. In addition to the preliminary insight into the core concepts of resource 
dependence approach, the next sections delivers a more in-depth analysis of the theory. 
 
2.3.1. Assembling Resource Dependence Theory 
 
Point of departure for the resource dependence perspective, which has been established by 
Pfeffer and Salancik in their book, “The External Control of Organizations. A Resource 
Dependence Perspective” (2003), is the assumption that organizations are in need of resources 
to guarantee their survival. Acquiring resources typically involves getting into transaction or 
exchange activities with other institutions in control over the required resources, and thus 
organizations substantially depend on their environments. Consequently, organizations face 
uncertainty when it comes to resource acquisition due to undependable partners, vulnerable 
relations, and problematic power structures. Inherent to the exchange process is that 
organizations in order to survive have to sacrifice parts of their autonomy, which explains that 
organizational survival can partly be contributed to the capacity of the organization to 
negotiate the environmental contingencies. 
 
When considering the organization’s environment the definition of the counterpart, i.e. the 
organization’s boundaries, is necessary. Organizations determine the behavior and actions of 
their participants. Their activities and behaviors are structured through organizations, but 
social actors can simultaneously be participants of different organizations, which means that 
organizations can exert control only over a limited part of the social actor. Advancing from 
this concept, organizational boundaries can be described by “the organization’s control over 
the actions of participants relative to the control of other social entities over these same 
activities” (Pfeffer et al., 2003: 259). Control is assumed to be the “ability to initiate or 
terminate actions at one’s discretion” (Pfeffer et al., 2003: 259). However, the control of 
organizations over a particular activity largely needs to be legitimized since it always 
competes with alternative claims over the activity which considerably limits the discretion of 
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control of a single organization. As a counterstrategy they formalize and institutionalize the  
transactions in order to extend the sphere of uncontested control, best achieved through the 
organization’s capacity to motivate participants acting on its behalf.  
 
Organizations are designed as coalitions of heterogeneous interests with participants showing 
different goal preferences. The answer to the  goal alignment problem is supposed to be found 
in power structures internal to the organizations which determine whose preferences finally 
are realized. Pfeffer and Salancik criticize that power had been neglected in research as an 
explanatory factor of decision-making in favor of concepts like efficiency and effectiveness 
(2003: 259). In contrast to Cyert and March (1963) and their coalition theory, Pfeffer and 
Salancik (2003) treat organizations as coalitions and as market places where influence and 
control are exchanged. Since organizations represent resources and those in need of resources 
seek to acquire control over them, transactions within and between organizations revolve 
around critical and scarce resources. Consequently, those organizations, units, or individuals 
controlling crucial and scarce resources enjoy more power than those lacking control over 
these resources, i.e. the organization.  
 
Organizations are socially controlled partly since the participants who provide relevant 
resources are beyond the realm of the organization demanding these resources. Therefore they 
represent the context or environment of the organization. Consequently, not only may an 
organization control and exert power on its participants, but also do external participants 
influence the particular organization. Pfeffer and Salancik (2003 260) list eight factors which 
are expected to facilitate the control over an organization: (1.) Possession of relevant 
resources by the social actor; (2.) The importance of the resources to the focal organization; 
(3.) The inability of the focal organization to obtain the resource elsewhere; (4.) The visibility 
of the behavior or activity being controlled; (5.) The social actor’s discretion in the allocation, 
access, and use of the critical resources; (6.) The focal organization’s discretion and capability 
to take the desired action; (7.) The focal organization’s lack of control over resources critical 
to the social actor; (8.) The ability of the social actor to make its preferences known to the 
focal organization.  
 
However, the conditions and relationships are not everlasting and each organization seeks to 
change its position into a relatively powerful one, which means controlling resources critical 
for itself and for others in order to reduce its dependence on others and increase the 
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dependence of others on it. In addition to the variability of environments Pfeffer and Salancik 
model organizations’ environments not as objectively existing realities but as constructed 
contexts (2003: 260). Construction reality is a subjective process in which the actors enact 
and define its surrounding depending on their perceptions, attention, and interpretation. This 
is also true for dependencies and demands experienced by an organization, the construction of 
which “is determined by organizational structures, information systems, and the distribution 
of power and control within organizations“ (Pfeffer et al., 2003: 260). This view contains two 
assumptions that lead to very specific consequences, with the first one maintaining the biased 
cognitive and perceptual processes of individuals when assessing situations  with the result 
that mostly success and failure are attributed to organization- internal factors. And the second 
is that due to the organization internal contest for resources organizational units seek to 
construct their environment as particularly supporting for their interests. Only if an obvious 
mismatch between environmental demands and the particular subunit occurs, the power of the 
latter might suffer. The velocity of power decrease depends greatly on the institutionalization 
of the subunit’s control over organizational processes. 
 
Organizations are obliged to satisfy conflicting demands among a variety of participants. This 
complicates managing since satisfying demands from one participant immediately translates 
into neglecting requests from other participants, assuming resource scarcity. To preserve 
some degree of flexibility in reacting to changing environments, organizations need to 
guarantee some discretion, which means to feature some organizational slack. Preserving 
flexibility also means to avoid being controlled and influenced by external actors and, at the 
same time, trying to establish stable, reliable resource transactions with other institutions. For 
an organization a dilemma emerges because establishing control over external partners 
includes simultaneously sacrificing some degree of autonomy. Supposedly, organizations are 
eager to reduce their dependence on others, seek to acquire control over requested resources 
and follow a strategy which allows fo r increasing the dependence of others on it. The inherent 
dilemma, however, to follow autonomy on the one hand and stable resource exchanges on the 
other hand leads to mergers, joint ventures, cooption, growth, political involvement, biasing 
information etc. (Pfeffer et al., 2003: 263). 
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2.3.2. Conception of the Organization in Resource Dependence Theory: 
Markets for Influence and Control 
 
Rejecting the view of organizations as a rational instrument applied to achieve a certain goal, 
shared by all participants (Parsons, 1956a, 1956b), Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) follow the 
coalition concept of organizations as designed in behavioral theory (Cyert et al., 1963; March 
et al., 1958).  
 
A major contribution of resource dependence theory to the inducement and contributions 
theory is that not all participants of the coalition contribute inputs that are of equal importance 
to the organization. Certainly, some contributions are valued higher than others, which also 
means that some contributions result in more appreciated inducements than others. Part of the 
higher-appreciated inducement is having more influence and control (i.e. power) over the 
organization since these two factors are perceived by coalition members as inducements. 
Through the permanent transactions and exchanges among participants of the organization, 
power structures are established that reflect differences in the participants’ importance to the 
organization. Those members contributing highly valued resources, behaviors, capabilities 
etc. enjoy greater influence and control than other participants (Pfeffer et al., 2003: 27). 
Power, therefore, is based on discretion over highly required contributions to the coalition and 
perceived as an inducement by those who contribute.  
 
Similar to behavioral theory, the RDT approach tackles the issue of different and competing 
demands of the participants in the coalition. While behavioral theory expects organizational 
slack to cushion and align the different demands and thus prevents the coalition from 
dissolution, resource dependence theory delivers a different mechanism to solve this conflict. 
The basic problem is described as having a set of coalition members showing diverging 
preferences concerning demands, goal perceptions and so forth. If these preferences were 
somehow consistent, satisfying one’s demand would simultaneously satisfy the demands of 
others as well. However, since the more frequent case is that coalitions have to deal with 
incompatible demands among their members, the satisfaction of one preference automatically 
results in neglecting the preference of others, with the consequence of negatively affecting the 
maintenance of the coalition. Since organizations terminate their existence as soon as the 
coalition falls apart, one of the strategic tasks is to assure the long-term satisfaction of the 
different demands expressed by the participants. 
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So far, again, behavioral theory provides the foundation for resource dependence theory, but a 
crucial difference between these two theories is evident when it comes to the concepts of who 
or what is part of an organization and what is not, i.e. where an organization’s borders are. 
Advancing from the perspective that individuals are involved in organizations (March et al., 
1958), Pfeffer and Salancik (2003: 30) maintain that only behaviors are included in 
organizations, therefore one person can at the same time be part of the organization and its 
environment depending on which behavior is articulated at a given point in time. This 
assumption bears considerable consequences for a different concept of the coalition theory 
because firstly, it is not persons but behaviors that constitute coalitions and secondly, an 
organization’s existence does not terminate with the loss of persons but with the loss of 
behaviors. A person carrying out a specific activity within an organization can easily be 
replaced by another individual who has the capacity to perform the same activity. The huge 
advantage of organizations is their ability to motivate behaviors on their behalf independent 
from any particular single person. The vital task for an organization to secure its survival is to 
recruit individuals who are –based on the inducements offered- willing to show a certain 
behavior. Pfeffer and Salancik (2003: 32) conceptualize organizations as follows: “The 
organization survives to the extent that the activities included are sufficient for the 
organization to maintain itself. The organization is the total set of interstructured activities in 
which it is engaged at any one time and over which it has discretion to initiate, maintain, or 
end behaviors”. 
 
2.3.3. The Concepts of Effectiveness and Efficiency in Resource 
Dependence Theory 
 
Organizational effectiveness is not an objectively given concept that unambiguously allows 
for valuing an organization. Much more, effectiveness is a subjectively constructed measure 
that substantially depends on the criteria applied, which preferences are to be satisfied, and 
which group evaluates an organization. Pfeffer and Salancik point out that the terms 
effectiveness and efficiency are often misused and that measures applied to evaluate the 
performance of an organization frequently miss the point (2003: 33).  
 
Building on the basic concept of efficiency, which is a ratio of unit of input per unit of output, 
the authors claim that although efficiency is easy to measure –all one needs are some figures 
of the organization’s activities- a meaningful interpretation of the resulting information is 
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quite complicated since the process of interpreting requests assumptions of causalities and 
theoretical insight, both of which are rarely possessed by analysts. In evaluating the efficiency 
of social systems analysts must depart from assumptions of causality, of inputs and outputs, 
etc. but there is always a lack of information leaving an unexplained residual. Conclusions 
drawn from interpreting performance measures are normally arguable and contested, which 
means they are not definitely clear because organization-internal cause and effect chains are 
not entirely understood. Nevertheless, efficiency as a concept is widely legitimized and 
accepted as a neutral, value free, and ubiquitously applicable tool. “After literally decades of 
management ideology venerating efficiency, efficiency has come to be a valued social ideal” 
(Pfeffer et al., 2003: 35).  
 
Effectiveness, on the other hand, is an external threshold used to measure whether or not the 
output of an organization meets the needs of those affected by the organization’s activities. 
Again, the subjective nature of the measure is stressed by claiming that the effectiveness of an 
evaluated organization depends considerably on the capacity to satisfy the evaluator’s 
demands.  
Interestingly, Pfeffer and Salancik question the positively framed idea of a totally lean 
organization as the role model and argue that too much efficiency could be harmful to 
organizational survival in the long run (2003: 36). Indirectly, the authors speak out in favor of 
organizational slack which, referring to Leibenstein (1966, 1969), is nothing more but  
inefficiency. 
 
2.3.4. Organizational Slack in Resource Dependence Theory 
 
Although not explicitly referred to, resource dependence theory explains very well how 
organizational slack is created in an organization and provides an alternative model to the 
behavioral theory. More specifically, resource dependence theory predicts the accumulation 
of both, budgetary and organizational slack in organizations. Referring to the literature on 
budgetary bias (cf. Lowe & Shaw, 1968; Schiff et al., 1970), budgetary slack occurs when 
mangers intentionally bias “performance targets below their expected level” (Webb, 2002: 
361) with the aim to deliver the expected performance and to avoid negative consequences for 
underperformance. Similarly argue Young (1985: 831), Onsi (1973: 536), Dunk and Nouri 
(1998: 73), Davila and Wouters (2005: 589), Van der Stede (2000: 609). 
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When considering the core assumption of resource dependence theory, which is that 
organizations seek to secure sustainable resource streams by acquiring control and discretion 
over crucial resources (Beyer, 2000: 240), it seems to be a logical consequence of managerial 
behavior to accumulate slack resources. Since individuals, organizational units, and 
organizations themselves pursue maximum independence from their respective environment 
through exerting power, and power in turn is a function of the amount of scarce and critical 
resources under control, then accumulating slack resources is a logical goal to pursue. In their 
article “The bases and Use of Power in Organizational Decision Making: The Case of a 
University”, Salancik and Pfeffer (1974) investigate the effects of subunit power on 
organizational decision-making and specifically on budgetary processes. They repeat that 
subunit power is a major parameter in budget allocations within organizations and that those 
subunits enjoying more influence have better chances that their budget preferences are 
realized. Another article by Pfeffer and Salancik (1974), “Organizational Decision Making as 
a Political Process: the Case of a University Budget”, results in similar conclusions and 
explains that –ceteris paribus- subunit power is an important determinant in decision-making, 
particularly in the allocation of resources within the organization.  Both findings were 
replicated in another study conducted by Pfeffer and Moore (1980) which reexamined the 
results of the prior investigations.  
 
Having established an explanation for slack accumulation within resource dependence theory, 
another question concerns the treatment of slack and which functions slack may fulfill in an 
organization in the framework of the resource dependence approach. Apart from a variety of 
functions attributed to organizational slack (for an overview: Bourgeois, 1981; Bowen, 2002; 
Cyert et al., 1963), Pfeffer and Salancik (2003: 274) refer explicitly only to the buffer or 
cushion role which slack resources may play. In the context of organizations as coalitions 
with participants pursuing incompatible demands and the dissatisfaction of which could 
jeopardize the existence of the organization, slack resources can facilitate coping with the 
problem because they supply sufficient resources for simultaneously satisfying these diverse 
requests. The key to conflict reduction is seen in minimizing interdependencies, the 
realization of which is more likely in the presence of enough resources. Also, slack resources 
are a crucial input when additional structures are intended to be set up. Additional structures 
are actualized in subunits or departments coping with different environmental demands (e.g. 
hotline for clients’ complaints) but are loosely coupled among each other to fulfill the buffer 
function i.e. solving conflicting demands. If these subunits were not loosely coupled then 
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responding to environmental demands would not be possible without immediately affecting 
other organizational units.  
 
Other authors, however, focus their research on organizational alliances in the framework of 
resource dependence theory (cf. Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 
1996; Finkelstein, 1997; Patzelt, Shepherd, Deeds, & Bradley, 2008; Paulraj & Chen, 2007; 
Provan, Beyer, & Kruytbosch, 1980; Song, 1995) and partly come up with organizational 
slack as an influencing parameter in the decision process, whether or not to form alliances. 
Song (1995: 273) for instance argues that resource dependence theory predicts that 
organizations seek independence from resources controlled by their environment and 
concludes that organizational slack could cater for a higher degree of independence, for slack 
increases the organization’s capacity to guarantee steady resource streams while buffering a 
turbulent environment. Patzelt and his colleagues (2008: 479) maintain that financial slack 
impacts the alliance formation of venture managers in two different ways: Either in a way that 
supports alliance formation if managers believe that through new alliances they can acquire 
new capabilities previously lacked in the organization. In this case, slack delivers the 
necessary financial resources to conduct the alliance formation. On the other hand the authors 
found that financial slack could inhibit alliance formation if managers believe  that due to their 
slack resources they do not need to form an alliance with another organization. Here, slack is 
the excuse for not forming the alliance.  
 
2.4. Alternative Explanations: Loose Coupling and Sensemaking 
 
Building on the comprehensive contributions of Karl Weick to organization theory (cf. Hiller, 
2000; Sutcliffe, Brown, & Putnam, 2006), two of his concepts are particularly relevant for this 
piece of work, loose coupling and Weick’s approach to sensemaking in organizations. 
Therefore, the subsequent sections will elaborate on these concepts. The ideas are insofar 
important as Weick incorporated contemporary know-how of cognitive psychology (Hiller, 
2000) which says that actions determine cognition since actions precede cognition resulting in 
“I’ll see it when I believe it” (Weick, 1976: 3).  
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2.4.1. Loose Coupling and Slack 
 
The concept of loose coupling was not invented by Weick himself; rather he refers to the 
works of Glassman (1973) and March/Olsen (1975), who introduced the term to the literature. 
Quoting Glassman, Weick defines loose coupling as the responsiveness of events to each 
other with both events preserving a considerable degree of independence (1976: 3). In an 
organizational context this means “units and activities are relatively independent and can 
adjust to changing demands in different ways and at varying rates” (Staber & Sydow, 2002: 
417). The strength of the linkages between different elements of a system depends on the 
degree of the two systems either sharing weak variables or having only few variables in 
common (Glassman, 1973: 73). In a later book, Weick added another definition of loose 
coupling, which he describes as evident when elements affect each other “suddenly (rather 
than continuously), occasionally (rather than constantly), negligibly (rather than 
significantly), indirectly (rather than directly), and eventually (rather than immediately)” 
(1982: 380). However, Orton & Weick (1990: 203pp.) and Beekun & Glick (2001: 227pp.) 
for instance criticize that the concept has frequently been referred to by other researchers but 
has never been specified. Providing yet another definition of loose coup ling is not intended 
here but reciting Weick’s approach to screen it for elements of organizational slack is what 
happens in this section. 
 
Organization scientists have described a variety of different elements that can be coupled, 
thus holding the organization together on the level of indicators, individuals, organizations 
and systems (cf. Beekun et al., 2001: 229; Orton et al., 1990: 208). Weick (1976: 4) 
distinguishes between two coupling mechanisms, which are the technical core on the one 
hand and the authority of office on the other hand. Technical couplings include mechanisms 
related to technology, task, subtask, role, territory, and person in the one or the other way, 
while in the case of authority the elements include positions, offices, responsibilities, 
opportunities, rewards, and sanctions. Johnsen (1999) investigated the implementation of 
performance measurement systems on the local government level in Norway and found that 
implementing performance indicators was more successful when being decoupled from or 
only loosely coupled to organizational objectives and were coupled with decision-making 
instead. Another paper couples organizational elements on an individual level by introducing 
social capital (Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). In their quantitative study, the authors showed that 
intrafirm networks, i.e. social capital within the organization, positively impacts on product 
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innovation. Yet another article talks about the advantages and disadvantages of tight and loose 
coupling on the level of systems (Mayer & Whittington, 1999). Mayer and his colleague seek 
to answer the question whether national business systems should be either tightly or loosely 
coupled with the national institutional framework it is embedded in and recommend a loosely 
coupled arrangement. Galbraith (1974) stipulates in his paper on organization design and 
slack resources that organizational slack helps the organization to decouple different subunits, 
which protects the organization’s top management from an information overload. He suggests 
that decoupling keeps the information process requirements down at a level which equals the 
processing capacity of the organization.  
 
Now that the elements of coupling are clarified, another question refers to the strength of 
coupling i.e. how can one distinguish between tight and loose coupling? Weick’s answer to 
the strength of coupling is that “‘anythings,’ that may be tied together either weakly or 
infrequently or slowly or with minimal interdependence” (1976: 5) is loosely coupled and 
adds a number of examples to illustrate his ideas: (i) slack times – resources exceed demands; 
(ii) different means producing the same ends; (iii) highly connected networks in which 
influence is either slowly or weakly spreading; (iv) slow, viscous, or total lack of coordination 
in the system; (v) no regulations; (vi) unresponsiveness; (vii) causal independence; (viii) 
reduced observational capabilities of the observer; (ix) infrequent inspection of activities 
within the system; (x) decentralization; (xi) delegating discretion; (xii) absence of 
theoretically existing linkages; (xiii) structure and activity of an organization do not fit; (xiv) 
different actions always lead to the same  result; (xv) the more prerequisites, the tighter the 
coupling. The examples given are rather imprecise and are to be treated as very spontaneous 
ideas to support his thoughts. To provide a more advanced perspective on the strength of 
coupling – also referred to as “coupling dimensions” by Beekun and Glick (2001: 231pp) – 
four different dimensions are distinguished in the literature: strength, directness, consistency, 
and dependence. 
 
Strength of coupling is described again as depending on its frequency, intenseness, 
probability, and negligibility (Beekun et al., 2001; Grabowski & Roberts, 1998). 
Directness of coupling relates to the observation that loosely coupled systems communicate 
and interact less directly with each other leaving ample room for noise and other factors to 
disturb the communication and interaction process (Beekun et al., 2001; Grabowski et al., 
1998). 
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Consistency is a measure of the degree of coupling insofar as the more heterogeneous the 
responses of coupling elements are to an external stimulus, the less tightly they are coupled 
(Beekun et al., 2001; Orton et al., 1990).  
Dependence of elements indicates whether they are loosely coupled or not, since loosely 
coupled systems are characterized by independent, autonomous elements (Beekun et al., 
2001; Weick, 1976).  
 
Moreover, coupling does not happen in a vacuum but in certain “domains” (Beekun et al., 
2001: 231) which describe the immediate environment of the association between the 
coupling elements. Domains researched so far comprise: (i) task-related communication 
domains involving work related information; (ii) non-task-related communication domain 
including work unrelated communication; (iii) workflow domain dealing with task-related 
production processes; (iv) bureaucratic domain including support tasks; (v) resource exchange 
domain talking about the exchange of resource processes; (vi) structuring domain involving 
structural changes and process innovation; (vii) social domain including informal, social 
communication.  
 
Taking a more distanced look at these domains reveals that they can be spotted on a 
continuum ranging from formal structure to informal structure, with formal structural domains 
including any planned behavior, whereas informal structure refers to spontaneous and 
unplanned activities (Beekun et al., 2001: 231). One further distinguishing element concerns 
the temporal dimension in the coupling domains because the differentiation between dynamic 
and static as well as between long and short run is important. Coupling is a dynamic process 
with its status changing from time to time between loosely and tightly coupled. Also, 
elements that appear to be closely coupled in the short run might turn out to be loosely 
coupled in the long run (Beekun et al., 2001: 231). 
 
In his article “Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems” (1976: 6pp) Weick 
discusses the potential advantages and disadvantages of loosely coupled systems which are 
recited here and will be complemented with another literature review by Orton and Weick 
(1990) to complete the concept of loose coupling.  
 
Organizational persistence: Loose coupling makes organizational persistence more likely, for 
it allows organizations not to respond to each single environmental stimulus occurring. In that 
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way loose coupling buffers the organization from external changes and preserves some degree 
of stability, which is necessary for survival.  Also it is recognized that organizations need to 
have some kind of shock-absorbing resources in their processes to avoid disruption 
(Bourgeois, 1981: 30). 
Sensitive Sensing Mechanism : Loosely coupled systems are assumed to show higher 
sensitivity in screening its environment than tightly coupled systems. This is because a greater 
number of smaller independent elements are more externally constrained and therefore more 
receptive of their surrounding.  
Localizing: Systems that are loosely coupled might be more likely to allow for localizing and 
adaptation because each single element is able to adapt without affecting all other elements of 
the system. Therefore loosely coupled organizations could show higher flexibility in adapting 
to different local market demands at the same time, of course at the cost of sacrificing 
advantages from standardization. 
Innovation: Through the more or less independent subunits which preserve their unique 
identities, different solution approaches are possible, which is more likely to result in 
innovative ideas. The idea of innovation through loosely coupled systems involves 
organizational slack as Weick argues: “When a specific system fits into an ecological niche 
and does so with great success, this adaptation can be costly. It can be costly because 
resources which are useless in a current environment might deteriorate or disappear even 
though they could be crucial in a modified environment” (1976: 7). Slack resources could 
therefore help adapt to changing environments, an argument that is often delivered in the 
slack literature (cf. Bourgeois, 1981; Bourgeois & Singh, 1983; Bour geois, 1985; Cyert et al., 
1963; Staber et al., 2002).  
Isolation of troubles: If there emerge troubles in one part of the organization, their spreading 
is inhibited through loosely coupled elements. Loosely coupled systems have more chances to 
isolate and absorb problems in one part of the organization and prevent them from reaching 
other elements of the organization. 
Self-determination: A loosely coupled system is characterized by relatively autonomous 
subunits which preserve substantial amounts of self-determination. Centralized control is not 
present and leaves high discretion over subunits’ own decision-making.  
Low costs of coordination: Since loosely coupled organizations show low degrees of 
coordination they are expected to be quite inexpensive because coordinating always requires 
financial resources. Additionally Weick assumes loosely coupled systems to cater for fewer 
internal conflicts, fewer inconsistencies and fewer discrepancies.  
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Above the functions identified by Weick (1976) other authors found that loose coupling 
facilitates system adaptation (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), lowers the probability of incurring 
the same mistake twice (Masuch, 1985) and reduces the risk of escalating commitments (Ross 
& Staw, 1993). Loosely coupled systems are particularly effective if participants take 
advantage of the extensive information base they are provided through their connections - 
however weak - to a wide range of organizational units (Staber et al., 2002: 418).  
 
A substantive literature review on articles about loose coupling is provided by Orton and 
Weick (1990), which identified four  recurring topics: Causes of loose coupling, types of loose 
coupling, direct effects of loose coupling, and compensation for loose coupling. Since these 
issues merge to a loose coupling concept that leads to five distinctive organizational outcomes 
which are persistence, buffering, adaptability, satisfaction, effectiveness (Orton et al., 1990: 
217), they will be described briefly. 
 
(i) Issue of causation: This issue seeks answers to the question why some systems  are loosely 
coupled but others are not. Theories that are intended to explain the variation of systems 
deliver three different answers. Firstly, causal indeterminacy makes loose coupling more 
likely. Causal indeterminacy describes means-ends connections as not being entirely 
understood and therefore making different, ambiguous, and competing interpretations 
possible. Since it is unclear which variables are effective, subunits agree only on weak or few 
variables to share. Secondly, fragmented external environments lead to loosely coupled 
systems because this enables them to acquire flexibility to respond to fragmented demands or 
stimuli. Thirdly, fragmented internal environments are also discussed to provoke loose 
coupling because there is no centrally located control device that would supervise the entire 
system. 
(ii) Issue of Typology: The intention of the issue of typology is to provide clarification about 
which different types of loose coupling exist in order to make more exact assumptions on 
causal relations between coupling and outcomes. Consequently, the question of typology 
identifies a set of different loose coupling types based on the level of analysis, comprising 
loose coupling among individuals, among subunits, among organizations, between 
hierarchical levels, between organizations and environments, among ideas, between activities, 
and between intentions and actions.  
(iii) Issue of Direct Effects: This stream of research views loose coupling as a management 
tool, explores its effects on organizations and finally identifies three different sets of impacts. 
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The first effect is that loose coupling facilitates a modularly structured system, i.e. a system 
that shows relatively independent single modules but still sharing a common identity. A 
second effect is sensitivity, which is fostered through loose coupling because relatively small 
single elements numerous in its existence are more sensitive in perceiving its environment 
than are great, heavy units that do not ‘feel’ minor environmental changes. Thirdly, another 
effect of loose coupling is discretion, either behavioral or cognitive discretion. Behavioral 
discretion refers to the freedom of autonomously deciding how to act and react, whereas 
cognitive discretion indicates the freedom to construct and perceive the environment in a self-
determined, particularr way. 
(iv) Issue of Compensations: In contrast to arguments in favor of loose coupling, the issue of 
compensation covers ideas suggesting loose coupling to be a suboptimal situation that should 
be overcome. The major reason is that loosely coupled systems are difficult to manage and 
propose enhanced leadership, focused effort, and shared values as techniques to decrease 
loose coupling. 
(v) Issue of Organizational Outcomes: Linking cause and effects not as directly as the 
arguments of direct effects of loose coupling does, five outcomes are presented which are 
assumed be attributable to loose coupling. Persistence, as collective variable comprising 
features such as stability continuity, resistance to change etc., is the first outcome. Secondly, 
loose coupling is supposed to facilitate buffering effects by preventing problems from 
spreading through the entire organization. Adaptability is another outcome directed to enable 
organizational change and assimilation through three mechanisms. Experimentation is one 
source, collective judgment another and conservation of dissent a final source that guarantee 
organizational adaptation. Satisfaction and effectiveness are also described to be an outcome 
of loose coupling. 
 
2.4.2. Sensemaking in Organizations – The Subjective Construction of 
Slack 
 
The second relevant concept considerably shaped by Karl Weick is sensemaking in 
organizations. A central element in the process of organizing is the modus in which 
individuals construct the specific perception of their surrounding environment. Based in the 
tradition of the cognitive constructivist theory, the basic argument in Weick’s sensemaking is 
his objection of rationalist approaches and strengthening the idea instead that sensemaking 
happens retrospectively. Actions and experience are interpreted and made sense of ex post 
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(Hiller, 2000: 330). Sensemaking describes the cognitive action of structuring the outside 
unknown in a way that attributes meanings to what was observed, done, or experienced 
(Weick, 1995: 4pp.). Sensemaking, therefore, can be defined as “an ongoing accomplishment 
through which people create their situations and actions and attempt to make them rationally 
accountable to themselves and others” (Allard-Poesi, 2005: 171). In an organizational context 
sensemaking is a social process among the participants where a collective understanding 
develops out of the prevailing perceptions.  
 
Sensemaking viewed as a process comprises seven characteristics that are presented and 
discussed in this section. These seven properties of sensemaking are: (i) grounded in identity 
construction; (ii) retrospective; (iii) enactive of sensible environments; (iv) focused on and by 
extracted cues; (v) social; (vi) ongoing; and (vii) driven by plausibility rather than accuracy 
(Allard-Poesi, 2005: 111pp.; Weick, 1995: 17pp.). 
 
(i) Grounded in identity construction: Sensemaking for an individual is very much 
connected with finding one’s own identity. Through the process of attributing 
meaning, sense and rationality to one’s own actions, identity is created and 
perpetuated or sometimes changed.  
(ii) Retrospective: As already pointed out before, sensemaking happens ex post, i.e. 
individuals make sense only of the past, not of the present. Since experience and 
the present moment both have implications for the interpretation of the past, four  
points have to be made. First, sensemaking is an attentional process but attention is 
focused on past events. Second, because sensemaking is a retrospective process 
through which the past is attributed sense and meaning, the present situation 
however determines substantially the perception of the past. Third, since making 
sense is a cognitive process directed towards past events stored in one’s memory, 
all factors that influence recollecting memories has an affect on sensemaking as 
well. Fourth, stimulus-response chains are infinite with neither a definite start nor 
a definite end, therefore possibly leading to incorrect conclusions when they are 
applied as an analytical tool.  
(iii) Enactive of sensible environments: Persons are not entirely decoupled from their 
environments, which means that through acting individuals shape and influence 
their environments, which in turn influences back on the person as a source of 
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stimuli. The relationship between individual and environment is a responsive one, 
with each influencing the other. 
(iv) Focused on and by extracted cues: In the process of sensemaking, people compare 
newly registered events with the information, understanding, and knowledge they 
already have. In that process new events are then classified relative to their 
similarity to existing mental maps either as e.g. similar or unlike or an example of. 
(v) Social: Sensemaking is certainly a collective process and has therefore a social 
dimension in that each individual contributes through her statement to the future 
direction of the conversation. The same is true for concluding remarks of 
discussions, where the conclusion may not reflect everybody’s opinion but the 
conclusion is the result of the entire discussion process including all statements, 
questions, remarks etc. made by the participants. Consequently, the focus here is 
that sensemaking is not an individual process but a social one. 
(vi) Ongoing: Sensemaking is a perpetuated process, which means that sense is 
permanently made, adapted, remade and so forth without a clear starting point and 
without a clear endpoint. Sensemaking is always in the middle of history, looking 
back and having a future, both constructed out of presence. 
(vii)  Driven by Plausibility Rather than Accuracy: In the process of sensemaking events 
are described to a degree that seems to be justifiable. Accuracy is not necessary to 
obtain legitimacy when making sense of certain events, the reasons and 
explanations provided only have to be justifiable. 
 
Having discussed the concept of sensemaking in organizations, an argument important for this 
research can be brought forward, which is that organizational slack here is not treated as an 
objectively given measure that unfolds its mechanisms only when exceeding a certain 
threshold. Rather, organizational slack is constructed through enactment processes carried out 
by the organization participants depending on their perceptions of the stock of organizational 
resources, the demands exerted by the organization’s environment and the perceived fit of 
these two. Should the participants conceive of external demands surpassing the organization’s 
capacity to meet these demands, then the organization will not take advantage of slack 
resources. Should the participant s in contrast conceive of external demands being easily met 
with the stock of organizational resources available to the organization, then the organization 
might take advantage of slack resources (Chattopadhyay, Glick, & Huber, 2001: 940; Meyer, 
1982: 519p.). 
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In the previous sections four different organization theories were introduced, with each of 
them having contributed at least one piece for completing the puzzle to construct a slack 
concept that is appropriate for modeling the impact of organizational slack on innovation in 
nonprofit organizations. The following section will aim at aligning the relevant concepts of 
organizational behavior, agency, resource dependence and Weick’s theories. 
 
2.5. Wrapping up Theory 
 
The only organization theory explicitly constructing organizational slack as a concept that 
helps explain observable phenomena in organizations is organizational behavior theory. The 
other three theories, however, either contain assumptions or mechanisms that can be 
summarized as organizational slack or they refer to the concept of slack without defining it 
themselves but building on the definition brought forward by behavioral theory. To present an 
integrated concept of organizational slack, this section is organized as follows: first, the 
fundamental elements that contribute to a more comprehensive slack model are identified and 
briefly summarized for each theory. Then, these elements are combined, resulting in the basic 
model which will be applied to clarify the relationship between organizational slack and 
innovation in nonprofit organizations. 
 
2.5.1. Organizational Behavior Theory 
 
Organizational Slack is the difference between the resources available to the organization and 
the demands in payments of the coalition members. This difference is assumed to be 
responsible for a number of effects, with the most important to protect the coalition from 
dissolving and therefore guaranteeing organizational survival. Beyond this major function, 
organizational slack is also supposed to cushion the organization from environmental 
changes, to serve as a stabilizing factor for the organization, and to foster adaptation.  
According to behavioral theory (Cyert et al., 1963), organizational decisions and choices are 
not based on optimization calculations but on the selection of acceptable alternatives, with the 
latter being influenced by the level of organizational slack. Consequently, organizations 
showing higher amounts of slack will apply lower thresholds to identify a certain project as 
feasible. With innovations always being a source of risk, uncertainty, and ambiguity, more 
relaxed control mechanisms in evaluating alternatives, will encourage the implementation of 
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innovation projects. Second, slack resources create an environment that is more prone to 
innovation as it decouples the organization from the uncertain outcome of innovation projects. 
Hambrick and Snow (1977: 111) are convinced that “as slack is generated, the organization 
can literally ‘afford’ to experiment with new strategies – new products, new markets, and so 
forth”. 
 
The organizational behavior theory treats organizational slack in a clearly positive way. Its 
contributions towards the effects of slack both within the organization (stabilizing, cushion)  
as well as on the organizations’ outcomes (innovation, adaptation) are favorable and 
advantageous. Being quite elaborated on the positive effect dimension, this theory does not 
say anything about potential negative effects of organizational slack which are conceivable 
too (waste, inefficiency). Neither does the organizational behavior theory talk about more or 
less effective levels of slack in an organization (cf. Bourgeois, 1981). Referring finally to the 
concept of slack search (Cyert et al., 1963; Levinthal & March, 1981), which holds that 
organizational slack enhances survival of organizations because it facilitates strategic 
innovation, underpins the theory’s positive view of the slack concept. 
 
Consequently, what we can learn from the organizational behavior theory is that 
organizational slack exerts a direct and infinite positive effect on innovation in organizations 
(infinite insofar as no thresholds are delivered that would give reason to argue otherwise). 
This approach cannot remain without contradiction, and immediately counterarguments erupt 
that question this onesided view by asking if too much slack would not result in funding 
abstruse innovation projects without any expected rewards, if too much slack would not lead 
to a threshold of satisficing dangerously low etc. (cf. Bourgeois, 1981; Bourgeois et al., 1983; 
Geiger et al., 2002; Leibenstein, 1969; Nohria & Gulati, 1996; Nohria & Gulati, 1997). 
 
2.5.2. Agency Theory 
 
These counterarguments can be summarized in principal agency theory, which directly 
objects to organizational behavior theory, by maintaining that organizational slack has mainly 
negative effects on the organization, and its performance. Agency theorists do not 
conceptua lize their own slack construct but refer regularly to Leibenstein’s (1966) theory of 
X-inefficiency. According to economic theory, slack resources must not exist as they are a 
violation against the concept of efficiency. Leibenstein (1966) introduced the concept of slack 
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in the economic literature and referred to it as a component of X-inefficiency. X-inefficiency 
is a term used by economists to describe the difference, i.e. waste, between the theoretically 
possible maximum output with a given set of input and the actual output reached by a specific 
firm. “The simple fact is that neither individuals nor firms work as hard, nor do they search 
for information as effectively, as they could” (Leibenstein, 1966: 407). Leibenstein (1966) 
concludes that four reasons are to explain why the maximum possible output is hardly ever 
reached. (i) Contracts for labor are incomplete, which leaves ample opportunities to 
management for discretionary behavior, (ii) not all factors of production are marketed, 
therefore imperfect factor markets exist that lead to difficulties in pricing, (iii) the production 
function is not entirely specified, and (iv) interdependence and uncertainty lead competing 
firms to cooperate, and to imitate the techniques applied. 
 
Even though it is acknowledged that slack resources do exist in organizations, they are not 
attributed any positive functions. Rather, it is assumed that these resources are misused for 
selfish and unproductive means by managers (Williamson, 1974). Additionally, managers are 
supposed to follow a set of goals that does not necessarily comply with the principal’s goals, 
such as job security, money, prestige etc. Accordingly, as soon as organizations grow and the 
owner, i.e. principal, cannot anymore exert direct control over the management, i.e. agents, 
the latter start first accumulating and second using slack resources to engage in excessive 
diversification, empire-building, and on the-job shirking (Dunk et al., 1998; Schiff et al., 
1970).  
 
In contrast to authors arguing a positive relation between organizational slack and innovation, 
its opponents advocate that slack resources even impede innovation because they lead 
companies to follow dubious projects, unrelated acquisitions or pet R&D projects (Denis, 
Denis, & Sarin, 1999; Jensen, 1993; Kim, Kim, & Lee, 2008). The basic argument is that 
through slack resources control mechanisms are so relaxed that managers tend to follow 
projects that rather align with their own interests than with economic considerations (Child, 
1972). 
 
The learnings from agency theory perspective are that organizational slack does not have any 
positive effects on organizations, neither on performance-related issues nor on innovation or 
risk-taking (cf. Bromiley, 1991). In so arguing, agency theory directly contradicts 
organizational behavior theory, which leaves ample room for discussion about  who is actually 
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right. Maybe both standpoints have their legitimacy and turn out to be correct as will be 
analyzed in greater detail in chapter 3 where an overview of empirical results is provided.  
 
2.5.3. Resource Dependence Theory 
 
The central concept of resource dependence theory is to secure steady resource inflows 
through exerting power either by decreasing the dependence on other sources or by increasing 
the dependence of other sources on the focal organization. Additionally, each organization, 
but also each organizational unit, and also individuals strive for independence in terms of 
resources. Consequently, to reach a certain degree of resource autonomy, accumulating slack 
is an appropriate strategy. The more slack available the higher the independence. Within 
organizations the technical process of piling up slack works either through managers biasing 
performance targets below actually expected levels or through understating actually achieved 
performance levels (cf. Davila et al., 2005; Lowe et al., 1968; Schiff et al., 1970; Van der 
Stede, 2000; Webb, 2002; Young, 1985).  
 
In contrast to the two theories presented above resource dependence theory does not so much 
inherently discuss whether or not slack has advantageous or disadvantageous effects on the 
organization, but delivers a mechanism that explains how organizational slack is accumulated 
in an organization and which motivations facilitate slack creation. Advancing from a different  
focus point than behavioral theory, which applies the coalition theory, here the building of 
slack is a mere consequence of organizational action per se. Concerning the effects of 
organizational slack, empirical studies concentrate greatly on the issues revolving around 
establishing cooperations and alliances and how slack resources impact on these decisions. A 
more in-depth analysis is provided in chapter 2.3.4 of this study. However, one function 
explicitly acted on by Pfeffer and Salancik (2003: 274) is that of slack as a buffer for 
organizations, which helps simultaneously fulfill divergent demands of organization 
members.  
 
While delivering a convincing mechanism that explains how and why organizational slack is 
accumulated in an organization, resource dependence theory falls short of evaluating potential 
effects that the presence of slack resources may have in organizations. In spite of the few 
effects tackled in the theory, i.e. buffering and alliances, there do not exist any explicit 
statements on the pros and cons of organizational slack and particularly not on the impact of 
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slack on innovation.  In its whole conception resource dependence theory does not argue 
normatively in either direction, and it remains a quite positive approach (Spicer, 2008).  
 
2.5.4. Loose Coupling and Sensemaking 
 
Discussing loose coupling in the context of organizational slack is indeed a tricky thing since 
loose coupling takes two roles: either one as a cause for or an effect of organizational slack. 
Loosely coupled elements are defined as preserving a substantial level of independence while 
simultaneously showing responsiveness between each other. The first argument presented 
here is that loose coupling facilitates slack accumulation. This is because under loosely 
coupled frameworks unit managers enjoy more managerial discretion (Williamson, 1974) 
than they would under tightly controlled circumstances. Increased managerial discretion could  
eventually result in accumulating slack resources for ascertaining its independence position. 
The second argument in case hypothesizes that loose coupling is a consequence of 
organizational slack since the presence of organizational slack is assumed to relax control 
mechanisms and surveillance of organizational units (Bourgeois, 1981; Cyert et al., 1963). 
Evaluating the effects of organizational slack in the context of loose coupling is implicitly 
possible by recapturing the analysis on loosely coupled systems, which identified the positive 
effects of assuring persistence, buffering, facilitating adaptation and innovation, and leading 
to satisfaction and effectiveness (Weick, 1976: 6pp.). However, the positive view on loosely 
coupled systems is not universally shared and criticism remains that focuses on the 
management problems of these systems (Orton et al., 1990: 211). Nevertheless, when it 
comes to the impact of loose coupling on innovation, the theory suggests a positive 
association because loose coupling provides for the space and freedom to experiment, which 
is necessary for creativity and innovation, an argument which is similar to Cyert and March’s 
(1963) slack search concept. 
 
The concept of sensemaking in organizations, which maintains that participants actively enact 
their environment, is a very helpful vehicle for analyzing organizational slack in 
organizations. The point is that –according to sensemaking- slack does not objectively exist in 
an organization but is the result of a consensual process in which sense is made of the 
resource situation in the respective organization or unit. Consequently, organizational slack is 
present and its effects become true when participants perceive the resource outfit to be more 
than matching environmental demands. Therefore this study does not conform with the 
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traditional view that slack can only be measured by objective data such as evaluating the 
financial situation of an organization (Bourgeois, 1981; Litschert & Bonham, 1978). This 
study will rely on subjective measures (Bowen, 2002; Nohria et al., 1997) when investigating 
organizational slack since they reflect in a much more relevant manner whether organizational 
slack can unfold its effects or not. 
 
What can be taken away from the loose coupling and sensemaking approach is that first slack 
resources promote loose coupling (and vice versa) and impact positively on innovation. 
Sensemaking points to the creative and active role that humans take on in the organization by 
constructing through their perception the existence or non-existence of organizational slack.  
 
2.5.5. Bringing together Bits and Pieces 
 
Table 2.1 provides both a summary and an overview of the sections above.  
 
Theory Organizational 
Slack 
Positive  or 
Negative 
Attributions  
Relation between 
Slack and 
Innovation 
Normative / 
Positive 
Statements 
Organizational 
Behavior Theory 
Slack is result of 
imperfect factor 
markets and 
ambiguous 
information 
Positive effects 
are attributed to 
the presence of 
organizational 
slack 
Positive Normative 
Principal Agent 
Theory 
Slack is a result of 
selfish behavior 
Negative effects 
are attributed to 
the presence of 
organizational 
slack 
Not investigated 
directly but risk- 
taking is 
influenced 
negatively 
Normative 
Resource 
Dependence 
Theory 
Slack is a result of 
managerial 
behavior when 
striving for 
resource 
independence 
Does not talk 
about effects. 
Only buffering 
and alliances are 
investigated, here 
results are 
ambiguous 
No statements on 
that 
Positive 
Loose Coupling 
and 
Sensemaking  
Slack is a result of 
discretionary 
behavior enabled 
through loose 
coupling, and an 
socially enacted 
concept 
Mainly positive 
effects are 
considered under 
the loose coupling 
framework. 
Sensemaking 
does not evaluate 
effects 
Positive  Positive and 
Normative 
Table 2.1: Summary Theory on Organizational Slack 
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It shows what the four theories examined contribute to the clarification of organizational 
slack, its organizational consequences, the relation of these concepts, and whether the theory 
involves normative or positive statements.  
 
Condensing these thoughts into an integrated framework that illustrates the explanations each 
theory gives, as well as the different effects that are attributed to organizational slack, is the 
idea of figure 2.1, which is shown below. On the left side of the model the four theories are 
described that explain the creation of organizational slack. The core part of the model consists 
of two ellipses, with the bigger one representing slack. The second ellipsis is attached to the 
slack ellipsis and reflects the concept of loose coupling, which can be the cause for or the 
effect of organizational slack. Additionally, the main ellipsis is given a broader frame where 
sensemaking is located, which illustrates the importance of the concept according to which 
slack is the result of a collective enactment process. Finally, on the right side of the model the 
different consequences and effects of organizational slack are shown ranging from positive on 
the top to negative on the bottom, with the area in between not judging positively or 
negative ly regarding the effects - only the extreme positions indicate positive or negative 
effects.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Integrative framework of organizational slack 
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2.6. Specifying Organizational Slack 
 
Since its introduction to organizational literature by Cyert and March (1963), the concept of 
organizational slack has widely been recited, altered, advanced and specified. These processes 
took place in two main areas, with the first being definition issues and the second 
measurement issues. While in this section the focus is on definition, the measurement 
challenges will be analyzed in chapter 6.2. 
 
As has already been referred to in chapter 2.1.1. the slack construct established in the 
framework of the organizational behavior theory is constrained to payments to members of 
the organization. More concisely, slack is conceptualized as the difference between the total 
amount of resources and the necessary payments to the members of the organization to protect 
the coalition from dissolving (Cyert et al., 1963: 42). This approach however is quite limited 
and narrow in its scope since organizational resources do not only have to fulfill participants’ 
demands but also need to suffice for other routine liabilities such as balancing suppliers, and 
so forth.  
 
A somewhat broader definition by Bourgeois (1981: 30) refers to organizational slack as “that 
cushion of actual or potential resources which allows the organization to adapt successfully 
to internal pressures for adjustment or to external pressures for change in policy, as well as 
to initiate changes in strategy with respect to the external environment”. As opposed to Cyert 
and March (1963), who focus their definition on payments, Bourgeois (1981) in his frequently 
cited article “On the Measurement of Organizational Slack” refers to an unspecified set of 
resources that could contain financial, factual or human resources as organizational slack. 
Building basically on the ideas developed in the organizational behavior literature, which 
does not involve any suggestions for how to measure organizational slack, this article aims to 
develop a tool that allows for a concise and objective scaling of the amount of slack in an 
organization. By summarizing the state of the art of slack research in the beginning 1980s, 
three roles are attributed to slack in organizations, which are represented in the definition 
provided above. Firstly, slack functions as a cushion that guarantees an organization the 
flexibility to quickly adapt to rising demands, i.e. slack as an insurance against an 
unforeseeable future. Secondly, slack is a tool applied by top management to enable strategic 
changes where slack provides the extra resources necessary to carry through these change 
processes to adjust to new environmental demands. Thirdly, organizational slack takes on the 
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role as a means for permitting innovation processes, either product innovations or process 
innovations. Finally, another important conceptual contribution of Bourgeois in this paper is 
the idea of slack and its association with organizations’ success, however unspecified the 
latter term remains. The argument is that either zero slack or too much slack is connected with 
considerable disadvantages for the organization because zero slack leaves the organization too 
inflexible, while too much slack results in inefficiencies accelerating the organizations’ 
termination. Consequently, the proposed relationship between success and slack is inversely 
U-shaped, an idea widely acknowledged in slack research (cf. Geiger et al., 2002; Geiger & 
Makri, 2006; Herold, Jayaraman, & Narayanaswamy, 2006; Kim et al., 2008; Love & Nohr ia, 
2005; Nohria et al., 1996; Nohria et al., 1997; Tan, 2003a; Tan & Peng, 2003b). 
 
Out of an almost infinite pool of definitions for organization slack, a more recent concept 
from Geiger and Cashen (2002: 69) seems to be very suitable and perfectly applicable to this 
study: 
 
“The resources in or available to an organization that are 
in excess of the minimum necessary to produce a given level of organizational output.” 
 
This definition is viable as it incorporates different dimensions of slack that are distinguished 
in the relevant literature (Bourgeois et al., 1983; Bowman, Keating, & Hager, 2005; Geiger et 
al., 2002; Herold et al., 2006; Lant, 1985; Love et al., 2005; Sharfman, Wolf, Chase, & 
Tansik, 1988; Singh, 1986). The idea to frame organizational slack as a multidimensional 
concept was originally developed by Bourgeois and Singh (1983) in their study 
“Organizational Slack and Political Behavior among Top Management Teams”, where they 
identified the need to develop a more sophisticated and differentiated concept of slack. 
Advancing the research findings from Bourgeois’ 1981 paper, where he developed a 
measurement tool based on financial indicators, it is now observed that these financial 
indicators are not homogeneous concerning their relation towards their ease with which the 
resources may be available and transformed from one resource into another. Imagine, for 
instance excess liquidity, which is easily accessible and can rather quickly be transformed 
from monetary into any other form which might be needed in the organization, e.g. computer 
equipment, or a new ambulance car. If the slack resource does not exist in the form of excess 
liquidity but overhead cost, then both the access and the transfer of slack are not as easily 
possible any more since reducing overheads often requires restructuring or streamlining 
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processes first. Consequently, before overheads can be transformed into another resource it 
has to be made available, turned into liquid funds and then be redeployed. This example 
already makes clear that organizational slack can emerge in very different appearances with 
substantially different impacts on the functions slack may perform in an organization.  
 
Responding to this deficiency a more elaborated slack model was constructed that takes into 
account the different degrees of ease-of-recovery, i.e. their degree of incorporation in the 
organization’s structures, processes, and routines. These three slack dimensions comprise (i) 
available slack, being the resources that have not yet been absorbed by the organization, e.g. 
excess liquidity, or retained earnings, (ii) recoverable slack, being the resources that have 
already been assimilated into the organization’s structures, processes or routines, typically as 
excess overhead costs, and finally (iii) potential slack, as the organization’s capacity to 
generate additional resources from outside, e.g. debts, loans, equity capital (Bourgeois et al., 
1983: 43). Available slack therefore is the most flexible as it can easily be transformed into 
any form of resource and deployed where additional resources are necessary. Recoverable 
slack is not as easily redeployed, as these slack resources are enmeshed in the organization in 
the form of overheads, technical equipment, or human resources etc.  
 
Another concept pointing in the same direction is that of absorbed and unabsorbed slack 
resources (Singh, 1986). Similarly to available slack, unabsorbed slack denotes resources that 
are in excess and liquid resources that are not committed to any organizational task or 
activity. Absorbed slack would therefore equal recoverable slack that signifies some excess 
costs in an organization, i.e. absorbed slack indicates waste since it does nothing else but 
increase the cost of production in the respective organization (Singh, 1986: 567).  
 
Yet another way to distinguish between the different dimensions of slack is to concentrate on 
the degree of discretion resources allow. Clearly, uncommitted resources can more flexibly be 
shifted - thus leaving managers with greater possibilities for following their aims –which can 
but do not have to align with the organization’s goals. In their research on the antecedents of 
organizational slack Sharfman et al (1988) follow the argument of a multidimensional slack 
concept but add a different perspective by focusing on the degree of managerial discretion5 
that is determined differently by each slack dimension. To a great extent they argue to follow 
the definition provided by Bourgeois (1981) but stress two important adaptations: Firstly, in 
                                                 
5 For a comprehensive discussion of discretionary behavior see: Williamson, O. E. 1974. The economics of 
discretionary behaviour. Managerial objectives in a theory of the firm London: Kershaw Publ. Comp. . 
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order to be considered as slack the excess resources must have been detected and realized by 
the manager, and these resources must be available so that they can be employed in the future. 
Secondly, organizational slack must not be referred to as a one-dimensional concept but has 
to be approached in a more sophisticated way. Slack resources, consequently, appear in 
different types that vary in their applicability to protect the organization from internal and 
external pressures. Accordingly, Sharfman et al (1988: 602) distinguish between high 
discretion slack, which would basically equal available slack, and low discretion slack, which 
equals the recoverable slack dimension. High discretion slack such as cash allows managers 
substantially more flexibility and discretion in deploying these resources than would low 
discretion slack, e.g. excess machine capacity or highly skilled labor. The total amount of an 
organization’s slack resources is composed of high and low discretion slack, the composition 
of which depends substantially on specific external circumstances (Sharfman et al., 1988: 
603pp). On a firm level the distinguishing predictors are unstable environments that lead to 
high discretion slack and predictable technology and organizational age as antecedents for 
low discretion slack.  
 
Figure 2.2: Advanced research model of organizational slack 
 
Incorporating the definitions presented above and enriching the one-dimensional 
organizational slack concept by recognizing the differences according to the ease-of-recovery 
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aspect, an advanced model of organizational slack (see figure 2.2) will be the basis for further 
research in this study. 
 
Organizational Slack and Innovation  From Theory to Empirics 
 
 53 
3. Organizational Slack in Empirical Research – an 
Overview 
 
The purpose of the preceding theory chapter was twofold. First, a concept of organizational 
slack was constructed out of theoretical considerations, and second, organizational slack was 
specified by elaborating a suitable definition that would be the basis for the empirical part of 
this study and would contribute to the clarification and understanding of organizational slack.  
The following sections will connect to the previous ones in that they are designed to give an 
overview of the landscape of empirical literature that has been concerned with testing, 
advancing, and refining organizational slack. Of particular interest are research endeavors that 
treat organizational slack either as a dependent or an independent variable and 
correspondingly associate it with one or more dependent or independent variables. 
 
Dependent variable organizational slack, 
independent variable: 
Independent variable organizational slack, 
dependent variable: 
Factor markets Human resource management 
Economizing Earnings variation 
Competition Political behavior 
Managerial behavior Market entry timing 
Budgetary bias Environmental strategies  
Management control systems Strategy 
Information asymmetry Performance 
Budgets as performance evaluation Risk-taking 
Controlling Innovation 
Obedience pressure Organizational greening 
Manager’s reputation Corporate philanthropy 
Organizational characteristics Strategic change 
Organizational flexibility Information processing 
Performance  
Subsidy regime  
Table 3.1: Dependent and independent variables in empirical studies  
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A landscape normally consists of a variety of different regions, be it mountains, lakes, woods, 
deserts, populated areas, and so forth. Similarly, also the landscape of organizational slack 
research shows a diversity of characteristics mainly related to the specific topics that are 
discussed. Therefore this chapter is organized as follows: Firstly, empirical results will be 
presented that deal with the question of how organizational slack is accumulated in an 
organization. Secondly, a number of studies are discussed that deliver results on different 
effects of organizational slack. This second part of the chapter will again be subdivided 
according to different dependent variables that are applied in these different investigations, an 
overview of which is provided in table 3.1. 
 
3.1. Organizational Slack as a Dependent Variable 
 
Treating slack as a dependent variable in most research projects implies studying the 
mechanisms how slack is created in an organization. Which determinants, behaviors, and 
antecedents are identified that facilitate the accumulation of slack resources is the question to 
be answered. Apart from theoretical considerations discussed in the previous sections, which 
provide arguments for slack creation, this chapter first discusses the concept of X-efficiency, 
the creation of budgetary slack, followed by studies that investigate antecedents of slack 
resources, after which results from slack creation in public and nonprofit organizations are 
presented. 
 
3.1.1. Introduction of Slack into Economic Theory 
 
In classic economic concepts organizational slack is unknown since it does not fit with the 
deterministic assumptions which are reflected in the microeconomic production function 
(Siemens, 1997: 55). Waste or inefficiencies are not incorporated into the production function 
even though observations regularly confirm that no organization works at the level of 
theoretically discerned efficiency levels. A first approach towards recognizing suboptimal 
efficiency in microeconomic theory is Leibenstein’s (1966) concept of X-inefficiency. In so 
doing, X-inefficiency conveys two implications: first it introduces the idea of organizational 
slack into economic models, and second it delivers an empirically based explanation of a 
mechanism that causes organizational slack. Leibenstein criticizes the general economic 
assumption that every organization efficiently acquires and uses its inputs, which leads to the 
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conclusion that all deviations from an efficient performance are due to price and quantity 
distortions. However, organizational behavior research (cf. Cyert et al., 1959; Cyert et al., 
1963; March et al., 1958; Williamson, 1974) has already shown that individuals neither in 
organizations nor anywhere else behave exactly and solely in the rational way which is 
presumed in economic theory. Accordingly, Leibenstein suggests considering another source 
of distortion next to price and quantity, which is the allocation of managers. The problem 
might occur that suboptimal managers are employed who do not only affect their own 
performance but determine also the performance of the whole organization, thus leading to an 
inefficient organizational outcome which might finally result in huge losses. A number of 
empirical studies are recited in support of his argument that output variations do certainly 
exist even under comparable conditions and similar amounts of input factors such as capital, 
labor, and techniques (Leibenstein, 1966: 397pp). Still, what exactly is it that Leibenstein 
names X-efficiency? This construct refers to three elements which are considered to be 
specifically important: (1) intra-organizational motivation, (2) extra-organizational 
motivation, and (3) non-market input efficiency. These three factors are thought to influence 
the actual performance of an organization and regularly lead to inefficient outcomes. Four 
reasons are brought forward which explain why organizations do in most cases not deliver the 
theoretically possible level of efficiency. Neither organizations nor individuals work to their 
full capacity and search for information as intensively as they could, which is why efficiency 
is not reached. In more detail, the deviations from inputs to projected outputs are due to: (i) 
incomplete labor contracts, (ii) lack of market conditions for some input factors, (iii) 
unknown or underdetermined production function, and (iv) unruly inter-organizational 
cooperation as a reaction to uncertainty and interdependence. Economists at that time 
implicitly assumed that inputs determine to a substantial extent organizational performance, 
and variations in either dimension were neglected. Obviously, variations do exist and input 
does not at all strictly determine the final performance. Inputs can either be underspecified 
and/or performance can show a considerable variability depending on the employment of the 
input factors. With suboptimal or unsuitable application of inputs their performance will 
suffer. Imagine for instance a specialist in nonprofit HR management who is asked to manage 
the marketing department of the organization. The perfect choice for tackling HR-related 
problems might turn into a bad choice when confronted with marketing issues. 
Performance is additionally moderated by the specifications in a labor contract. The argument 
rather is that in most cases the labor contract is not fully specified and leaves quite a lot of 
areas subject to further negotiation, interpretation, and customization. Additionally, the 
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production function is hardly ever fully known and therefore projections of changes in inputs 
and their results are impossible. These arguments altogether lead to the assumption that not all 
organizations follow cost-minimizations and therefore allow organizational slack in their 
operations. 
 
In a similar vein, a later article titled “First-order Economizing: Organizational Adaptation 
and the Elimination of Waste in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry” investigates the effects of 
economizing on organizational slack resources by referring to X-efficiency theory and 
combining it with resource-based theory (Key, Reed, & Sclar, 2005). The authors base their 
arguments on central aspects of X-efficiency theory by saying that (1) individuals are the 
proper unit of analysis since they are the ones contributing intellectual capacity to the 
organization, (2) individuals show bounded rationality since their behavior contains rational 
and non-rational elements, (3) principal-agency relations are a part of organizational reality, 
(4) inertia moderates reactions of humans to environmental changes, and (5) incomplete labor 
contracts leave more or less pronounced degrees of discretionary behavior. Consequently, 
external pressure is the only trigger forcing organizations to incur rationalization programs. 
The concept of economizing causes the elimination of “wasteful practices, poor organization, 
and excessive organizational slack” (Key et al., 2005: 513). First order economizing is the 
process of eliminating the difference in financial resources to shift from an inefficient to an 
efficient level of production6. Clearly, this points to the fact that through first order 
economizing slack resources are in the focus of rationalization. Slack resources are 
conceptualized as being waste resources, the existence of which is to be attributed to inferior 
organizational performance and a lack of external pressure (Key et al., 2005: 514). 
Additionally, the authors refer to Leibenstein’s concept of X-efficiency and the observation of 
inefficient behavior of organization participants, i.e. under conditions of lax external pressure 
individuals tend to perform less efficiently than under conditions of adequate external 
pressure, thus creating organizational slack or waste which has to be eliminated through first 
order economizing. The results revealed that improved performance stems from reducing 
waste in the organization with the final recommendation that managers should immediately 
start reducing organizational slack when experiencing external pressures (Key et al., 2005: 
522).  
 
                                                 
6 Second-order Economizing would relate to measures that increase output through price reductions and 
improved efficiency. See: Key, B., D. , Reed, R., & Sclar, D., A. . 2005. First-order Economizing: 
Organizational Adaptation and the Elimination of Waste in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry*. Journal of 
Managerial Issues, 17(4): 511. 
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Yet another article referring to X-efficiency literature and conceptualizing organizational 
slack as a dependent variable investigates the effects of internal competition on organizational 
slack (Kerschbamer & Tournas, 2003). The study “In-house competition, organizational 
slack, and the business cycle” takes a closer look into multiplant firms and the internal 
competition mechanisms they experience. This competition takes place between each of the 
different plants that actually belong to the same company but are subject to rivalry. Through 
asymmetric information between the headquarters and the single facilities, the latter achieve 
to accumulate organizational slack which is used for empire building and other unproductive 
activities. The arguments are derived from principal agency theory and assume only negative 
effects of organizational slack very much in the tradition of the economic approaches towards 
slack theory. Even though the investigation is not purely empirical, the article is introduced 
here since it formulates a set of theoretically derived propositions that are supported by 
empirical evidence from other studies cited in the article and, vice versa, empirical results are 
discussed by applying their own theoretical models. However, the article shows two results 
which are interesting for slack research: (i) If levels of organizational slack are observed over 
a longer period it seems to be pro-cyclical just as Cyert and March (1963) proposed. 
Accordingly, under conditions of in-house competition, slack per unit of output decreases in 
times of lower capacity constraints. This is because competition among the plants for higher 
production quotas facilitates the elimination of slack resources. In contrast, during boom 
periods of capacity constraints, slack resources are increasing because headquarters cannot 
trigger in-house competition. (ii) Another interesting result refers to production allocation 
within the multiplant firm. The findings suggest that in downturn periods headquarters 
sometimes opt for production in higher cost facilities even if lower cost plants do not operate 
at full capacity because this leads to an increase in X-efficiency in low-cost facilities. Or, the 
other way round, already efficient plants are prohibited to accumulate slack resources in face 
of a permanent threat to allocate production even to high cost facilities.  
 
Not only economists investigate slack in organizations but also accounting and financial 
management researchers. Accordingly, these scholars are concerned with the question how 
slack resources find their ways into the budgets of organizational departments. Therefore the 
next section presents empirical studies that deal with the budgeting process and the 
mechanisms that allow slack creation.  
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3.1.2. Budgetary Slack: How Slack Makes its Way into the Organization 
 
In April 1970 an important piece of research was published that talks about the role of human 
beings in the budget-setting process and how human behavior leads to the accumulation of 
budgetary slack. Since the study of Schiff and Lewin (1970) is a major contribution to the 
field it will be presented in great detail here.  
 
Budgets are recognized to be crucial instruments for an organization’s control and planning 
process. Budgets simultaneously perform two roles: on the one hand they are a planning 
instrument that summarizes an organization’s financial projects for the coming year. At the 
same time budgets are also a control mechanism since they represent the financial targets 
against which a manager’s performance will be measured. Against this backdrop, Schiff and 
Lewin (1970) review financial budgets and their role in corporate planning and control 
processes. The analysis is initiated by comparing assumptions on human behavior of different 
management models and discussing their specific implications for the budgeting process. 
Starting off with the classical economic Tayloristic model with its ideas of humans as passive 
organizational members that need authority and control, the authors contrast it with the 
assumptions of behavioral theory that views people as being goal-directed, rationally 
constrained and having individual personalities. Additionally, scholars advocating 
participation of organizational members argue that organizations are obliged to provide the 
framework in which individuals can follow their needs and at the same time achieve the 
organization’s goals. The critics of traditional economic approaches point to budgets as the 
ultimate means of coercion and belive that only participative management enables an 
environment that allows for achieving individual and organizational goals simultaneously. 
This polarization, however, seems to be too simplistic since organizations are neither totally 
inhuman, nor is it that all organizational ideas that derive from Tayloristic models are bad per 
se. Division of labor, for instance is a crucial feature that facilitates the functioning of 
complex organizations (Schiff et al., 1970: 260). Conflicts within organizations regularly 
circulate around questions of resource allocation, which actua lizes in recurring decision 
making processes. These decision-making procedures also serve to align two sets of goals 
which are individual goals on the one hand and organizational goals on the other hand. While 
individual goals presumably involve income-related compensation, staff size, and certain 
levels of discretionary control over resources, consequently managers would abuse the budget 
allocation process to make sure budgetary slack is incorporated to align individual and 
Organizational Slack and Innovation  From Theory to Empirics 
 
 59 
organizational goals. These ideas finally result in the formula that managers will definitely 
attempt to create slack in designated budgets and this is done by “understating revenues and 
overstating costs” (Schiff et al., 1970: 262). To substantiate their theoretical assumptions with 
empirical data, the authors refer to findings of a study among three multi-division companies 
where the authors observed the budget process over a period of two years. The investigation 
revealed that managers deployed slack in good years to satisfy individual aspirations but 
transformed these slack resources into profits in bad years. On a technical level slack 
resources were incorporated into budgets by underestimating revenues and by not mentioning 
enhancements in production processes and efficiency gains which leads to higher stated costs 
than actually occurring. Managers that enjoyed discretionary budget allocation power behaved 
similarly, in that they biased human resource budgets which would be staffed to expectations 
in good years, but in downturn periods the additionally available positions would be left 
vacant to channel the saved resources into the division’s profit statement. Referring to the 
above, one might wonder about control devices normally represented through the position of 
the controller in an organization. Does he not have the duty of guaranteeing lean 
organizations? Schiff and Lewin observed that control systems had been increasingly 
decentralized in organizations for two reasons. One is to react to claims for increased 
participation and the second, more important, was the expectation of more efficient decision 
making and stricter control over decentralized budgets since the controller would have much 
more detailed information about the budgets under decentralized conditions. However, the 
authors found out that in contrast to the intention of decentralized controlling systems, the 
division controller took on very much the identity of the divisional management which he is 
part of and therefore was considerably supportive in creating budgetary slack on the 
divisional level (Schiff et al., 1970: 263). But slack creation is not at all particularly inherent 
to organizations featuring decentralized control systems. Rather it is the case that 
organizations with a centralized control system show the same levels of slack creation with 
some slight differences, however. Slack on the divisional level is not as much hidden as under 
decentralized frameworks, since it is assumed that the central controller does not have the 
necessary insight into the divisional processes as to detect the slack resources (Schiff et al., 
1970: 264). The authors finally conclude that budgets and controllers as means to counteract 
slack creation fail since these mechanisms result in mutually agreed upon thresholds which 
can more or less easily be biased by the responsible managers. 
 
Organizational Slack and Innovation  From Theory to Empirics 
 
 60 
A later study by Davis et al (2006) examines the effect of obedience pressure and perceives 
responsibility on management accountants’ creation of budgetary slack. Relating to the 
research by Schiff et al. (1970), Davis contributes by taking a closer look into individually 
motivated behavior to reason why divisional controllers build slack into the budgets. The 
research team holds that management accountants create budgetary slack even against their 
own ethical values when confronted with obedience pressure from a close superior.  
 
Biasing of information through management in the budgeting process has not only been 
described by Schiff and his colleague. An earlier study by Lowe and Shaw (1968) investigates 
the biasing of information during the budgeting process in a US retail chain. Setting the 
research in the framework of behavioral theory of the firm, the authors assume that the 
budgeting process guarantees maintaining the coalition and therefore organizational survival. 
On the other hand, economic decisions have to be made in terms of output and pricing goals. 
Through analyzing the company’s sales, and budgeting documents, and examining interviews 
carried out with senior managers who were included in the budgeting process, sources of bias 
and counterbias were detected.  
The authors defined bias as the “extent to which a forecaster adjusts his forecast due to his 
own personal interests and perceptions and independently of factors which might influence 
the actual results” (Lowe et al., 1968: 306). Based on this definition three forms of biases are 
identified that differently influence the managers’ forecasts: the reward system, the 
company’s practices and norms, and finally the insecurity of managers.  
The specific reward system applied in the organization to establish a strong and transparent 
link between individual achievement and compensation leads to managerial behavior 
preferring downward adjustments of their forecasts. This is because each manager’s future 
income depends on reaching the projected sales numbers: in case of underperformance (i.e. 
not reaching their forecasts) they would be punished by cuts in their compensation, in case of 
surpassing sales forecasts a bonus would be granted. Since achieving lower sales forecasts is 
easier than higher projections, managers are induced to bias their projections downward.  
Besides the reward system another source of bias is the organization’s norms and practices. 
These norms were reflected in a 5% increase that is consciously added by each shop manager 
to the basic forecast figure in order to meet the area manager’s assumed expectation. The shop 
managers’ assumptions were confirmed by the fact that the area manager was more satisfied 
with higher forecasts than with lower ones even if the latter were more realistic. Consequently 
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the authors concluded that shop managers’ expectations on the area managers’ behavior had a 
significant influence on biasing projected budgets upwards (Lowe et al., 1968: 310).  
Finally, a third source of budget bias emerged in this study, which is the insecurity of 
managers. Since job security depends among other factors also on the manager’s 
performance, they are induced to promise growth rates way too high to compensate for 
unsatisfactory recent performance. The analysis proved that managers who underperformed 
relative to the company’s average biased their forecasts upward at a much higher rate than did 
their colleagues performing satisfactorily.  
In response to this slack creating behavior by some managers, this article describes techniques 
applied by other managers who seek to identify and counteract the slack accumulation 
through a mechanism called “counterbiasing”, which is defined as “the attempt by other 
managers to eliminate the part of forecast which stems from personal interest of the 
forecaster” (Lowe et al., 1968: 312). However, even if the existence of a forecasting bias is 
recognized and the management tries to eliminate the slack part of the projections, a major 
problem has to be tackled, which is to untangle the three sources of forecast errors, which are 
(i) unpredicted environmental changes, (ii) inaccurate assessment of predicted environmental 
changes, (iii) forecasting bias. While the first error can more or less easily be measured ex 
post, the second and third errors are somewhat more complex to distinguish. Finally, from an 
organizational slack perspective the question arises: when is the forecast bias slack and when 
is it merely a miscalculation of an uncertain future? And, is there a difference between these 
two concepts at all? From the studies of Lowe et al. (1968) and Schiff et al. (1970) it is safe to 
say that managers consciously bias the budgets to create slack in order to better achieve their 
goals. However, budget biasing also serves to counteract uncertain environmental 
developments, which protects the organization from external threats. The distinction between 
the three different forms of forecast errors, correlates greatly with Kunz’ concept of different 
forms of slack (2002: 3). Along the two dimensions planning and behavior Kunz basically 
differentiates six forms of slack: (i) slack as waste, (ii) slack as ex post inefficiency under risk 
–optimum prior planning under risk but suboptimal result ex-post due to environmental 
changes, (iii) slack as ex-post surprise –some potential environmental shifts have not been 
taken into account when planning, (iv) slack as resource preference, i.e. discretionary 
behavior, under (iv/a) certainty, (iv/b) risk, and (iv/c) uncertainty. From an economic 
perspective the two slacks (i) and (iv/a) are a violation against the paradigm of allocative 
efficiency and therefore have to be treated as waste. Similarly, the slacks (ii) and (iv/b) result 
from failure in accurately predicting future developments and are therefore just another form 
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of inefficiency. Only the two slacks (iii) and (iv/c) are attributed positive effects since they 
can be seen as a insurance against unpredictable unfavorable environmental changes (Kunz, 
2002: 5). Thus, Kunz’ classification suggests that in most cases slack resources are to be 
treated as waste with the only two exceptions of slack as a buffer.  
 
In a similar but more positive vein Mohammed Onsi argues that “slack, however, is not 
necessarily undesirable per se. Its worth depends on the manner of its utilization, since it 
provides a source of funds that may not otherwise be available or approved because of 
scarcity” (1973: 535). Onsi investigates in his article behavioral variables that affect the 
creation of budgetary slack and does this in a two-step methodological design consisting of 
interviews first and a subsequent questionnaire-based survey. Based on a literature review the 
following four assumptions on budgetary slack are formulated and serve as the point of 
departure for the empirical part of the research. (i) Managers bias budget setting through 
bargaining for slack resources by understating revenues and overestimating costs. 
Nevertheless, it is still unclear in the relevant literature whether managers bargain slack 
resources for selfish reasons or to use slack as a buffer. Additionally, there is lack of 
knowledge about behavioral and economic factors that make a manager more or less effective 
in negotiating slack resources. (ii) Slack resources can only be accumulated if there were 
profitable  periods prior to the slack creation. During these times when profits are generated, 
managers increase slack resources and convert them into profits in bad times. (iii) Top 
management suffers from information asymmetry concerning the amount of slack due to a 
lack of insight into and knowledge of the specifics of each division’s budget composition. (iv) 
The divisional controller in a decentralized organization contributes to the accumulation of 
budgetary slack. To further explore these assumptions and particularly the role of behavioral 
factors in determining a manager’s ability to bargain slack resources, personal interviews with 
32 managers of five large US and international companies were carried out. The analysis of 
the interviews resulted in six findings: First, 80% of the interviewees responded that they 
consciously incorporated slack resources into their estimations on future sales volumes, on 
pricing, and on manufacturing costs, which means that organizations typically have some 
levels of organizational slack and hardly ever operate on zero slack conditions. Slack creation 
was most prominently reasoned with two arguments: (a) slack helps achieve the budgets and 
profit growth levels which are expected by the management, and (b) slack is used as a hedge 
against uncertainty (Onsi, 1973: 537). Second, another finding reveals that budgetary slack 
does not only exist in good times but slack exists also during periods of less successful 
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performance. The responses indicate that slack is accumulated also during adverse business 
conditions to protect the managers, but there are lower thresholds of eliminating slack 
resources in bad times which are subject to the prior performance of the division, the 
percentage of surplus decline, the division’s connection to the control system etc. Third, 
divisional managers use budgetary slack to meet their goals and assure proper compensation. 
While top management is not unaware of these practices, it is not capable of determining the 
exact amount of slack and can only estimate an approximate measure. However, even the 
claim that top management has a rough idea of the magnitude of slack is doubted by the 
author (Onsi, 1973: 537). Fourth, in spite of the measuring problems a distinction should be 
made between slack reduction on the one hand and slack utilization on the other hand. While 
in the first case slack resources are subject to bargaining and have to be defended against 
corporate pressure, slack utilization represents a behavior based on motivation to take 
advantage of budgetary slack. The qualitative analysis shows two emergent strategies that 
divisional managers consider when deciding to reconvert slack resources: Either they seek to 
meet management’s expectations in terms of accurate forecasting, or they attempt to estimate 
the difficulty for increasing slack in the year to come as compared to the current level of 
slack. Thus, behavioral factors in addition to economic parameters seem to play a major 
influential role in utilizing slack resources. Fifth, another differentiation is recommended to 
be made between forecast errors and budgetary slack, which once again is the same idea as 
discussed just above by Kunz (2002) and Lowe (1968). Onsi (1973) argues that forecast 
errors in contrast to budgetary slack are unintentional and can consciously be reduced through 
enhanced projection techniques. Due to methodological shortcomings, accounting analyses 
cannot clearly distinguish between either slack creation, or forecasting error, which is a good 
argument in place to assume that top management is hardly capable of objectively assesing 
the level of slack in each of the divisions. Finally, sixth, the existence and utilization of slack 
depend on the company’s particularities, i.e. a company showing steady profit grows is likely 
to show a different slack pattern than one driven by innovation, which probably shows very 
fluctuating slack levels, sometimes high slack levels and sometimes low or no slack levels. 
Results of a subsequent quantitative analysis indicate a correlation between budgetary slack 
and the managers’ perception of an authoritarian top management budget control system. 
Slack accumulation is a response to pressure from the management, its use an answer to top 
management’s requirement of profit creation. Also, the study suggests that top management 
should be able to identify slack through the budget information they receive but this does not 
result in reduced slack usage at the divisional level. Another finding reveals that departmental 
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heads are aware of the fact that division controllers take advantage of slack resources to attain 
their budget goals. It is concluded that more participative budgeting processes could lead to 
reduced necessities to incorporate budgetary slack by divisional managers. An empirical study 
by Young (1985) elaborates on the question how participative budgeting affects slack 
creation. 
 
Young (1985) advances in his study from an agency theory perspective, which focuses on the 
question whether information asymmetries that exist to the advantage of the divisional 
manager lead to higher slack creation. This is an argument actually contradicting Onsi’s 
(1973) approach presented before of assuming that enhanced participation would decrease 
budgetary slack creation. Young, however, maintains that through participative processes, 
which allow the subordinate to bring in his particular information to setting budgets, could be 
abused by the latter to consciously build budgetary slack. Due to the information asymmetry 
the head cannot verify whether or not the budget requirements articulated by his subordinate 
contain slack.  
An experimental design was chosen in which forty-three full-time MBA students were asked 
to participate in the study. The results of the data generated through the experimental setting 
confirm the assumption that information asymmetry induces higher budget slack creation in 
participative budgeting. 
Davila and Wouters (2005) conducted a research project and found that managers 
intentionally build budgetary slack to facilitate goal achievement. 
Viewing budgets as a widespread management tool, Davila and Wouters (2005) ask how 
budgetary slack helps managers to pursue multiple goals besides emphasizing budget 
alignments. The results indicate that budgetary slack assists managers who are responsible for 
achieving a diversified goal system to succeed.  
Organizations may even intentionally build budgetary slack if environmental conditions are 
expected to get increasingly demanding, for the reason to simultaneously follow budget goals 
and still have resources to meet quality, service or other demands. On the other hand, 
organizations may reduce budgetary slack when externa l conditions allow for a stricter 
emphasis on budget goals.  
Another, similar, situation to the one above is when managers expect a large demand to come. 
Managers again face the problem of aligning two inherently contradicting goals with adhering 
to rigorous budgets on the one hand and the need for expensive variable cost on the other 
hand. The latter are a consequence of a situation when demands get close to the capacity of 
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the producer, who then has to deploy more costly resources such as overtime, temporary 
employees, express shipment and so forth. Assuming that a company wants to keep its levels 
of product quality and/or customer service, it needs to increase budgetary slack. Higher 
amounts of budgetary slack decrease the budget emphasis and enable managers to focus on 
the company’s soft goals.  
Demanding conditions do not only affect management of budgets but also non-financial-
objectives of the organization, such as customer service in the case of the present study.  
The study investigates four logistics centers of a multinational company which were located 
in North America, Europe, Asia, and Southeast Asia.  
It provides empirical evidence for the assumption that budgetary slack does –under certain 
conditions- provide positive impacts for the organization, as slack enables it to pursue 
multiple goals simultaneously. The results also suggest that budgetary slack is built 
intentionally to assure organizational survival in situations when objectives other than 
financial goals are important. These arguments contradict a great body of research that holds 
that managers would create budgetary slack overwhelmingly for selfish reasons and would 
use slack for unproductive behavior (cf. Child, 1972; Fisher, Maines, Peffer, & Sprinkle, 
2002; Jensen, 1993; Merchant, 1985; Schiff et al., 1970; Williamson, 1974; Young, 1985).  
 
Relating back to the question which factors impact on building budgetary slack, Fisher and 
his colleagues (2002) take a closer look at budgets for performance evaluation and its effects 
on budget slack. Through experiments the authors found evidence that when budgets are used 
for both, resource allocation and performance evaluation, budgetary slack can substantially be 
decreased. A leveling out of information asymmetries among subordinates also contributes to 
reduced budgetary slack.  
 
Another recent study on budgetary slack focuses on the role of the business unit controller in 
decentralized firms and asks how management accounting systems affect organizational slack 
(Indjejikian & Metjka, 2006). Even though the authors refer in their work to organizational 
slack, in fact they investigate budgetary slack. A typical indicator is that they use the degree 
of achievability of annual performance targets as a proxy for slack, which fits perfectly well 
for budgetary slack but is a scope too narrow for organizational slack. Therefore, the study is  
discussed in this section and not in the subsequent dealing with research results related to 
organizational slack. 
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Point of departure for the study is the assumption that accounting systems have two main 
goals; one of which is to facilitate decision-making and the second is to abandon control 
problems. Slack, however, is viewed exactly as a typical consequence of control shortages in 
decentralized firms. A sample of 104 business units (BUs) is to be surveyed in order to shed 
light on determinants of organizational slack –or more correctly of budgetary slack. With the 
help of adverse selection models and a principal agent framework, the role of accounting 
systems and its impact on slack is investigated. The accounting system provides two types of 
information; information that reduces the control problem by limiting the information 
advantage of the business unit controller, and second, information that assists everyone in 
understanding of operations carried out by the business unit controller. Both types of 
information help reduce the information asymmetry between business units and headquarters.  
The results basically support the hypotheses stated above ; in detail the study finds that slack is 
higher when BU controllers focus relatively more on their local decision-support 
responsibilities than on their control responsibilities. Simultaneously, the data reveal that a 
greater local focus by BU controllers is beneficial. This means that management accounting 
systems established to support local decision-making can effectively counteract control 
problems in decentralized organizations. On the contrary, the results indicate to be cautious 
with management control systems that emphasize too heavily corporate control, since they are 
likely to negatively impact local decision-making to the disadvantage for the whole 
organization. Moreover the study finds evidence that slack is a continuous phenomenon, 
meaning that past slack induces future slack (Indjejikian et al., 2006: 865).  
 
The results presented so far have treated budgetary slack mainly as a result of conditions and 
frameworks set on the organizational level. However, there is still the role of the individual 
who finally has to decide whether or not to include slack resources into budgets. Of particular 
importance in this respect is the management accountant. The management accountant has to 
assure proper budgets in the interest of the organization as a whole on the one hand, but he is 
also dependent on his immediate superior in a division or unit, the goals of which might not 
always align with the organization’s goals. In addition, budgetary slack in the view of 
management accountants equals inefficiency which must be eliminated. Therefore, creating 
budgetary slack implies ethical conflicts for management accountants since it means a 
violation against their professional ethos. Nevertheless it is obvious and empirically observed 
that organizations, departments, divisions, units, and so forth do build slack in their budgets, 
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which raises the question about control mechanisms and the role of the individual whose task 
is to act on behalf of these control mechanisms.  
Davis, DeZoort, and Kopp (2006) elaborated on this topic and published an article named 
“The Effect of Obedience Pressure and Perceived Responsibility on Management 
Accountants’ Creation of Budgetary Slack”. Their experiments revealed that almost half of 
the participants built budgetary slack when facing obedience pressure even against explicit 
corporate policy and ethical beliefs.  
Obedience pressure is defined as “…a type of social influence pressure resulting when 
individuals with authority command other individuals’ behavior” (Davis et al., 2006: 19). 
Thus, this concept is highly valuable for researching management accountants’ behavior in 
relation to slack creation, because slack creation genuinely contradicts their ethical principles 
of true and transparent budgets. However, since Milgram’s experiments scholars have been 
aware that individuals exposed to obedience pressure will act against their own beliefs and 
values, partly because they are able to deny responsibility and attribute their behavior to 
orders received from a higher authority. Through external attribution of actions to other 
individuals or authorities, people legitimize what they committed. The authors maintain that 
contrary to explicit corporate policy on building slack, management accountants who face 
obedience pressure from an authoritative superior will create budgetary slack.  
The results of the experimental study are consistent with prior theoretical considerations that 
first, obedience pressure leads management accountants to create budgetary slack and second, 
that those managers who obeyed felt less responsible than those managers who resisted. 
Moreover this study shows that already relatively low levels of pressure – which are assumed 
to actualize in an experimental setting – make managers susceptible to slack creation despite 
basic company regulations and ethical considerations.  
 
Obedience pressure is certainly not the only variable explored in a budgetary slack framework 
on an individual level. Another research endeavor carried out by Webb (2002) takes into 
account the impact of reputation and variance investigation policies on the creation of 
budgetary slack. In contrast to obedience pressure, the argument here is that individuals fear a 
loss of reputation and the existence of variance analysis leads to diminished budgetary slack. 
The results of a laboratory experiment suggest that maintaining an advantageous reputation 
and a variance investigation policy do induce lower budgetary slack.  
Budgeting is not a single period event but a repeating process. Consequently, surveys that 
want to study managers’ behavior in the budgeting process need to recognize the fact that 
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managers take into account not only a single period perspective but a long-run perspective. 
Budgets are permanently reviewed and evaluated by superiors, performance is monitored and 
finally, any variances must be explained. Thus, a manager’s concern for his reputation is 
probably influencing his budgeting decisions, especially when the manager knows that 
budgets are monitored and he is responsible for explaining any variances. This means that 
managers are assumed to build less budgetary slack when their reputation is affected by the 
accuracy of their budget recommendation. An experiment with 90 business students was 
conducted with the results indicating that slack reducing mechanisms such as reputation and 
variance investigation policies effectively reduce budgetary slack creation. 
The analysis of the empirical data indicates a significant effect for the variable “reputation”, 
which means that when budget reliability affects reputation, the result is lower slack. Also the 
results suggest that a policy of potentially investigating favorable variances results in less 
budget slack. The experiment also revealed that despite short-term incentives to create budget 
slack, managers rather opt for a long-term strategy of possessing a reputation for reliability 
and build only reduced budget slack.  
 
Similarly, a study by Van der Stede (2000) explores the consequences of budgetary control 
mechanisms on budgetary slack, and additionally on managerial short-term orientation. This 
study examines whether there exist spillover effects between the two consequences of rigid 
budgetary control styles, budget slack and managerial short-term orientation. Viewing these 
two consequences as dysfunctional, the results indicate that attempting to reduce budgetary 
slack creation through rigid budget control mechanisms, another dysfunctional behavior is 
triggered, which is an increased emphasis on short-term results. Two important antecedents, 
however, are suggested to affect the consequences. The unit’s past performance and its 
competitive strategy exert an impact in a way that units pursuing a differentiation strategy or 
generated higher profits experience less rigid control mechanisms which increase the 
probability to create slack and the probability of long-term orientation among managers.  
Results of a structural equation model show that assessing the positive or negative effects of 
budgetary slack resources is very much dependent on strategic considerations of the 
organizations. While competitive strategies emphasizing standardization and cost leadership 
are probably better off without slack, organizations pursuing differentiation strategies with 
innovative and high quality products are well advised to include slack resources.  
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Having examined how slack resources make their way into organizations, the following 
chapter deals with preconditions of organizational slack. 
 
3.1.3. Antecedents of Organizational Slack 
 
Since the prior chapter has dealt particularly with budgetary slack, which is a part of but not 
entirely congruent with organizational slack, this chapter is intended to provide deeper insight 
into research about antecedents of organizational slack and organizational slack as a 
dependent variable. Budgetary slack indicates the difference between submitted budget 
estimates and honest budget forecasts and therefore points to an intentional bias created by the 
manager. Three main differences between organizational and budgetary slack are reported by 
Busch (2002: 154p.): First, budgetary slack is defined ex ante, while organizational slack is 
defined ex post. Second, budgetary slack is closely connected to the estimates of the budget 
manager concerning the honest, minimum budget at which the unit or organization could 
produce their services or products. Third, time is a crucial factor, as a manager would only 
view these resources as budgetary slack that can be converted into profits within a budget 
period, otherwise the resources might be organizational slack, but not be considered by the 
budget manager.  
Thus, the subsequent studies cover areas such as antecedents of organizational slack 
(Sharfman et al., 1988), organizational size (Verdú-Jover, Lloréns-Montes, & J. García-
Morales, 2006), and prior performance as a predictor for levels of organizational slack 
(Greenley & Oktemgil, 1998). 
 
Even though the first piece of research presented here is not an empirical work but strictly 
conceptual, it is not excluded due to its relevance for subsequent articles and its ideas about  
potential prerequisites that influence the creation of organizational slack. Sharfman and his 
colleagues (1988) establish a model that aims to predict different levels and types of slack 
resources through explicitly stating three sets of variables on the levels of environmental 
contingencies, organizational characteristics, and values and beliefs of dominant coalitions. 
From these three sets of predicting variables, three models of slack are discerned that explain 
the overall level of slack, the level of high discretion slack, and the level of low discretion 
slack. Accordingly, the three sets of variables are discussed in greater detail in the coming 
sections. 
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Environmental characteristics as extra-organizational variables are explained first. Building 
on the work of Thompson (2005 -first edition 1967), the authors identify three environmental 
factors that determine an organization’s level of slack, which are (i) the rate and magnitude of 
general environmental change, (ii) the availability of resources in a market, and (iii) the 
structure of the market. Referring yet to another author (Aldrich, 1979), the environmental 
impact is specified through adding the rate of change in the environment ranging from slow to 
fast and its magnitude from small to large. For instance, the current financial crisis affecting 
most of the economies worldwide would represent an environmental change that appeared 
very fast (rate of change dimension) and with a large impact (magnitude dimension).  
A second environmental contingency relevant for predicting the level of organizational slack 
is supposed to be the availability of resources to a given market. The assumption discerned 
from availability is that organizations will have different forms of slack depending on the 
amount and types of resources in their environment. For nonprofit organizations that means 
for instance that availability of voluntary labor might substitute financial resources, which 
leads to a different structure of organizational slack than for profit organizations. The third of 
the environmental contingencies refers to the structure of the specific market the organization 
operates in. In this respect the focus lies on the characteristics of the output the organization 
produces.  
Related to these environmental contingencies, a number of assumptions can be derived. 
Firstly, according to the rate and extent of environmental changes the question arises: how 
can an organization apply organizational slack to buffer its core from these shifts? In 
environments that are rather stable than unstable, and where changes occur slow in pace and 
small in scope, organizations are observed to be very specialized (Sharfman et al., 1988: 606). 
This means that organizations need to be very careful with their slack resources in the sense 
that efficient production is crucial to successful specialism. This can be facilitated through 
low discretion slack, which can appear in the form of inventory or excess capacity.  
On the other hand, if the environment is characterized by a fast shifting environment and the 
impact of these changes is large, then slack inventory and capacities make the organization 
too inert to response quickly enough. Instead, the organization requires a great deal of high 
discretion slack resources in order to react accordingly. High discretion slack comprises 
resources such as cash, highly liquid resources and so forth. These arguments are consistent 
with prior studies that investigated the impact of competitive strategies on budgetary slack, 
where the conclusion was that cost leadership strategies (high level of standardization and 
efficient production) favor lower levels of slack than differentiation strategies (high level of 
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innovation and creativity), with the need for slack resources to seize an organization’s 
creative potential (Van der Stede, 2000). Consequently, it is assumed that the faster the 
changes come, and the larger those changes are, the more high discretion slack the firm will 
need.  
Secondly, referring to the argument of availability of resources to a given market, the concept 
of “munificence” was introduced (Sharfman et al., 1988: 606). Munificence describes the 
level of resources available in a market measured in terms of market growth. Put differently, 
the higher the market growth, the more resources are available to the market. With respect to 
organizational slack it is assumed that in a munificent market higher profit levels are possible. 
However, since these markets are highly attractive to competitors, competitive pressure 
increases, particularly for specific resources required in this market. This leads to the 
supposed behavior that organizations do not accumulate high discretion slack since the 
specific resources they need in that market might be scarce at the time of converting liquidity 
into these resources, but organizations will stockpile low discretion slack in the form of 
inventory and excess capacity. This is expressed in the following assumption: The more 
munificent a market, the more likely the firm is to hold low discretion slack resources.  
Third, industry structure as such is supposedly playing another predictor role which itself has 
two influencing sub-dimensions, the nature of the industry’s output and the stage in the 
industry’s life cycle.  
Referring to the basic nature of the output involves determining whether the industry mainly 
delivers products, or services, or both. The argument why this is relevant is again derived 
from the flexibility to respond to environmental changes. Assuming an organization that 
provides a variety of different services (mixed service provider), such as a health care 
provider, needs to be prepared to react quickly to new environmental challenges such as new 
diseases, more advanced treatments, and so forth. This means that these organizations require 
primarily human capacity as well as machinery that support their new treatment methods. In 
order to remain responsive and adaptable, liquid financial resources are of decisive need, 
which allows for acquiring new resources if necessary.  
In contrast, an organization that specializes in the provision of one particular service (pure 
service organizations) such as retail stores or restaurants, which provide service coupled with 
tangible products (food, clothes, etc.) rather need inventory, labor capacity, and machinery, 
but not so much liquid financial resources since sales normally guarantee a sufficient cash 
flow. Demand variations (environmental changes) are absorbed through production 
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variations, adapting human resources, or changing the level of inventories by boosting sales 
for instance.  
Organizations involved in the production of goods (manufacturing firms) show a quite 
diversified set of characteristics as far as slack is concerned, since their slack demands vary 
along their technology dimension. Nevertheless, it is assumed that these firms are rather in 
need of inventory slack than slack in machine capacity. The reason is that in manufacturing 
efficiency is key to remaining competitive. Manufacturing efficiency in turn demands both, 
inventory and the machinery to produce the products.  
Against this backdrop, the following proposition is formulated: The more a firm is providing 
a service, the more high discretion slack resources it will need. The more that a firm is 
providing products, the more likely it will need low discretion slack resources.  
Fourth, in addition to the above-mentioned antecedents, the stage in the industry life cycle 
seems to be crucial as well. The concept of an industry life cycle is adopted from Porter 
(1980) which implicitly contains arguments for different needs of slack resources by the 
organizations in relation to their specific position in this life cycle. In the emergent and 
growth stages for instance, environmental change is permanently present and companies 
experience fierce profit pressures. Consequently, these organizations might need slack 
resources that allow them a high degree of flexibility when responding to environmental 
challenges, which is high discretion slack such as cash, credit lines, and so forth. When 
organizations advance from the emerging and growth stages to a more mature stage, they are 
increasingly confronted with demanding production efficiency and a resource outfit that 
enables them to remain in this position. Above it has already been discussed that slack 
resources on the level of inventory and machine capacity are at need in such a situation. 
Meeting specific resource requirements and guaranteeing an efficient production in the 
maturing stage is supposed to outweigh the opportunity costs of holding low discretion slack 
resources, however. When organiza tions subsequently enter the decline stage, organizations 
must regain their flexibility capacity with simultaneously minimizing opportunity costs. The 
argument here holds that firms would fail even faster if they do not have any slack which 
triggers a downward spiral, since failure prevents the organization from accumulating slack 
resources, which therefore accelerates the termination of the organization’s existence.  
To summarize this argument, the subsequent assumption states that: As firms move from 
emergence/growth into the maturity stage, they are more likely to hold low discretion slack 
resources. Firms entering the decline phase (and not failing) will employ high discretion 
slack.  
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After having presented the environmental characteristics supposedly serving as predictors for 
organizational slack, next the organizational characteristics will be introduced. 
The set of organizational characteristics impacting on slack in organizations are 
organizational size, organizational performance, organizational age, technology, and finally 
internal stability. Each of these factors is going to be detailed, beginning with organizational 
size.  
Relating to organizational size and its connection to slack the fact is simply that the larger an 
organization, the more opportunities arise and the more resources it owns to create links, 
buffers, and slack. Moreover, it is assumed that larger organizations have a greater physical 
and financial capacity to accumulate excess resources. Hence, the larger the firm, the higher is 
the absolute level of slack resources. 
Performance is originally discerned from the above argument that larger organizations can 
perform better because they feature more slack. However mixed and ambiguous literature 
results are on the connection between size and performance (cf. Sharfman et al., 1988: 608), 
the argument holds that prior profitability is a prerequisite for accumulating organizational 
slack. However, Sharfman and his colleagues argue that when an organization’s environment 
does not force slack accumulation, it would not at all or only at very limited levels appear in 
spite of previous high performance (1988: 608). Thus, two suggestions are discerned: First, 
under ceteris paribus conditions firms performing better will have higher levels of slack 
resources. Second, in very calm environments, higher performing firms will have lower levels 
of slack.  
Organizational age was observed to predict the survival rate of organizations. Sharfman 
(1988: 608) delivers research findings showing a curvilinear relationship between 
organizational age and death rates, which means that the older the organization, the lower the 
propensity that this organization would die. Theoretically this can be reasoned by assuming 
that younger organizations face difficulties in getting established, in building a legitimate 
reputation, and in gathering the resources they need for their survival.  
A good case in point is again the current financial and economic crisis. Old, long established 
companies are seeking bail-outs from governments (take for instance bank ing institutions in 
Europe or the “big three” car manufacturers GM, Ford, and Chrysler in the US), and can be 
quite positive to receive extra tax-money instead of letting market forces rule the game, which 
the managers of these companies normally were not afraid to require as soon as they felt 
restricted by governmental actions.  
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Besides the advantages older firms enjoy when it comes to legitimacy, resources, and 
reputation, older organizations also can refer to a bigger set of experiences and survival skills, 
one of which is know-how of slack creation. Assuming that established companies have had 
ample opportunities of experimenting with a variety of different slack-related measures, they 
probably have learned which levels and types of slack are most appropriate to support their 
survival. Additionally, supposing that older firms behave similarly to mature industries and 
that they quite likely have detected the specific resource mix they demand, they are able to 
take advantage from very specific slack. As mature organizations have a comprehensive 
knowledge about their needs, the following proposition is discerned: The older the 
organization, the higher the level of low discretion slack resources.  
Technology of an organization is composed of two pillars; one is the extent to which the 
process encounters exceptional cases, the other is the degree to which the organization 
encounters problems that can be solved through analytical processes. Thus, a technology 
could be referred to as highly predictable if the company is hardly ever confronted with 
exceptions, and those exceptions can be tackled in an analytic or programmed way. Basically, 
if the problems the organizations encounters are routine and their solutions are recurring 
procedures, technology is limited. In contrast, if the organization is frequently confronted 
with high levels of exceptions and these exceptions cannot be solved with analytic or 
programmed strategies, the technology is hardly predictable. How is the technology 
connected with organizational slack then? Actually, it is the predictability of technology 
which is the crucial factor in this regard, with the following mechanism. An organization that 
deals with highly predictable technologies will know very well the slack it needs at any given 
point in time in order to meet its demands. This organization will very likely take advantage 
of low discretion slack such as inventory, machinery, etc. due to the predictability. If an 
organization, in contrast, employs technologies which are highly unpredictable (e.g. high-tech 
firms, biotechnology, research centers) then they will more likely choose high discretion slack 
which leaves room for flexible application. Hence, the next proposition summarizes the 
technology argument: The more predictable the production process and its applied 
technology, the more likely the firm is to employ low discretion slack.  
The set of organizational characteristics has still another component, which is the internal 
stability of the organization. Here, the authors refer to the slack literature in the tradition of 
the organizational behavior research and argue that slack is very much dependent on 
organization- internal factors such as political behavior, resource outfit, risk-taking, and so 
forth (Sharfman et al., 1988: 609). Under stable conditions, so the argument, organizations are 
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not in need of any slack resources. However, organizations are normally in permanent 
transition for a lot of reasons, such as in- and outflow of employees, customers, new product 
lines, need to react to environmental demands, and so forth. Since internal stability is a 
permanent process of negotiation about resources with highly diverse demands, slack 
resources need to allow for a high degree of flexibility, should they be intended to help meet 
demands agreed upon in the negotiation process. Therefore, another proposition captures this 
discussion: The more unstable the internal environment of the organiza tion, the more likely 
the firm will hold high discretion slack resources.  
Finally, a last set of variables is part of the antecedents supposedly determining the level and 
composition of organizational slack. This set of variables does not perfectly fit the previous 
predictors which heavily rely on rational decisions and judgments. To complement and 
complete the model of antecedents, values and beliefs of the organization and its members are 
introduced. Since it is common knowledge that decisions and behavior are not entirely 
rational (cf. Cyert et al., 1959; Cyert et al., 1963; March, 1988b, 2006), it cannot be assumed 
that the options for slack resources are fully rational. To capture the non-rational dimension in 
organizations, Sharfman et al. (1988) take into account two variables; propensities towards 
political behavior, and risk. These two variables are not studied on an individual level but on 
an organizational, i.e. collective level. Reciting Cyert and March’s (1963) concept of the 
organization as a coalition with a diversity of dominating sub-coalitions who set the 
organization’s goals, also slack decisions are made on a coalition level. Also, an 
organization’s culture is suggested to represent more than only the mere sum of individual 
values and beliefs, but rather the collectively shared set of norms exceed those of the 
participants of the coalition. Consequently, choices made in relation to risk and power politics 
are to be found on the collective level and not on the individual one.  
Political behavior as a consequence of organizational slack has been prominently researched 
(cf. Bourgeois et al., 1983; Cyert et al., 1963). Since this article is dedicated to the antecedents 
for instead of consequences of organizational slack, Sharfman et al. (1988: 610) turn around 
the direction and argue that slack resources are a prerequisite for political behavior. The next 
proposition captures this argument: The higher the level of political behavior in the firm, the 
bigger the level of slack necessary.  
Another argument embedded in the political behavior debate refers to the assumption that in 
organizations showing a high degree of political behavior, resources are claimed upon 
entering the organization and incorporated into the company’s processes and structures. 
Hence, high discretion slack such as cash, liquidity, and so forth is quickly transferred into 
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low discretion slack resources such as human resources, equipment etc. A second proposition 
is stated: The higher the level of political behavior in the firm, the lower the level of high 
discretion slack resources and the higher the level of recoverable/low discretion.  
Risk attitude as the second variable within the values and beliefs predictors is assumed to 
impact slack decisions since it represents a coalition’s propensity towards its desire for safety, 
and slack in turn is a potential cushion, buffer, and so on providing some sort of safety. 
Behavior in this respect, however, is not a constant variable but is determined by two factors; 
one is the organization’s perceived environment, and the second is the collective risk attitude. 
Combining arguments from prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), which holds that 
in opportunity situations organizations are rather risk averse and in threatening environments 
organizations are risk prone, with arguments found by Singh (1986) that slack resources are 
used differently in opportunity and threat situations, it is then reasonable to predict that 
organizations which perceive being in an opportunity situation will accumulate slack 
resources, and in a threat situation they will spend slack to buffer themselves against the 
threat. This thought is condensed in the following suggestion: When the coalition perceives 
opportunities, firms will hold more slack. In situations in which the coalition perceives 
threats, firms will hold less slack.  
The work by Sharfman and his colleagues provides interesting ideas and theoretically 
discerned insights into mechanisms that exert supporting or inhibiting influence on slack 
creation in organizations. Particularly relevant are the contingencies on the environmental, 
organizational, and collective levels which determine the structure of slack resources.  
 
Apart from theoretical contributions that investigate the role of organizational slack as a 
dependent variable, the number of empirical articles that have been published is rather 
limited; most of the empirical work is concentrated on studying slack as an independent 
variable. Nevertheless, two studies are briefly presented here, with the first one talking about 
the difference between large and small firms.  
 
More specifically, the study of Verdú-Jover and his colleagues (2006) investigates the 
environment-flexibility coalignment and performance in large and small firms. The work 
seeks to answer two questions; first, is there a difference between small and large firms in 
their strategies towards ensuring flexibility, and second, how does the degree of coalignment 
between an organization’s flexibility and the environment’s required level of flexibility 
impact on the performance of the organization.  
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Empirical results provide evidence that there are significant differences between small and 
large firms regarding operative flexibility, strategic flexibility, financial flexibility (i.e. slack), 
and performance, with larger firms achieving a higher level of flexibility fit. Next, the study 
reveals that smaller firms show a higher information processing capacity, which allows them 
to constantly align their flexibility fit to environmental demands. Finally, results also show 
that in large firms higher levels of organizational slack foster a greater general flexibility fit.  
Since organizational slack is assumed to provide an organization with the resource outfit to 
react flexibly to environmental changes, the relevance of this study becomes apparent (Cyert 
et al., 1963; Thompson, 2005).  
 
Another study surveying comparable relations with the prior study is a comparison of slack 
resources in high and low performing British companies by Greenley and Oktemgil (1998). 
Referring to flexibility theory it is predicted that slack resources provide the necessary inputs 
needed to develop and follow a strategic, flexible approach. Moreover it is argued that 
generating and redeploying slack fosters flexibility, which in turn spurs performance.  
The study is based on two theoretical concepts, which are strategic adaptation on the one hand 
and strategic flexibility on the other hand.  
Strategic adaptation is the process of the organization aligning to environmental shifts and 
comprises adaptive specialization and adaptive generalization. In the first case, the aim is to 
guarantee an optimal level of fit between the organization’s actions and the demands set by its 
environment by seeking to take advantage of the current environmental situation in a way that 
allows the organization to generate surplus profits. Therefore, it is argued, adaptive 
specialization is the process of generating slack resources. The alternative approach is 
adaptive generalization, which describes the process of investing the previously generated 
slack resources with the aim to establish or enhance the capabilities necessary for adapting to 
uncertain and unknown future external demands. In so doing, the organization tries to prepare 
for long term prosperity.  
With strategic flexibility, the second concept is introduced and means an organization’s 
ability to respond to a variety of demands from changing environments with a high degree of 
uncertainty where organizational slack provides the resources enabling flexibility. Along the 
temporal dimension, flexibility consists of two modes, which are the ex-ante mode meaning 
preparation in advance of some future environmental shift, and an ex-post mode meaning 
reaction to an environmental shift after its occurrence. Along the second dimension, which is 
the intentional dimension, flexibility can be differentiated according to its offensive or 
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defensive approach. While in the first mode, the organization creates and takes advantage of 
initiatives, in the second mode the organization protects itself from competitors and corrects 
mistakes.  
The combination of the strategic flexibility options establishes a 2x2 matrix with a set of four 
different strategic foci.  
 
Strategic Flexibility Ex ante Ex post 
Offensive Pre-emptive manoevres: 
Create options 
Exploitive manoevres: 
Reap opportunities 
Defensive Protective manoevres: 
Insurance against loss 
Corrective manoevres: 
Learn from mistakes 
Table 3.2: Modes of strategic flexibility. (Source: Greenley et al., 1998: 380) 
 
The different strategic implications of each of these four quadrants are described in greater 
detail here (Greenley et al., 1998: 380pp.). 
Ex ante/offensive mode: Building on the argument that organizational slack allows firms to 
feature a higher level of flexibility to detect and establish opportunities that might be fruitful 
in the future, this mode points to observations that organizations actively create and access 
opportunities. Since this mode refers specifically to situations which are subject to 
uncertainty, the employment of slack resources to these opportunities is connected to 
uncertain outcomes as well. But this  is why slack resources are important, because they 
enable the organization to start such future-oriented projects. A number of empirical studies 
have shown that high performing firms possess more slack resources than low performing 
organizations, with the consequence that there is also a difference in the degree of flexibility 
for creating ex ante options for potential future opportunities. Referring to the concept of 
strategic adaptation the ex ante/offensive mode is closely linked to the concept of adaptive 
generalization, i.e. invested slack. This study reveals that high performing companies appear 
to show higher levels of invested slack than do low performing companies.  
Ex ante defensive mode: While before the managers had to counteract uncertainty, here risk is 
the problem. Therefore, flexibility in this mode is a means to protecting the organization 
against adverse consequences which might emerge from high risk situations. Innovation 
projects typically are risky endeavors featuring risk. In the case of risk, slack serves as an 
insurance against possible future damage. Also it is reported that high performing 
organizations hold higher levels of slack to protect themselves against a wider spectrum of 
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disadvantageous environmental situations than do low performing organizations. Concerning 
risk management, empirical evidence suggests that low performers pursue more risky projects 
than high performers.  
Ex post/offensive mode: In the case of emerging unforeseen opportunities the availability of 
organizational slack provides the firm with the opportunity to respond more quickly and 
develop appropriate strategies immediately. Thus the organization is able to offensively seize 
these new opportunities and can exploit first mover advantages for instance. This strategy 
suggests that organizations featuring slack better wait and develop strategies after uncertainty 
has been overcome so as to make ex post options outperforme ex ante options. High 
performing organizations often use their slack to wait and observe new developments before 
deciding how to react to changing environments. The ex post/offensive mode equals the 
concept of adaptive specialization, where high performing organizations feature higher levels 
of generated slack than low performing companies.  
Ex post/defensive mode: Learning from prior mistakes is at the core of this mode. By 
developing new strategic approaches to environmental shifts, organizations react to adverse 
environments such as competitor pressure. High performers, for instance, invest more 
resources in competitor observation than do low performers. 
However, the expected outcome of deploying slack resources is improved company 
performance. Even though slack is not effective in boosting short-run performance, in the 
long-rung slack is supposed to enhance an organization’s position.  
 
Another relevant dimension is the difference between high and low performing companies. 
Supposedly, high performers have higher levels of slack than low performers (Greenley et al., 
1998: 383). However, empirical evidence is quite limited in this respect and only two studies, 
one from Chakravarthy (1986) and the second from Hambrick and D’Aveni (1988), are cited 
to confirm these propositions. Additionally, these studies are criticized on four grounds. First, 
both studies are from the same country, and second both samples are quite narrow in their 
scope, since Chakravarthy considers fourteen companies all from the same industry, and 
Hambrick and D’Aveni investigate bankrupt firms only. Third, not all results are coherent 
with theoretical predictions that high performers show higher levels of slack than low 
performers. Fourth, and finally, the studies are unclear in determining which measures of 
slack are higher in high performing firms.  
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In order to obtain an appropriate sample of high and low performing companies, the high 
performing organizations were chosen according to a prior study by Saunders et al (1992), 
who established a multidimensional scale for examining the performance of a company. To 
take into account a time gap between performance and slack, the slack data were collected for 
the period from 1986-1991, and the performance data were gathered from 1991 to 1993 for 
the respective companies.  
The results show that high performing companies are relatively more successful in investing 
their slack resources to boost performance than are low performing companies.  
 
3.1.4. Organizational Slack in the Context of Nonprofit and Public 
Organizations 
 
Apart from the variables discussed in previous sections which determine the extent of 
organizational slack, there are certain very specific circumstances under a nonprofit and 
public organization framework which shape slack in these organizations. In this respect, a 
study is presented that examines different subsidy strategies and their impact on 
organizational slack in nonprofit organizations (Duizenstraal & Nentjes, 1994).  
 
The approach of Duizendstraal and Nentjes (1994) is an economic one, which implies that 
they argue in strict microeconomic terms. Therefore, they base their model on agency theory 
and X-inefficiency and then apply it to empirical data. 
Organizations, once again, are designed as coalitions of participants with coalition members 
not only following the organization’s goals, but also their own individual objectives. Possibly, 
these individua l objectives do not entirely correlate with the organization’s goals, which leads 
to a trade off for the individual member on the one hand and the organization on the other 
hand. However, as long as an organization is exposed to competition, these competitive forces 
make the coalition and each of its members follow the official goals primarily and oppress 
their individual objectives. If an organization is not subject to competition, such as public 
bureaus or nonprofit organizations, then these disciplining forces do not exist and there is 
ample room for discretionary behavior which is primarily (ab-)used for pursuing individual 
goals at the cost of the organization. Consequently, the performance of these organizations 
suffers since parts of the energy are channeled to othe r goals but the organizations’ and leads 
to X-inefficiency.  
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Against this background, the question is raised which external conditions determine this 
pursuit of informal objectives (i.e. organizational slack in this paper) and could be used to 
restrict this behavior. Duizendstraal and Nentjes identify subsidies as a very suitable 
mechanism to influence the degree of organizational slack in nonprofit organizations. Here, 
they distinguish among four different types of subsidies, assuming that each of these four 
types exerts different influences on the level of slack. These four types are lump sum subsidy, 
input-, output- and revenue subsidy. The final model must be able to predict whether 
alterations in the subsidy system affect the choice between producing a formal output and the 
production of organizational slack, or informal output.  
 
In order to follow the argument of the study it is necessary to look more closely at the model 
which was developed and applied. The basic model is quite simple and sketches organizations 
that deliver a service on a non-commercial basis  with a large proportion of their income 
deriving from sales of their output (R) to clients. Additionally, they enjoy income from 
subsidies provided by the government (G). Sticking to economic behavior, the organization is 
modeled as a utility maximizer, with utility consisting of two dimensions. One is non-
commercial or formal output (d1) of the organization and the second is informal output (d2). 
The latter output is an approximation for organizational slack or X-inefficiency. The modeled 
utility function U=U(d1, d2) is concave and differentiable in d1 and d2. However, the utility 
function is certainly constrained by a number of restrictions which should represent the 
organization’s environment and are formulated by these equations: 
 
C = C1(d1) + C2(d2)  C´1, C´2 > 0   (2) 
    C´1, C´2 = 0 
R = p(d1) * d1   p´ < 0    (3) 
G + R = C1 + C2      (4) 
 
where 
 
d1 formal output 
d2 informal output 
C1 total cost of producing formal output 
C2 total cost of producing informal output 
C total cost of formal and informal output 
Organizational Slack and Innovation  From Theory to Empirics 
 
 82 
P price of formal output 
G government subsidy 
R total revenue from selling formal output. 
 
In this ensemble of different equations, equation (2) models total expenditure on inputs that 
are used up in the production of formal and informal output. The assumption is that input 
prices are constant. Changes in total costs can only arise from an increase or decrease in the 
quantity of inputs. Additionally, the organization is the only supplier of the service, which 
leads to the demand curve with a negative slope as modeled in equation (3). One particular 
characteristic of nonprofit organizations is their non-distribution constraint, which is reflected 
in equation (4): total expenditure equals total revenue from selling formal output and 
government subsidy.  
To complete the model the different subsidy regimes need to be described. The four systems 
are defined as follows: 
 
lump sum subsidy G = G       (5a) 
input subsidy  G = sC   0 < s < 1  (5b) 
output subsidy G = gd1     (5c) 
revenue subsidy G = tpd1  0 < t < 1  (5d) 
 
with s and t being subsidy percentages and g being a subsidy per unit of formal output. 
Based on the above model, implications of changes in the different subsidy regimes for the 
output mix d1, d2 are examined.  
 
After having modeled and derived the implications from each of the different subsidy regimes 
(Duizendstraal et al., 1994: 303-310) according to the basic equations described above, the 
theoretical results suggest that under both conditions, (a) negative marginal revenue and (b) 
positive marginal revenue from selling formal output, the output subsidy is most likely to 
reduce slack accumulation behavior of the NPO. Put differently, the output subsidy system 
leads to the highest level of formal output and the lowest level of informal output, i.e. 
organizational slack. Under the condition of positive marginal revenue from selling formal 
output, the four subsidy regimes can be ranked as follows: 
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X-efficiency ranking order Positive marginal revenue  
1 Output subsidy 
2 Input and revenue subsidy 
3 Lump sum subsidy 
Table 3.3: Subsidy regime ranking (Duizendstraal et al., 1994: 312) 
 
To counteract the problem of a quantity-focused subsidy system that is blind for quality, 
which would be the case under an output subsidy system because it supports the organization 
for each additional unit of output neglecting the quality which is delivered, a suggestion is to 
impose certain constraints that come with the support. For instance, the supporting institution 
could demand a specified minimum level of formal output under either subsidy regime 
(Duizendstraal et al., 1994: 312).  
 
The theoretically derived model was then applied to predict the consequences of alterations in 
the subsidy system in the Netherlands’ residential adult education. Adult education is supplied 
by NPOs that get subsidized by the government. Therefore, between 30 to 40 percent of the 
costs get covered through participation fees, the remaining 60 to 70 percent are paid for 
through subsidies. Teachers and other staff are directly employed by and receive a salary on a 
time basis from the teaching institution. Analysis of the work load of the different teaching 
institutions reveals substantial differences which indicate that there is room for organizational 
slack, or X-inefficiency.  
Interestingly, the government institution that grants the subsidies has made a number of 
changes of the subsidy system over the last few decades, including attempts to control and 
reduce total subsidy expenditure. The subsidy regime developed from an (1) input subsidy 
system in the form of a fixed percentage of cost of inputs, primarily salaries, to (2) a restricted 
input subsidy system, and ended up in (3) a change from the input subsidy system to an output 
subsidy system with a maximum that is subsidized to output.  
 
The results of the final evaluation of the implications of these changes for organizational slack 
are not entirely consistent with the theoretical models’ predictions, though. First, under the 
condition of positive marginal revenue from selling formal output, the lump sum restriction 
which was added to input subsidy had no implications on the organizational slack. The same 
is true for the subsequent introduction of the introduction of the output subsidy with 
restriction instead of the input subsidy. Only under the condition that marginal revenue is 
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negative, the output subsidy showed a positive impact on organizational slack, i.e. a reduction 
in the latter (Duizendstraal et al., 1994: 317).  
However, there are some recommendations for governments when designing a subsidy regime 
for nonprofit service providers. The problem of input, revenue, and output subsidies is that 
they might turn out more expensive than actually calculated since the government does not 
control for the quantity that is supplied by the organization. The cure here would be to link the 
output subsidy to a maximum to subsidized output in order to gain control over the 
expenditure. Through these measures, the subsidizing agency can reduce organizational slack 
and control its own expenses. 
 
3.1.5. Summary of Organizational Slack as a Dependent Variable 
 
The previous chapters provided an extensive overview of the present state of the art in 
empirical research related to organizational slack as a dependent variable. To further condense 
this knowledge, table 3.4 summarizes the presented studies in terms of authors, year 
published, independent variables, as well as the impact the variables had on each other.  
 
Author, year Study Independent 
variables 
Main statement Impact on 
organizational 
slack 
Leibenstein, 1966 Allocative 
Efficiency vs “X-
Efficiency” 
· Incomplete labor 
contracts  
· Lack of market 
conditions 
· Production 
function 
· Interorganizational 
cooperation 
Organizations do 
normally not work 
at maximum 
efficiency, which 
leads to X-
inefficiency. 
positive 
Key et al., 2005 First order 
Economizing: 
Organizational 
Adaptation and the 
Elimination of 
Waste in the US 
Pharmaceutical 
Industry 
· External pressure 
· Economizing 
· Firm size (control) 
External pressure 
leads to 
rationalization 
measures which 
reduce 
organizational 
slack and boos 
performance. 
negative 
Kerschbamer et 
al., 2003 
In-house 
Competition, 
Organizational 
Slack, and the 
Business Cycle. 
· In-house 
competition 
 
Internal 
competition leads 
to a reduction of 
organizational 
slack. 
Negative 
Schiff and Lewin, 
1970 
The Impact of 
People on Budgets 
· Managerial 
behavior 
Slack is created in 
good times and 
transformed into 
profits in bad 
times. 
Positive/negative 
depending on the 
economic health 
of the 
organization 
Lowe and Shaw, An Analysis of · Budgetary bias The specific Positive/negative 
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1968 Managerial 
Biasing: Evidence  
From a Company’s 
Budgeting Process 
· Reward systems  
· Company’s 
practices and 
norms  
· Insecurity of 
managers 
reward system, a 
company’s 
practices and 
norms and job 
security impact on 
creating slack 
resources . 
depending on the 
specific design of 
these factors 
Onsi, 1973 Factor Analysis of 
Behavioral 
Variables 
Affecting 
Budgetary Slack 
· Managerial 
behavior 
· Management 
control system 
Slack is created 
for: 
· Meeting 
budgets  
· Hedge against 
uncertainty 
· Protect 
managers 
· Assure 
compensation 
· Create a 
buffer. 
Positive 
Young, 1985 Participative 
Budgeting: The 
Effects of Risk 
Aversion and 
Asymmetric 
Information on 
Budgetary Slack 
· Information 
asymmetries 
· Participative 
budgeting 
Participative 
budgeting leads to 
slack; risk-averse 
managers build 
more slack; social 
pressure reduces 
slack creation; 
private information 
does not lead to 
higher slack. 
Positive/negative, 
depending on 
details  
Davila and 
Wouters, 2005 
Managing Budget 
Emphasis through 
the Explicit Design 
of Conditional 
Budgetary Slack 
· Ambiguous 
environments 
Budgetary slack 
helps the 
organization to 
tackle 
simultaneously 
different problems 
and enhances its 
flexibility. 
Positive 
Fisher et al., 2002 Using Budgets for 
Performance 
Evaluation: Effects 
of Resource 
Allocation and 
Horizontal 
Information 
Asymmetry on 
Budget Proposals, 
Budget Slack, and 
Performance 
· Budgets as 
performance 
evaluation 
· Budgets as 
resource allocation 
· Information 
asymmetry 
When budgets are 
used for resource 
allocation and 
performance 
evaluation, and 
when information 
asymmetry is 
reduced, slack 
decreases . 
Negative 
Indjejikian and 
Metjka, 2006 
Organizational 
Slack in 
Decentralized 
Firms: The Role of 
the Business Unit 
Controlle rs 
· Business unit 
controller 
· Information 
asymmetry 
· Management 
control systems  
Slack is higher 
when BU 
controllers focus 
less on their 
control 
responsibilities, but 
greater local focus 
is beneficial. 
Control systems 
should not be too 
centralized. 
Positive if BU is 
too lax; Negative 
otherwise 
Davis et al., 2006 The Effect of 
Obedience 
· Obedience 
pressure 
Most managers 
build slack when 
Positive for 
obedience 
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Pressure and 
Perceived 
Responsibility on 
Management 
Accountants’ 
Creation of 
Budgetary Slack 
· Corporate policy 
· Ethical beliefs 
faced with 
obedience pressure 
even against their 
own ethical beliefs 
and corporate 
policy.  
pressure; 
Negative 
otherwise 
Webb, 2002 The Impact of 
Reputation and 
Variance 
Investigations on 
the Creation of 
Budget Slack 
· Reputation 
· Variance control 
system 
Possessing a long 
term reputation of 
reliability is highly 
important, which 
leads to reduced 
slack creation. 
Negative 
Van der Stede, 
2000 
The Relationship 
Between two 
Consequences of 
Budgetary 
Controls: 
Budgetary Slack 
Creation and 
Managerial Short-
Term Orientation  
· Budgetary control 
systems  
Assessing the 
effects of 
budgetary control 
on slack depends 
on the competitive 
strategy pursued by 
the organization. 
Standardization 
strategies suffer 
from slack while 
differentiation 
strategies gain 
from slack 
resources . 
Rigid control 
systems negative; 
Positive 
otherwise 
Sharfman et al., 
1988 
Antecedents of 
Organizational 
Slack 
· Environmental 
variables 
· Organizational 
characteristics 
· Values and beliefs 
of the coalition 
Contingencies on 
the environmental, 
organizational, and 
collective level 
determine the level 
of slack in an 
organization. 
Positive and 
negative, 
depending on the 
specific 
characteristic of 
the variable 
Verdú-Jover et 
al., 2006 
Environment-
Flexibility 
Coalignment and 
Performance: An 
Analysis in Large 
versus Small Firms  
· Environment-
Flexibility 
coalignment 
· Size of the 
organization 
Large firms show 
higher degree of 
organizational 
slack than small 
firms , which leads 
to increased 
coalignment of 
flexibility 
requirements. 
Positive for big 
firms, negative 
otherwise 
Greenley and 
Oktemgil, 1998 
A comparison of 
Slack Resources in 
High and Low 
Performing British 
Companies 
· High and low 
performance 
High performing 
companies show 
more frequently 
associations 
between slack and 
performance than 
low performing 
companies. 
Positive for high 
performing 
companies, 
negative 
otherwise 
Duizendstraal and 
Nentjes, 1994 
Organizational 
Slack in 
Subsidized 
Nonprofit 
Institutions 
· Subsidy regime Lump sum subsidy 
leads to highest 
amount of slack, 
output subsidies to 
the lowest. 
Positive or 
negative, 
depending on the 
subsidy regime 
Table 3.4: Summary of organizational slack as a dependent variable. 
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The previous studies provide a great deal of insight into empirically tested mechanisms that 
explain first that even from a purely economic perspective there are arguments to consider 
organizational slack or X-inefficiency in organizations (cf. Kerschbamer et al., 2003; Key et 
al., 2005; Leibenstein, 1966, 1969; Young, 1985); second, a bulk of studies finds empirical 
evidence that managerial behavior tends to incorporate slack into organizations, in spite of 
control mechanisms (cf. Davila et al., 2005; Davis et al., 2006; Fisher et al., 2002; Indjejikian 
et al., 2006; Lowe et al., 1968; Onsi, 1973; Schiff et al., 1970; Van der Stede, 2000; Webb, 
2002; Young, 1985); third, a number of contingencies on the environmental, organizational 
and cultural level determine the extent and form of organizational slack (cf. Greenley et al., 
1998; Sharfman et al., 1988; Verdú-Jover et al., 2006); fourth, specifically in the case of 
nonprofit organizations, the amount of organizational slack is a function of the subsidy regime 
designed by governments (cf. Duizendstraal et al., 1994). 
 
Despite the great scope of the empirical studies and the variety of insights they supply, one 
major problem remains which concerns the comparability of the results. Although most 
studies have a common understanding of the broad, theoretical concept of organizational 
slack, each of these studies develops and applies its own, specific measures of organizational 
slack. Hence, it is impossible to derive an overall, combined, and comprehensive conclusion. 
The only exception to this is the studies dealing with budgetary slack since they mostly refer 
to the same definition. However, even here the pitfall remains that when it comes to measures, 
diverse approaches are evident. This challenge has already been referred to by Bourgeois 
(1981) when he lamented the lack of a commonly accepted measurement tool to capture 
organizational slack. But also the proposed measurement tool by Bourgeois (1981) could not 
turn around the wheel and streamline the empirical approaches towards measuring 
organizational slack. As will be referred to later in greater detail, the concept of slack is 
broader than only considering a bunch of financial indicators, which is one of the reasons why 
even at the cost of incommensurability it is better to advance slack measurement by applying 
new ideas and tools.  
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3.2. Organizational Slack as an Independent Variable 
 
A much wider range of the literature on organizational slack is interested in the question how 
slack impacts on organizations. In this context, empirical studies have put slack variables on 
the independent side of the equation and have investigated a vast variety of dependent 
variables, ranging from strategy, via behavioral variables, and performance indicators to risk, 
adaptation and innovation. The latter part of the literature is of particular relevance for this 
research since slack and innova tion are the main variables. However, it is also intended to 
provide a comprehensive overlook and discussion of organizational slack itsel,f which is why 
also studies dealing with other dependent variables than innovation will be presented here. A 
major concern of the studies investigating the influence of organizational slack on different 
organizational parameters is, whether slack impacts positively or negatively on organizations. 
Referring back to theoretical approaches elaborating on the question, there are two core 
organizational theories that provide arguments for either standpoint. On the one hand there is 
the organizational behavior theory (Cyert et al., 1963), which assumes positive consequences, 
while agency theory (Fama, 1980) in the tradition of classic micro-economic approaches 
(Leibenstein, 1966) stipulates negative effects. Accordingly, the subsequent studies are 
presented and discussed with reference to their respective contribution for supporting the 
negative effects or the positive effects approach.  
To guarantee a systematic way of presenting the variety of empirical research results, in a first 
stage articles with an organization- internal focus will be introduced, followed by studies 
emphasizing organization structural variables such as structure, strategy, adaptation and so 
forth. Finally, empirical results will be discussed that focus on organization-external 
consequences.  
After that, in a second stage the empirics of organizational slack and its effects on 
performance, risk, and innovation will be presented.  
 
3.2.1. Organization Internal Consequences 
 
The first four empirical studies examined share an organization internal- focus, which means 
that they consider dependent variables which are inside the organization. Specifically, one 
piece of research takes a closer look at variables that influence human resource policies in 
organizations (Dimick & Murray, 1978), another one examines cost and earning variations 
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under slack conditions (Marino & Lange, 1982), whereas the third article considers the effect 
of organizational slack on political behavior among top management teams (Bourgeois et al., 
1983). The final piece of research examined here deals with the effects of slack on market 
entry timing decisions (Wally & Fong, 2000).  
 
Dimick and Murray (1978) contribute the earliest study on organizational slack as an 
independent variable. In their study among twenty Canadian companies of different sizes, 
industries, and locations they investigated which organizational and contextual variables 
influence human resource policies. The independent variables included in the study were 
organization size, organizational slack measured as the average profit over a five-year period 
and institutional variables such as workforce structure, ownership, and the specific market 
conditions. The analysis confirmed that slack resources are positively related to staffing 
sophistication, the range of non-managerial training and performance appraisal. The evidence 
makes the authors conclude that slack might create the conditions which allow an 
organization to conduct projects that would otherwise be too costly (Dimick et al., 1978: 617).  
 
The study by Marino and Lange (1982) is titled “Earnings Variation, Inventory Growth, and 
Cost Behavior Under Slack Resource Conditions” and investigates the effects slack has on the 
three dependent variables earnings stability, inventory growth and cost behavior in 
organizations.  
Sticking to objective measures by analyzing secondary financial data, two specific measures 
are employed. First, the return on total assets and second the cash flow margin per sales dollar 
is considered, not least as a supplemental measure.  
The results comply with the expectation that high slack firms feature more stable earnings 
than their low slack competitors. However, reliable explanations are still pending. This is 
because the two most obvious ideas to explain the results had to be rejected. These two were 
first a superior market position of the high slack firms, and second, greater capital intensity of 
the low slack firms. In more detail, the results reveal that low slack firms experience a higher 
increase in inventory turnover than high slack firms.  
Referring to the question whether this study follows the positive or negative approach, the 
tested hypotheses implicitly assume that slack induces lower organizational efficiency.  
 
Referring to the consequences of organizational slack on behavioral issues within an 
organization, Bourgeois and Singh (1983) provide a recognized piece of research where they 
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not only concentrate on empirics but also advance theoretical considerations of organizatio nal 
slack by introducing a multidimensional concept of organizational slack. The idea is to 
distinguish among three different slack dimensions that show different degrees of recovery.  
The degree of recovery refers to the ability of a certain slack resource how quickly it can be 
transferred to deployment in the organization. Assume, for instance, liquid cash resources. 
They can easily be transferred from cash into any other resources at need by the organization, 
such as a new ambulance car. If slack was present in the form of overhead cost, the process is 
not as easy anymore since overhead slack is incorporated into organizational structures and 
processes, which means more complex and time consuming steps to make these resources 
available. In the case of overhead slack the organization first needs to transfer this slack into 
cash resources by streamlining internal organizational processes. Then, the organization can 
use these cash resources for the acquisition of a new ambulance car.  
Accordingly, slack is conceptualized as a multidimensional concept referring to different 
degrees of recovery: available slack is readily available ; recoverable slack can be redeployed 
with some effort; and potential slack is still outside the organization but can easily be 
attracted. 
Building on the work from Cyert and March (1963) and Astley (1978), who hypothesized 
about the impact of organizational slack on behavior among management teams, particularly 
on political behavior and strategic discord, Bourgeois and Singh test a number of hypotheses 
empirically. While Cyert and March argue for a positive influence, i.e. organizational slack 
reducing political behavior among management, Astley holds that slack increases political 
behavior among management teams. Political behavior refers to tactics and actions that aim to 
secure access to newly generated slack resources. Managers in a position to pool slack 
resources would expectedly engage in bargaining and coalition-forming to receive a share of 
the slack resources.  
Results indicate that recoverable slack reduces political behavior, while potential slack 
increases political behavior but suppresses strategic discord. When controlling for the size of 
the dominant coalition, potential slack still retains its role, and potential slack as well as 
available slack affect strategic discord negatively. However, under a controlled framework, 
recoverable slack loses its significant negative impact on political behavior.  
Concerning the question whether the authors choose a positive or negative theoretical 
approach towards slack, the hypotheses are formulated in a way that implies a negative slack 
approach. 
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The third paper dealing with organization- internal consequences of slack focuses on quite a 
different issue and talks about the influence of slack resources on entry timing decisions  
(Wally et al., 2000).  
Entry timing is a strategic decision and basically oscillates between the two alternatives early 
entry, hoping to profit from the first mover advantage but with the risk of premature entry. Or, 
firms can opt for a late entry, when most uncertainties are eliminated but with the risk of 
being banned from a profitable market by early entry firms.  
Potential influencing factors besides slack are thought to be firm performance and debt, which 
together determine the innovation and risk-taking behavior of organizations, which in turn is 
supposed to be the main parameter in entry timing decisions. Even though, in a different 
context, the causal chain of slack resources and risk behavior/innovation management seems 
to be a widely recognized concept already.  
Firm performance is supposed to influence entry timing via innovation and risk-taking. A 
literature review on this topic leads to the assumption that poor performance propels 
innovation because it diminishes trust in the status quo, which triggers change. High 
performance on the other hand confirms the status quo, which makes management act 
conservatively.  
The results for the influence of organizational slack on entry timing are not statistically 
significant (Wally et al., 2000: 178). However, it is argued that the working capital ratio 
might not capture the slack dimension necessary for product innovation since it shows the 
amount of readily available resources. Innovation and risk-taking are supposed to require 
resources that are more incorporated into the organization such as recoverable slack, instead 
of available slack resources7 (Wally et al., 2000: 180).  
As far as theoretical approaches are concerned, it is safe to say that the article follows a 
positively framed concept since it does not refer to the slack-opposing literature but sticks to 
those studies that suppose or empirically show positive effects of organizational slack.  
 
Drawing a comprehensive conclusion concerning the impact of slack on organization- internal 
variables is not as easy since the research summarized in this chapter tackles quite diverse 
subjects. Nevertheless, Dimick and Murray (1978) provided evidence that slack functions as a 
door opener for innovative projects, and Bourgeois and Singh (1983) found that recoverable 
slack decreases political behavior among top management teams, while potential slack seems 
to increase political behavior. Marino and Lange (1982) contributed that high slack firms do 
                                                 
7 For counterarguments see: Herold, D. M., Jayaraman, N., & Narayanaswamy, C. R. 2006. What is the 
Relationship between Organizational Slack and Innovation. Journal of Managerial Issues , 18 (3): 372-392. 
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not tend to operate more inefficiently than low slack firms, and finally Wally and Fong (2000) 
showed that slack does have a positive influence on entry decisions (i.e. it makes firms enter 
new markets earlier) but the parameter does not comply with statistical significant thresholds. 
Potential slack in contrast has a reliable positive influence on entry decisions.  
 
3.2.2. Organization-External Consequences 
 
The papers presented in this section share an organization external focus in a way that the 
dependent variable is not internal to the organization. More precisely, the dependent variables 
revolve around the topics of organizational greening and environmental issues and talk about 
the following: Sharma Sanjay (2000) examines the affect of managerial interpretation and 
organizational context on corporate strategies involving environmental issues. Additionally, 
King (2000) investigates organizational responses to external regulations in a water-polluting 
environment. “What makes companies green” is the question that Florida and his colleagues 
(2001) seek to answer in their research. Another empirical study in this respect is by Bowen 
(2002) who explicitly investigates organizational slack and its role in corporate greening. 
Finally, Seifert and his colleagues (2004) take a closer look at slack resources and their effect 
on corporate philanthropy and firm financial performance.  
 
Examining managerial interpretations and organizational context as predictors of corporate 
choice of environmental strategy is a very relevant methodological contribution to this study 
because it considers the subjective role of managerial perception in constructing their 
environments. Having referred already to Weick’s concept of sensemaking, the article 
presented here provides another piece of research that links managerial sensemaking with 
organizational slack (Sharma, 2000).  
The underlying theoretical model, which is the basis for the empirical study, knows three 
independent variables that shape managerial interpretations: Issue legitimation, employee 
performance evaluation and discretionary slack. Managerial interpretations, on the other hand, 
exert influence on the environmental strategy of an organization, which is determined by the 
two variables scope of operations and organizational size. Discretionary slack is described as 
the time and other resources that are available to managers for experimenting, creative 
problem solving, and innovation (Sharma, 2000: 682). The variables size and scope of 
operations are included as control variables.  
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Managerial interpretations of the organization’s context  can either result in a perception of 
opportunities or their counterpart, threats. The paper argues that depending on the managers’ 
conclusion of their interpretations (i.e. either opportunity or threat) an organization’s reactions 
to its context range from sheer conformance to voluntary actions, in this specific case for 
environmental preservation.  
A questionnaire survey was carried out which included the whole population of the Canadian 
oil and gas industry with annual sales revenues exceeding $20 million.  
The research reveals that the presence of discretionary slack leads to lower threat 
interpretations of environmental issues among managers. Moreover, it is confirmed that 
managerial interpretations of environmental issues as opportunities are significantly 
influenced by the amount of slack resources available for the managers.  
This study theoretically follows the positive approach towards organizational slack since it 
assumes that slack resources facilitate innovative behavior and therefore foster the 
implementation of green strategies in companies. 
 
Another highly relevant study was carried out by Andrew King (2000), who investigated 
organizational responses to environmental regulation. Interestingly, King did not explicitly 
refer to organizational slack literature, but his results provide a great deal of evidence that 
slack resources foster corporate greening.  
The central question in his research is in which ways organizations respond to external 
pressures aimed to protect the environment. Theoretically it is found that organizations react 
to external pressures in a reactive way and strive to preserve the status quo, maintain existing, 
known routines and processes, which serves to protect the organizational core from external 
shifts (Galbraith, 1974; Thompson, 2005).  
In a qualitative research approach referring to the grounded theory, qualitative interviews with 
members of eight facilities from the printed circuit board fabrication industry were carried 
out. This industry is characterized by facilities that mostly use similar processes and 
organizational structures and produce very similar products, which means they are perfectly 
comparable. The organization members were interviewed on topics that reflected the 
organization’s stance on environmental decisions.  
The findings confirm theoretical assumptions that organizations build buffers which serve to 
protect the companies’ core processes and structure from new environmental requirements 
(Galbraith, 1974; Thompson, 2005). However, these findings are only one part of the story 
because the investigation also reveals that the technology and personnel buffers commenced a 
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process of incremental innovation. These organizations changed their processes and 
technologies, which finally resulted in better environmental protection, more efficient 
production, and in some cases entirely new products.  
These research findings comply greatly with prior theoretical and empirical findings on the 
relationship between organizational slack and innovation (c.f. Damanpour, 1991; Herold et 
al., 2006; Nohria et al., 1997; Tan,  2003a), which will be more intensively discussed in 
chapter 3.2.6. 
 
Organizational factors and their role in the adoption of environmental practices are the topic 
of yet another study, named “What Makes Companies Green? Organizational and 
Geographical Factors in the Adoption of Environmental Practices” (Florida et al., 2001). The 
basic interest of research is which factors influence on the adoption of environmentally 
conscious manufacturing practices. The research design is a quasi experiment based on 
matched pairs of 11 plants in several manufacturing industries which resulted in more than 
100 personal interviews.  
The empirical results about the role of organizational resources adhere to a great extent to the 
hypothesis that resources play a considerable role in the adoption process of environmentally 
friendly technologies. It is argued that slack resources provide the work groups with the 
opportunity to experiment and implement green technologies which emerge as a result of 
innovation projects. The research shows that organizations with a more convenient resource 
outfit feature the financial and human resources necessary to cope with the costs of innovating 
and implementing green technologies. 
Implicitly this study assumes a positive correlation between organizational slack and 
innovation even though it is not stated explicitly. However, organizational slack as a 
significant influential variable has been discerned theoretically and associated with enhanced 
innovative behavior. Thus, the authors follow a positive attribution of organizational slack.  
 
A more recent qualitative study among UK public limited companies examines the affect of 
organizational slack on corporate greening (Bowen, 2002). Basically seeking an answer for 
the same research question as the studies just presented above, the current research criticizes 
the prior studies, specifically Sharma (2000) for their quantitative approach when measuring 
organizational slack. Instead, Bowen (2002) builds on a prior study in which he investigates 
corporate greening issues (Bowen, 2000), and proposes a qualitative research design to 
capture the comprehensive nature of organizational slack. Providing an extensive literature 
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overview of different roles and functions of organizational slack, the study seeks to identify 
which roles slack plays particularly in the case of organizational greening.  
Therefore, it is argued that only qualitative data deliver the depth and richness that enable a 
comprehensive investigation of organizational slack and corporate greening. Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with senior managers from 25 business units in UK Plcs, and with 
operating unit managers within six of the business units. The questions primarily focused on 
environmental threats and opportunities for environmental supply-chain management, 
although, here most of the information concerning the role of slack resources was gathered in 
this section.  
The subsequent coding and interpretation process revealed the multiple functions slack 
resources carry out in an organization which greatly fit to prior literature classifications. Thus, 
slack was found to function as (i) an inducement to maintain the coalition; (ii) a means for 
conflict resolution; (iii) a workflow buffer; (iv) a facilitator of innovation; and finally as a (v) 
promoter of political behavior (see: Bourgeois et al., 1983).  
The diversity of roles recaptured in this research endeavor confirms the proposition that 
investigating organizational slack and its effects is not a trivial task to do. Consequently, 
conclusions from this study must be differentiated as well. Whether slack supports or inhibits 
corporate greening is assumed to depend on the nature of the slack resource. Discretionary 
slack is supposed to support organizational innovation, whereas absorbed slack in the form of 
overinvestment in production facilities could rather serve to protect the firm from adapting to 
environmental shifts and inhibit innovation. This article concludes with some 
recommendations for future research and holds that future studies should be aware of the 
range of roles slack plays, but that these studies also should be very specific on the particular 
contexts which determine the actual impact of slack on corporate greening. 
 
In contrast to the above-presented studies, another study investigates the influence of slack 
resources on corporate giving. Titled “Having, Giving, and Getting: Slack Resources, 
Corporate Philanthropy, and Firm Financial Performance” (Seifert et al., 2004), the study not 
only examines the influence of slack on giving, but also whether giving impacts the firm’s 
financial performance.  
Corporate philanthropy has been researched for quite some time with an emphasis on the 
relation between organizational resource outfit and philanthropy. In spite of the many research 
endeavors to clarify the association, it is not yet understood clearly (Seifert et al., 2004: 136).  
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Taking a look at the slack literature informs us that firm performance and profits generate 
organizational slack which can then be used to fulfill philanthropic requirements.  
On the other hand, another notion holds that effective management of social responsibilities 
and stakeholders leads to improved firm performance and profitability, supposedly through a 
better image and reputation as a caring company.  
Despite the intuitively accepted proposition of the positive relationship between 
organizational slack and corporate giving, empirical studies on that topic are rare and suffer 
methodological shortcomings in the way organizational slack is operationalized (Seifert et al., 
2004: 136).  
The empirical analysis reveals that organizational slack fosters corporate giving but could not 
find a relation between corporate giving and subsequent financial performance.  
Referring to the basic theoretical approach towards slack, it is safe to say that slack is treated 
in a rather positive way and that the implications of organizational slack on the dependent 
variable are positively framed.  
 
To get a clear impression of how slack influences organization-external variables, the main 
findings are summarized here. Sharma (2000) revealed that the presence of slack resources 
makes managers interpret their environment in a positive manner and leads to lower threat 
interpretations. King (2000) empirically confirmed that slack resources lead to incremental 
innovation in a firm’s environmental protection measures, and also Florida (2001) came to a 
similar conclusion and found that slack helps organizations to implement green technologies. 
Bowen (2002) unveiled that available slack supports innovation whereas absorbed slack 
rather fosters organizational inertia. Seifert and his colleagues (2004) proved that corporate 
philanthropy is positively effected by available slack.  
 
The following chapters do not necessarily fit into the frame that focuses on organization-
internal or external consequences of organizational slack. Instead, they deal with very specific 
dependent variables that are both either organization internally or externally located. Starting 
with strategy as the dependent variable, it will be followed by performance, risk, and finally 
innovation studies.  
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3.2.3. Strategy as the Dependent Variable 
 
In their conceptual paper “A Conceptual Model of Strategy Formation” (Litschert et al., 1978) 
it was suggested that organizational slack determines the fit between structure and contextual 
factors. Consequently the authors conclude that “organizational slack is a crucial moderator 
variable influencing necessary fit between structure and contextual variables and ultimately 
the contingent nature of strategy” (Litschert et al., 1978: 217).  
Against this theoretical conclusion, the following empirical studies are intended to either 
support or dismiss the above statement.  
 
John Kmetz (1980) argues in his study “A Preliminary Test of Relationships between 
Organizational Slack and Theoretically Related Variables” that slack is a strategic variable 
which influences severely the organization’s structure and effectiveness.  
Referring to the slack concept as designed by Cyert and March (1963) and to the conceptual 
model of Galbraith (1974), who links the effects of organizational slack with information 
processing in organizations, in this study the author tests the implications of slack for the 
strategic variables information flow, environmental turbulence, environmental dependence, 
and unit interdependence. Kmetz (1980) relies on correlation results only when analyzing the 
association between organizational slack and the set of dependent variables. However, he 
finds that slack leads to decoupling effects, which in turn assists the organization in its 
information processing capacity. Also, support was found for the suggested positive relation 
between slack and organizational effectiveness.  
Concerning a theoretical position towards organizational slack as either a positive or a 
negative concept, Kmetz (1980) refers to the rather positive approach of Cyert and March’s 
(1963) behavioral theory. It is clearly the ambition of this paper to take a fairly differentiated 
stance on the issue since the author’s idea is to empirically investigate whether positive or 
negative impacts of slack can be confirmed (Kmetz, 1980: 246).  
 
Barker III and Duhaime (1997) investigate in their study “Strategic Change in the Turnaround 
Process: Theory and Empirical Evidence”, among other influencing variables, the role of 
slack resources on strategic reorientation in declining firms. They construct a model that on 
the one hand theoretically derives variables influencing the firm’s capacity for strategic 
change and on the other hand derives variables that are thought to influence the need for 
strategic change, which both determine the actual strategic change behavior of an organization 
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(Barker III et al., 1997: 19). In their literature review it is argued that financial slack might be 
one of the major enabling variables for strategic change since it provides the firm with a range 
of options for change activities. On the contrary, companies featuring no slack are supposed 
to be severely constrained in their strategic options.  
The results of the statistical analysis show a negative, significant influence of depleted 
financial slack on the strategic change variable.  
Assuming slack resources as enabling strategic change points to the fact that Barker III and 
Duhaime (1997) opt for a positive slack approach referring to the well known proposition that 
slack functions as a door opener for innovation, change, strategic options, and so forth. 
 
Strategic simplicity is another variable supposedly influenced by organizational slack. In their 
research “The Evolution of Strategic Simplicity: Exploring Two Models of Organizational 
Adaptation”, Miller, Lant, Milliken, and Korn (1996a) investigate which variables influence 
the decision of companies whether to opt for an opportunistic or a passive strategic approach 
of organizational adaptation. In this study it is argued that two models of organizational 
adaptation exist. One is the passive model, which is characterized by sticking to routines, 
allowing only for incremental change with an overall focus on organizational stability, 
advancing already known organizationa l competences and activities. In contrast, another 
strategy is the opportunistic approach, which is characterized by seeking and examining a 
variety of alternative goals, activities and operations. The idea is not to enhance already 
known technologies or processes but to innovate and implement all new technologies and 
processes.  
These two alternative strategies are tested in two different contexts. One of them is a stable 
environment in the U.S. furniture industry, the second context is the highly volatile 
environment of the U.S. software industry. It is hypothesized that the passive model is 
supported in the stable context while the opportunistic model is rather found in the more 
volatile industry.  
The sample was drawn from the furniture and software industries because these industries are 
highly heterogeneous from each other but internally highly homogeneous.  
The statistical analysis revealed that in the passive model in the furniture industry, managers 
who experienced distress with problems and threats show a broadened strategic repertoire; 
also, it was shown that the scarcity of liquid assets leads to a more diversified strategic 
repertoire; lastly, absorbed administrative slack actually implies that the repertoire of strategic 
choices is broadened.  
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The results for the opportunistic model in the software industry are not as clear as in the 
furniture sample. The data shows a significant impact only for one measure of simplicity, 
while in all other instances the impact on both measures of simplicity was significant. One 
explanation for this ambiguous result is the fact that the timing of responding to resource 
shortages among managers varies (Miller et al., 1996a: 878).  
Finally, the effect of simplicity on future performance was tested. The regression analysis 
supported the prediction that in stable environments (furniture industry) simplicity is 
associated with increased performance. In contrast, the prediction that in turbulent 
environments (software industry) simplicity leads to lower performance was not supported. 
This study is particularly interesting for two reasons. First, it incorporates slack resources as 
projected independent variables. Second, implicitly this study takes into account two different 
dimensions of organizational slack, administrative slack on the one hand and available slack 
(liquid financial assets) on the other hand. While absorbed administrative slack was referred 
to explicitly, available slack was not treated as such and its impact was not discussed as 
embedded in the relevant slack literature. However, with reference to studies proposing the 
necessity to distinguish between different slack dimensions -available, recoverable, potential-  
these results are a case in point (Bourgeois et al., 1983; Bowman et al., 2005; Geiger et al., 
2002; Sharfman et al., 1988). It was shown that available slack impacts differently on 
broadening the strategic repertoire than does administrative slack.  
 
Seeking to answer a very similar question to the one above, Cheng and Kesner (1997) 
investigate whether slack resources have an effect on an organization’s response to 
environmental shifts. Of particular interest is how slack resources impact on resource 
allocation preferences of an organization. 
The basic idea of this study is that organizational slack can either foster innovation, change 
and consequently adaptation to environmental shifts since it provides the resources necessary 
to conduct innovation projects. On the other hand, it is argued, organizational slack can also 
be applied to buffer the organization from external changes, therefore inhibiting adaptation 
and instead stabilizing the status quo.  
On a strategic dimension, organizations can either act as prospectors, who are externally 
oriented firms with a strong will to be first movers into new markets, or defenders, who are 
internally oriented with great emphasis on efficiency and internal operations. Accordingly, so 
the argument, organizations allocate their resources differently, reflecting the respective 
strategic orientation. Externally oriented companies concentrate their resources on activities 
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that support exploiting market opportunities. Conversely, internally oriented firms allocate 
their resources on activities that are aimed to enhance efficiency.  
The data show that for organizations that allocate more resources to internal operational 
efficiency measures, increases in slack decrease the extent of environmental response. In 
contrast, for organizations which allocate more resources to promotion and sales activities, 
increases in slack increase the extent of environmental response.  
In addition to these findings, another interesting result refers to the different slack variables 
applied in the study. Building on the discussion of Bourgeois (1981) about operationalizing 
organizational slack, available, recoverable, and potential slack variables were calculated. 
Due to multicollinearity with two other variables, recoverable slack had to be eliminated. The 
two remaining slack variables representing available slack and potential slack showed –
against theoretical prediction- almost no variation between these two slack variables and their 
support for the propositions.  
 
A somewhat older study from 1982, “Adapting to Environmental Jolts” (Meyer, 1982), 
investigates organizational adaptations to an environmental jolt, i.e. an unforeseen and 
unprecedented event. In the study, a sudden doctors’ strike in the year 1975 created a natural 
experiment, which was analyzed. Of interest was how different hospitals reacted to this 
environmental challenge by taking into account their respective prior strategies, structures, 
ideologies, and slack resources.  
Through a qualitative research approach which was combined with a quantitative analysis it 
was found that slack resources, although generally having a rather low predictive power in 
explaining organizational responses to environmental jolts, constitute an important buffer 
which is used in times of distress. In the hospitals affected by the doctors’ strike, slack 
resources helped overcome the crisis without severe damage for the hospital, their patients, 
and staff.  
Conducting the research without a strong theoretical backing, the paper does not position 
itself when it comes to theoretical slack approaches. Empirical findings, however, assume a 
weak but positive impact (Meyer, 1982: 530).  
 
Research on slack and strategy is quite heterogeneous since strategy is a widely but 
differently used term. However, Kmetz (1980) found that slack leads to decoupling effects 
which assist an organization in its information processing. Barker III and Duhaime (1997) 
confirmed that slack resources enable strategic change processes in organizations, and Miller 
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et al. (1996a) found that in organizations following a passive strategy, available slack lowers 
the strategic repertoire while absorbed slack broadens the organization’s repertoire of strategic 
answers. Cheng and Kesner (1997) concluded in their study that in organizations that 
concentrate their resources on internal operations increased slack levels lead to decreased 
environmental response, while in organizations that concentrate their resources on external 
operations increased slack levels lead to an increased environmental response. Finally, Meyer 
(1982) found that slack resources helped organizations to buffer external shocks.  
 
3.2.4. Performance as the Dependent Variable 
 
The bottom line in management research always is the question: How does a specific variable 
effect performance? Does it improve or impede performance? 
Clearly, this very question has been raised by slack researchers many times as well. Results of 
the most influential empirical studies are presented in this section.  
 
Recently, a meta-analysis was published with the simple title: “Slack resources and firm 
performance: a meta-analysis” (Daniel, Lohrke, Fornaciari, & Turner, 2004). Once again 
taking on the long- lasting discussion about ambiguous affects of organizational slack on –in 
this case- performance by reciting positive (Cyert et al., 1963), negative (Jensen, 1986), and 
lastly indifferent or curvilinear approaches (Bourgeois, 1981), the new idea was to 
reinvestigate empirical studies published on this topic. Even though, so the authors argue, 
slack definitions are well established, three reasons lead to diverging stances on the slack-
performance relation (Daniel et al., 2004: 566p.). 
First, organizational slack is a theoretical construct which is yet very elusive, and difficult to 
capture. Theoretical approaches model slack either as a resource (Cyert et al., 1963), as 
inefficiency (Jensen, 1986), or as a combination (Bourgeois, 1981). 
Second, empirical studies find contradicting results due to measurement, modeling, and 
sampling differences. 
Third, more recent studies recommend distinguishing between different slack dimensions 
since they are supposed to affect other variables differently.  
Apart from theoretical differences in conceptualizing organizational slack which result in 
different conclusions about its affects, two further sources of ambiguity are to be found in 
empirical studies: (i) sampling error, i.e. random variation because of differing sample sizes 
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over different studies, (ii) inconsistent variable measurement, i.e. slack is operationalized in 
very different ways.  
To guarantee at least some level of consistency in this meta-analysis, only those slack studies 
are recognized which incorporate financial slack measures (e.g. liquidity) and financial 
performance measures (e.g. profitability).  
The actual analysis was carried out by reexamining relevant empirical studies which were 
searched for in major strategic management and general business journals for the period from 
1990 to 2000. To be included a study was required to feature a correlation between 
performance and at least one of the different slack measures, even if slack was included as a 
control variable only. To avoid comparability problems, only samples of U.S. organizations 
were considered. This procedure resulted in 80 samples (n=54 249) out of 66 studies. The 
greater number of samples stems from the fact that some of the studies featured more than one 
sample because they considered multiple industries or time periods.  
The analysis yields some answers to parts of the ongoing discussion. Most important, 
evidence is provided that a true, positive effect exists between the different types of 
organizational slack (available, recoverable, and potential) and performance. Moreover, the 
data suggest that the “slack as a resource” perspective in behavioral theory tradition is 
legitimate (Daniel et al., 2004: 571). Also, it was revealed that industry type moderators 
positively influence the strength of the relationship between slack and performance. Only 
available slack does not adhere to this pattern because it shows a weaker association when 
industry type is included. The reason could be that recoverable and potential slack are more 
industry-specific slack resources, whereas available slack is interchangeable across different 
industries. Additionally, time lag as a moderator did not show any significant effect on the 
slack-performance relation, which contrasts with prior findings. An explanation is that 
possibly organizations achieve to convert recoverable and potential slack into operating 
resources within one fiscal year, and thus the time lag does not show an effect (Daniel et al., 
2004: 572).  
 
Chakravarthy (1986) on the other hand shows in his paper that measuring strategic 
performance of an organization is better not done with profitability as the only indicator. By 
analyzing seven excellent firms from the computer industry and comparing them with seven 
non-excellent firms from the same industry, conclusions on the discriminating power of 
conceivable performance measures are possible.  
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The idea is to identify performance measures that explain the difference between these two 
samples of excellent and non-excellent companies. The empirical results indicate that 
traditional performance measures such as profitability ratios (e.g. ROS, ROE, ROTC), or 
financial market measures (e.g. Market/Book values ratio) are unable to dis tinguish sharply 
between excellent and non-excellent firms. The major drawbacks of these indicators concern 
(i) the assumption that a single performance indicator can measure excellence; (ii) the fact 
that these measures focus on outcomes and neglecting transformation processes of the 
organization; (iii) the limitation that they neglect the claims of other stakeholders besides the 
stockholders.  
Alternatively, Chakravarthy (1986) proposes taking into account a set of measures which is 
more future oriented. His research unveils that financial and market performance indicators 
are surely necessary conditions for excellence, but they definitely do not tell the whole story. 
Instead, a firm’s capacity to adapt itself to a shifting environment is a major discriminating 
variable between excellent and non-excellent firms. The strategic adaptability of a company 
was captured by taking a look at generated and invested slack resources. Excellent firms 
managed to generate much higher slack resources than non-excellent firms. Additionally, 
excellent firms invested much higher resources in research and development than their low 
performing counterparts.  
 
In a similar vein, Hambrick and D’Aveni (1988) investigate in an explorative study of 57 
large bankruptcies and 57 matched survivors the processes and dynamics of corporate failure. 
Although they did not examine in which ways slack improves performance or not, they 
observed that slack and performance are valuable indicators for organizational downturns. It 
was observed that, from the 57 twins, a significant proportion of those that went bankrupt 
showed early signs of diminishing slack and performance levels. It was evident over an 
extended period that the future bankrupt companies had lower slack and performance levels 
than their surviving counterparts (Hambrick et al., 1988: 12).  
 
Another two studies take a different perspective by focusing on the impact of slack resources 
on performance outcomes of diversification strategies (Gary, 2005) and the affect of slack 
resources on performance in privately held firms (George, 2005).  
In a recent study Gary (2005), using computer simulations, researched implementation 
strategies and performance outcomes in related diversification projects and found that 
successful diversification strategies demand slack resources, whereas an adverse outcome of 
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diversification is likely should organizational slack be absent. However, since the results are 
not based on an empirical foundation they are not further discussed here.  
The findings from George (2005) on the other hand are based on a longitudinal empirical 
study of 900 privately held U.S. firms from diverse industries and are supposed to answer 
how slack influences the performance of privately held firms. Advancing from prior research 
in publicly traded firms and slack research, the author assumes that in privately held firms, 
resource constraints rather than slack may enhance performance.  
The analysis shows that in general the regression model which includes the slack terms yields 
the best results in terms of model fit. The calculations reveal that the proposed non- linear 
association between high-discretion slack and performance cannot be supported. On the other 
hand, it is found that performance shows an increase with a subsequent decrease related to 
increases in low-discretion slack. The curvilinear association between resource availability 
and performance is significant, though these results do not support the idea that performance 
rises with high levels of resource availability.  
 
Yet another set of three studies investigates the role of slack resources on performance in 
Chinese enterprises (Su, Xie, & Li, 2009; Tan, 2003a; Tan et al., 2003b). 
While Tan (2003a) and Su et al. (2009) rely on two different huge Chinese databases to draw 
their samples from, Tan and Peng (2003b) conducted their own survey to collect the 
necessary data. Nevertheless, all three empirical studies came to the same basic conclusion 
when testing the relationship between organizational slack and performance. Results from all 
three investigations provide evidence that slack resources positively impact on performance in 
a curvilinear relationship, meaning that from a certain level of slack the impact turns negative. 
Even though these three studies applied different samples and partly different slack variables, 
with all of them derived from the relevant literature though, similar results were yielded. In 
more detail, Tan and Peng (2003b) applied unabsorbed and absorbed (Sharfman et al., 1988) 
slack and found that unabsorbed slack measures showed significant positive associations, but 
two out of three absorbed slack measures resulted in significant  negative associations with 
performance. When absorbed and unabsorbed slack measures were combined, the results 
showed a curvilinear relationship with performance.  
Similar results were yielded in the study of Tan (2003a), where he again applied absorbed and 
unabsorbed slack measures. The statistical analysis once more provided evidence for a 
curvilinear association between slack and performance.  
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Finally, also Su et al. (2009) confirmed the positive relationship between unabsorbed slack 
and performance. However they found no evidence for the curvilinear relationship, which is 
maybe caused by the specific firm sample consisting of Chinese firms which underwent 
institutional transitions.  
 
One study relates specifically to U.S. hospitals and explores slack and performance in health 
care delivery (Miller & Everett, 1996b). Using data envelopment analysis to identify high and 
low slack hospitals, the empirical results found that high slack hospitals achieved 
improvements in health care quality without productivity shortages, and that high slack 
hospitals could increase either quality or productivity but not both.  
 
A final research endeavor specifically explores the performance effects of slack reduction, i.e. 
when slack resources are converted into actual resources which are needed (Love et al., 2005). 
Assuming that slack facilitates creativity, innovation, and adaptability, post-downsizing 
investigations found that firms frequently reported problems in exactly these areas (creativity, 
innovation, adaptability) after downsizing measures (Love et al., 2005: 1090).  
By researching a panel of the 100 largest industrial firms (as ranked by Fortune magazine) in 
the U.S. from 1977 to 1993, which covers the start of the downsizing trend via years of 
economic recession and expansion, to a period when downsizing was widespread, absorbed 
slack was found to play a crucial role. Downsizing was more probable to lead to improved 
post-downsizing performance when firms had high levels of absorbed slack.  
 
All these previous studies showed that organizational slack positively influences performance 
in organizations. Daniel et al. (2004) revealed in their meta-analysis that a positive effect 
exists between various slack measures (available, recoverable, potent ial) and performance. 
Chakravarthy (1986) explained that excellent firms accumulated much higher slack levels 
than non-excellent firms and that excellent firms used these slack resources for higher 
investments in R&D. Similarly, Hambrick and D’Aveni (1988) found that bankrupt 
companies had lower slack levels over a long period than their better-performing twins. Gary 
(2005) revealed in computer simulations that without organizational slack the propensity of 
failure in diversification project rises. George (2005) showed for privately held firms that 
slack exerts positive impact on performance. Three further studies researching Chinese firms 
came to similar positive results and showed a curvilinear relation between slack and 
performance (Su et al., 2009; Tan, 2003a; Tan et al., 2003b). Finally, Miller and Everett 
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(1996b) showed a positive performance impact of slack for hospitals, and Love et al. (2005) 
provide evidence that slack increases post-downsizing performance.  
These results seem to be highly robust, taking into account the diverse slack measures, 
performance measures, sample sizes, industry backgrounds and the variety of privately or 
publicly held firms or nonprofit organizations which were included in the research. 
 
3.2.5. Risk as the Dependent Variable 
 
Risk is a key parameter in the discussion of organizational slack and its effects on innovation 
because it is assumed that slack relaxes risk-averse behavior, which makes innovation 
projects more probable since innovation projects are always subject to risk. Simultaneously, 
organizations with slack resources accepting risk seem to opt for better calculated risks than 
their counterparts that are prone to accepting too risky projects when attempting to turn 
around the wheel. However, before entering the discussion of empirical findings for the slack-
innovation association, empirical results concerning the relation between organizational slack 
and risk are presented. 
 
The basic question here is whether the presence of organizational slack leads organizations to 
risk averse or risk prone behavior. Contrary to prior findings, which posit a positive relation 
between risk and return, Bowman (1982: 40) argues that less profitable companies take larger 
risks than profitable companies. These findings are based on experimental results 
investigating individual risk-taking, which show that under normal conditions people  
underweight outcomes which are probable compared to outcomes which are certain, the so 
called certainty effect (Kahneman et al., 1979). Consequently, people behave rather risk 
averse in choices that contain sure gains and risk seeking in choices that involve sure losses 
(Kahneman et al., 1979: 284pp). Another interesting result was yielded by an experimental 
study by Bateman and Zeithaml (1989a; 1989b), which found that groups incurred higher risk 
under low slack conditions than under high slack conditions.  
Since profitability is a necessary prerequisite for organizational slack, it can be argued that 
organizational slack moderates risk-taking in organizations.  
 
A study by Bromiley (1991), in which the relationships between corporate risk-taking, 
organizationa l slack, and performance are tested, found that low performance and absence of 
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organizational slack trigger risk-taking and the risk taken under these circumstances yields 
poor returns.  
Building on the arguments of behavioral theory, it is understood that slack levels above or 
below a company’s reference level should increase risk-taking, while slack levels close to the 
reference level should reduce risk-taking, resulting in a U-shaped slack-risk relationship  
(Bromiley, 1991: 42). Adhering to the theory background, the following hypothesis was 
developed: High and low levels of slack should result in higher levels of risk-taking than 
moderate levels of slack.  
Risk, in this study, was measured as the ex ante uncertainty of a firm’s earning stream. More 
precisely, risk was operationalized as the variance in security analyst’s forecasts of the 
income of a company’s income stream for a given year. The logical assumption goes that the 
greater the variance in the forecasts, the harder it is to predict and therefore the riskier the 
income stream (Bromiley, 1991: 45). Slack was divided into its three dimensions available, 
recoverable, and potential slack, and measured by financial indicators as recommended by 
Bourgeois and Singh (Bourgeois et al., 1983). 
The hypothesis was tested against a sample of 288 manufacturing companies from a 
comprehensive database which delivered the necessary figures.  
The statistical analysis uncovered that organizational slack seems to reduce risk-taking. 
Taking other variables into account as well, it was found that firm performance, industry 
performance, and slack exert negative influence on risk-taking, which supports the 
assumption that low performance drives risk-taking. Thus, it is reconfirmed that companies 
performing poorly tend to make risky and low-return strategic choices.  
 
An earlier study by Singh (1986) tested similar associations with a specific focus on 
organizational decision-making. A comprehensive model was designed that explains the 
relationships between organizational performance and risk-taking in organizational decision-
making.  
It is argued that in general the presence of slack facilitates risk-taking because slack buffers 
organizations from adverse effects in the case of failure and because the legitimacy of 
experiment ing is less under pressure (Singh, 1986: 567). In contrast to Bromiley (1991), who 
argued for a more complex association between slack and risk, Singh proposes that 
organizational slack, both absorbed and unabsorbed, has a positive relationship with risk-
taking in organizations: organizations with more slack engage in greater risk-taking than 
organizations with less slack.  
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A questionnaire survey and archival sources provided the database for the research, which 
yielded 64 medium to large U.S. and Canadian corporations from diverse industries. Slack 
was measured as proposed by Bourgeois and Singh (1983), risk-taking in organizational 
decisions was measured by a questionnaire six- item scale, which asked top executives to 
indicate how much their organizations were oriented towards risk-taking as represented by 
decisions such as reliance on innovation, debt-financing, heavy R&D, and high risk high 
return investments as opposed to low risk moderate return investments.  
The results indicate that poor performance is coupled with high risk-taking in organizational 
decisions and good performance is related to low risk-taking. Also, good performance is 
related to high slack, both absorbed and unabsorbed. The findings reveal that absorbed slack 
is related to increased risk-taking and unabsorbed slack is unrelated to risk-taking. These 
results are interesting in various ways: First, they confirm the assumption that high 
performance is negatively related with risk-taking. Second, they also reveal that absorbed 
slack is positively related to risk-taking. And third, the data suggest that performance is 
positively related with absorbed and unabsorbed slack. The causal chain for the above 
relationships is that performance apparently has two connections to risk-taking, a direct and 
an indirect one. While in the first, direct, case satisfactory performance leads to reduced risk-
taking, the indirect relationship is mediated by absorbed slack. High performance is related to 
increased absorbed slack, which allows for greater risk-taking (Singh, 1986: 580).  
 
Researching risk in declining organizations, Wiseman and Bromiley (1996) constructed a 
model that includes six basic variables (1) performance, (2) slack, (3) aspirations  (hoped for 
level of performance), (4) expectations (anticipated actual level of performance), (5) risk 
(income stream uncertainty), and (6) organization size as a measure of decline. They seek to 
clarify the question whether low or high performing firms take higher risks and examine the 
role slack resources play in this game.  
Referring to behavioral theory literature the authors develop a number of hypotheses which 
link each of the above elements to risk-taking.  
The sample consisted of 344 low-performing firms in 19 manufacturing industries. Time-
series analysis that considers both the influence of decline on risk and the influence of risk on 
performance and controlling for firm slack and industry factors was conducted. 
Measuring risk similarly to Bromiley (1991) as an ex ante measure of income stream 
uncertainty makes the results comparable to other studies in the field. Also, slack was 
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operationalized according to Bourgeois and Singh (1983), therefore guaranteeing 
comparability with other findings.  
The results of various statistical procedures unveil that absorbed (SG & A/Sales) and potential 
slack (Debt/Equity) decrease risk. However, other measures of potential slack (interest 
coverage) had no effect, as did have the measure for available slack (current assets/current 
debt). These results comply with findings of Bromiley (1991), who also found that only 
absorbed slack had an impact on risk-taking.  
 
The research “Comparing alternative explanations for accounting risk-return relations” 
(Deephouse & Wiseman, 2000) tests again the relationship between slack resources and risk-
taking. Deriving the slack hypothesis from behavioral theory, it is assumed that moderate 
levels of each of the three slack dimensions (available, recoverable, potential) relates to lower 
risk-taking while low and high slack levels relate to higher risk-taking.  
Conveniently, risk is measured by ex ante income stream volatility similarly to most studies 
presented above. Additionally, slack is measured by similar concepts that have been applied 
in the above studies (cf. Bourgeois et al., 1983).  
The sample consisted of U.S. manufacturing firms over the period 1973-1987.  
The results of statistical processing show that the predicted U-shaped relationship between 
slack and risk-taking could not be confirmed (Deephouse et al., 2000: 474). Also, the 
assumption that firms use slack resources to conduct risky innovation projects does not find 
support in the data (Deephouse et al., 2000: 476).  
 
Another study which elaborates on slack and risk relations follows a different path in that it 
applies a different concept of risk (Miller & Leiblein, 1996c). Whereas the studies above refer 
to risk as a variance measure (variances in income streams), the present study refers to risk as 
a danger or hazard. The authors argue that variance risk measures give reason to doubt the 
validity of empirical results due to conceptual differences (Miller et al., 1996c: 94). Therefore, 
this study tests a number of hypotheses derived from behavioral theory but, in contrast to 
prior investigations, with risk measures capturing below-target outcomes.  
The sample comprised U.S. corporations from the period 1972 to 1991.  
Risk is measured as the magnitude of performance shortfalls as compared to an aspiration 
level. Slack is measured following Bourgeois and Singh’s (1983) recommendation. However, 
this study only considers recoverable slack measures.  
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The results indicate that the primary role of slack is to enhance organizational answers to 
downside risk, i.e. the risk to underperform. Consequently, slack resources achieve to 
improve an organization’s subsequent performance instead of threatening it. However, this 
study could not find evidence that slack plays a role in shaping organizational risk-taking 
(Miller et al., 1996c: 115). 
 
In a similar vein, Palmer and Wiseman (1999) continue the discussion of different risk 
measures and, in line with Miller and Leiblein (1996c) they distinguish between managerial 
risk-taking and income stream uncertainty. One of the major shortcomings of prior studies is 
that they neglect to differentiate between managerial risk-taking and organizational risks. 
Instead, it is mostly the case that organizational risk is used as a proxy for managerial risk 
even though there is no empirical evidence that these concepts are interrelated.  
However, in this study organiza tional risk and managerial risk-taking are two separate 
variables that are defined as follows: Managerial risk is the “management’s proactive 
strategic choices involving the allocation of resources” (Palmer et al., 1999: 1038). 
Organizational risk, on the other hand, is defined as the already known notion of income 
stream uncertainty (Palmer et al., 1999: 1039). The proposed holistic model of risk involves 
both of these two risk concepts and combines them in such a way that organizational risk, 
presumably, is triggered by the direct effects of environmental factors and managerial risk-
taking. Additionally, a number of environmental and organizational factors are supposed to 
indirectly affect organizational risk via managerial risk-taking.  
The measures used for slack are similar to prior studies in that they follow Bourgeois and 
Singh’s (1983) three slack dimensions of available, recoverable, and potential slack. 
Managerial risk-taking was measured by R&D investments and diversification strategies. 
Organizational risk was captured by income stream uncertainty.  
The quantitative results concerning organizational slack indicate that slack adheres to the 
proposed negative correlation with risk-taking. This means that in this study the notion of 
slack as resources that enable risk-taking and hence innovation cannot be supported. In 
contrast, it seems as if low levels of slack lead to increased investment in riskier alternatives 
(Palmer et al., 1999: 1055).  
 
A recent study by Martinez and Artz (2006) investigates firm slack and risk-taking in 
regulated and deregulated environments. On the one hand, reciting previous findings on the 
slack to risk relationship, the authors add an important and so far overlooked factor to the 
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discussion. Industry regulation had so far not played a crucial role in studies examining slack 
risk relations, which might partly explain the ambiguous findings (Martinez et al., 2006: 14). 
Therefore, a sample from the U.S. airline industry in two different time periods was drawn. 
First, the period from 1970 to 1975 represents a highly regulated industry, whereas the second 
period from 1993 to 1998 refers to a highly unregulated era in the airline industry.  
Including available and potential slack resources as well as risk-taking into their model, the 
question is how slack resources impact risk-taking within different regulative regimes.  
Not only has the new variable “regulation” been introduced, also in measuring risk new 
ground has been broken. Risk-taking is operationalized as the degree of deviation from group 
norms of competitive actions. On a more aggregated level this measure captures a “firm’s 
strategic action being significantly different than that of rival firm’s in a given year” 
(Martinez et al., 2006: 19).  
Slack measures, in contrast, have been conservatively chosen and are consistent with prior 
slack risk studies (cf. Bromiley, 1991; Palmer et al., 1999; Wiseman et al., 1996). However, 
only two slack measures have been chosen, available and potential slack.  
The analysis supports the notion of higher managerial risk-taking when losses loom, i.e. slack 
inhibits managerial risk-taking.  
 
After having presented these studies on the slack-risk relation, the question remains if there is 
a common conclusion. The results are definitely not as clear as in the case of the slack-
performance relation, therefore, to summarize the empirical evidence, the results are 
presented briefly. Bromiley (1991) found that slack reduces risk-taking while Singh (1986) 
came to the conclusion that absorbed slack induces higher risk-taking. However, Wiseman 
and Bromiley (1996) delivered evidence that absorbed slack and in part also potential slack 
decrease risk-taking. Deephouse and Wiseman (2000) on the other hand could not confirm 
that slack resources make firms conduct risky projects, and Miller and Leiblein (1996c) could 
not find any evidence for an association between slack resources and risk-taking. Palmer and 
Wiseman (1999) revealed that higher slack leads to lower risk-taking. Finally, Martinez and 
Artz (2006) revealed that available slack either leads to lower risk-taking, or showed a  U-
shaped relationship with risk. Similar results were true for potential slack which is either 
positively related or in a U-shaped way related with risk.  
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3.2.6. Innovation as the Dependent Variable 
 
The overarching topic in this thesis certainly is the complex relation between organizational 
slack and innovation. Therefore, a comprehensive overview of empirical studies dealing with 
slack and innovation is provided in this section, starting with early findings supposing either a 
linear positive or negative association and expanding to recent results which favor an inverse 
U-shaped relation between slack resources and innovation.  
 
Following the conceptual and theoretical considerations about organizational slack and 
innovation as formulated in behavioral theory (Cyert et al., 1959; Cyert et al., 1963), which 
assume that organizational slack might provide the necessary cushion for experimentation, 
hence innovation, first empirical insights were still pending at that time. 
 
Among the first8 to empirically test the slack innovation proposition were Aiken and Hage 
(1971) in their work about organizational design and innovation. Slack was measured by (1) 
the per cent increase in the organization’s budget, and (2) whether or not the resource base 
changed during a three year period and correlated with the rate of innovation during the same 
period. The findings supported the assumption that innovation requires increased financial 
resources since the data showed that the innovative organizations had increased resources 
available (Aiken et al., 1971: 78).  
 
The positive influence of organizational slack on innovation was also shown by Miller and  
Friesen (1982), who found in their study of 52 business firms from the Montreal region that 
resource availability and innovation were positively correlated in the case of conservative 
firms (Miller et al., 1982: 13).  
Further quantitative studies that confirmed the supposed linear positive association between 
organizational slack and innovation were conducted by Nystrom, Ramamurthy, and Wilson 
(2002); Greve (2003); Barrett and Sexton (2006); Geiger and Makri (2006); and Ruiz-Moreno 
and her colleagues (2008).  
Finally, among empirical studies that aim at exploring the relationship between organizational 
slack and innovation, the meta-analysis by Damanpour (1991) is one of the most significant 
papers and reviews 23 empirical studies, including 21 articles and 2 books that comply with 
                                                 
8 A prior frequently cited study by Rosner, M. M. 1968. Economic determinants of organizational innovation. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 12: 614-625. which investigated slack and innovation, is not referred to here 
because it captures slack in a dubious way by measuring the hospital occupancy rate. 
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the following four criteria: (i) The dependent variable is the rate of adoption of innovations, or 
the organizational innovativeness. (ii) The unit of analysis is the organization, and neither the 
individual nor the organizational population level. (iii) The scale of innovation is based on not 
less than two innovations. (iv) And finally, the results are published in a scholarly book or 
journal. Further, this study reviews the relationship between innovation and 13 potentially 
influential variables in for-profit and not-for profit organizations. Statistically significant 
associations are found for slack resources, specializations, functional differentiation, 
professionalism, centralization, managerial attitude toward change, technical knowledge 
resources, administrative intensity, as well as internal and external communication. For the 
independent variable slack resources Damanpour (1991: 574) expects a strong positive 
relation with innovation, which the data do not entirely confirm. Although a positive 
association is shown, the correlation is not very strong. A possible explanation for the 
weakness of the correlation is that the study does not distinguish between different slack 
dimensions, i.e. available, recoverable and potential slack. Since they are assumed to impact 
innovation differently, a more detailed analysis would deliver results that are more precise.  
 
However, although there seems to be thorough empirical evidence for this positive 
relationship, there are also studies that came to contrary conclusions. Not so much building on 
the organizational behavior theory (Cyert et al., 1963) but adhering to propositions from 
economic approaches and agency theory (Fama, 1980; Leibenstein, 1966), and conceptual 
papers reasoning a negative  relationship (cf. Child, 1972; Jensen, 1993), these research 
endeavors found negative associations between organizational slack and innovation.  
 
Katila and Shane (2005) for instance revealed in their quantitative study among a large 
sample of 964 U.S. firms’ innovation attempts that new firms were more innovative when 
suffering from a lack of resources (Katila et al., 2005: 826). Similarly, Zajac, Golden, and 
Shortell (1991) found in their qualitative and quantitative investigation among hospitals that 
slack exerted a negative influence on innovation. But the results for the slack variables were 
not significant, which was partly explained by sample characteristics (Zajac et al., 1991: 181). 
Yet another study by Manns and March (1978), which was certainly very much in the 
tradition of behavioral theory, unveiled that university departments enjoying high reputation 
and a convenient resource outfit were less prone to innovate (in terms of introducing new 
curricula) than their ill-equipped counterparts. Bolton (1993) also confirmed in his study the 
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negative impact of slack resources on innovation and found that instead substandard 
performance seemed to stimulate organizational innovation.  
 
Echoing the ambiguous incidences on the relation between slack and innovation ranging from 
positive to negative, with each of them featuring strong theoretical and empirical evidence for 
their findings, Herold, Jayaraman, and Narayanaswamy (2006: 372) ask the question: “What 
is the Relationship between Organizational Slack and Innovation?”.  
The relation between organizational slack and innovation has received a great deal of 
attention from research recently. One of the most prominent empirical studies in this research 
stream investigates the association with a sample of multinational business firms and asks the 
question “What is the Optimum Amount of Organizational Slack?” (Nohria et al., 1997). The 
important and new idea of this study is that the authors empirically show that the relationship 
between slack and innovation is neither purely linearly positive nor entirely linearly negative. 
Rather it seems as if the relationship can best be described as inverse U-shaped, meaning that 
up to a certain level of organizational slack in the organization the impact of slack resources 
on the innovative behavior is positive, but when this point is exceeded, then additional slack 
resources imply adverse effects on innovation.  
Two major variables are identified that shape the association between slack and innovation. 
On the one hand there is the propensity to experiment. Since innovations are always subject to 
risk and uncertain outcome, a resource cushion can facilitate to master the ups and downs 
along an innovation project. Additionally, managerial attention is increasingly focused on 
long term projects in the presence of slack resources, as compared to low slack situations, 
when managerial attention is tight and emphasizes short-term projects (Cyert et al., 1963). 
Consequently, when slack resources rise, also the number of innovation projects can be 
expected to increase, but only to a certain level because the possibilities for innovations 
decrease and suggest diminishing returns from experimentation. However, the second 
variable, which is discipline, influences innovation propensity in a different direction. The 
presence of slack resources also relaxes control mechanisms exerted by management and 
leads to a situation where the degree of discipline in selecting, pursuing and terminating 
innovation projects shows adverse outcomes (Leibenstein, 1969). Nohria and Gulati (1997: 
605) name two errors that might occur, (i) the type I error, and the (ii) type II error. The type I 
error describes situations when innovation projects get funded but should not be funded due to 
negative net values, and type II errors are decisions that stop projects that should be 
continued. However, not only can too lax discipline diminish innovation, this is also the case 
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with too stringent discipline. Low levels of slack result in tight controls and therefore impede 
innovation projects. These findings, particularly the aspect of an inverse U-shaped relation 
between slack have been reconfirmed by a number of follow up studies (cf. Geiger et al., 
2002; Herold et al., 2006; Kim et al., 2008; Mishina, Pollock, & Porac, 2004; Nohria et al., 
1996).  
 
However, for an advanced discussion it is fruitful to take a closer look at the different studies 
that support the inverse U-shaped relation between organizational slack and innovation.  
While the two investigations by Nohria and Gulati (1996; 1997) do not distinguish among 
different forms of organizational slack as proposed by Bourgeois et al (1983), the study by 
Geiger and Cashen (2002) includes available, recoverable, and potential slack measures. 
Recognizing suggestions that different slack dimensions impact differently on the dependent 
variable, three different hypotheses were established, with each of them relating to one of the 
three slack dimensions. Consequently it was argued that available slack was related inversely 
U-shaped with innovation, recoverable slack was supposed to behave similarly and potential 
slack was predicted to be related in a linearly positive way with innovation.  
The study was based on a random 250 firm sample over a ten year period drawn from the 
Fortune 500 database. Innovation was operationalized as the R&D intensity of the firm, 
available slack was measured by the quick ratio, recoverable slack was measured by Sales 
Expenditure, General & Admin Expenditure through Sales, and potential slack was captured 
by the debt to equity ratio. Risk, firm size, product diversification, time, and administrative 
structure were included as control variables. The subsequent linear regression models 
illustrated that all hypotheses were confirmed. So, available and recoverable slack showed the 
inverse U-shaped association with innovation, and potential slack seemed to have the positive 
linear relationship.  
In contrast, Herold et al. (2006) argue that only unabsorbed slack measures are suitable to 
investigate the influence of slack on innovation. This is because all other slack resources are 
already incorporated into the organization, the recovery of which might be a difficult and 
lengthy process probably not supporting the role slack is supposed to play for innovation 
(Herold et al., 2006: 374). Unabsorbed slack was predicted to have an inverse U-shaped 
relation with innovation. Therefore, the quick ratio was the independent variable representing 
available slack and the dependent variable innovation was operationalized by taking a look at 
the impact of a firm’s innovation based on the number of citations referring to a specific 
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company’s patent. The statistical analysis supported the inverse U-shaped theory for available 
slack.  
 
Also Kim et al. (2008) focused on only one slack dimension, which was financial slack as 
measured by the ratio of quick assets to liabilities. Innova tion was captured as R&D 
investments with the statistical analyses of 253 Korean manufacturing firms resulting in an 
inverse U-shaped relationship between financial slack and innovation. 
 
So what is the relationship between organizational slack and innovation? Empirical evidence 
supports three different assumptions. The first assumption holds a linearly positive 
relationship between organizational slack and innovation (cf. Aiken et al., 1971; Barrett et al., 
2006; Damanpour, 1991; Geiger et al., 2006; Greve, 2003; Miller et al., 1982; Nystrom et al., 
2002; Ruiz-Moreno et al., 2008). These results, however, are doubted by a number of other 
researchers, who found thorough evidence for their assumption, which supposes a linearly 
negative relationship between organizational slack and innovation (cf. Bolton, 1993; Katila et 
al., 2005; Manns et al., 1978; Zajac et al., 1991). Thirdly, more recently researchers have 
commenced to believe both assumptions and have tried to combine them in a new model 
which proposes an inverse U-shaped relationship between organizational slack and 
innovation. The synthesis (inverse U-shaped relation) of the thesis (positive relation) and its 
antithesis (negative relation) repeatedly found empirical support (Geiger et al., 2002; Herold 
et al., 2006; Kim et al., 2008; Nohria et al., 1996; Nohria et al., 1997).  
 
3.2.7. Organizational Slack in Nonprofit Organizations and in Nonprofit 
Research 
 
The concept of organizational slack was originally designed in a context that did not 
discriminate among different institutional forms of organizations (Cyert et al., 1963). 
Nevertheless, a lot of empirical studies have narrowed their scope to for profit firms only, 
which leaves ample room for researching organizational slack under a nonprofit framework. 
However, studies of nonprofit organizations exist that more or less explicitly refer to slack 
resources, but only a few of these investigations emphasize the relation of slack and 
innovation. Damanpour (1991: 577) differentiates in his meta-analysis between nonprofit and 
for profit organizations, with ambiguous conclusions. On the one hand he makes clear that the 
type of organization is an important contingency but on the other hand he does not go into 
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detail concerning the relation between slack resources and innovation. Alexander et al (1998) 
conducted a survey among more than 2000 nonprofit hospitals in the United States to research 
the behavior of nonprofit organizations adopting corporate governance models, which is in a 
broader sense a form of process innovation. Their findings are contrary to suggestions that the 
main trigger for organizational innovation is crisis, or weak revenue structures, or highly 
competitive forces. The results indicate that the likelihood of nonprofit organizations adopting 
process innovations depends considerably on the availability of slack resources (Alexander et 
al., 1998: 237). Another study aims to identify critical characteristics of innovative nonprofit 
organizations, with the result that the highest rating items are: searching for new ways, 
solutions and unconventional forms of work; adapting to new times; suggesting new forms of 
solving problems; and reflecting over organizational activities and actions (Jaskyte & Riobo, 
2004: 76). These characteristics are all facilitated through the presence of slack resources, 
which supports a positive association between slack and innovation. Finally, Bode (2003) 
includes slack resources in his study to explain the flexibility and adaptability of nonprofits in 
reacting successfully to external changes. Further studies confirm the role of slack 
encouraging adaptation and flexibility (Christensen & Ebrahim, 2006; Todd & Ramanathan, 
1994). The major caveats of these studies, however, are that they do not measure 
organizational slack comprehensively, but rather one-dimensionally and marginally if at all. 
Often slack is only referred to as a theoretical construct. Therefore, these studies hardly fill 
the gap of investigating the concept of slack in NPOs and incorporating the specifics of 
nonprofit organizations such as volunteers and mission orientation, which results in high 
intrinsic motivation, and so forth.  
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3.2.8. Summary of Organizational Slack as an Independent Variable 
 
The previous chapters provided an extensive overview of the present state of the art in 
empirical research related to organizational slack as an independent variable. To further 
condense this knowledge, table 3.5 summarizes the presented studies in terms of authors, year 
published, independent variables, as well as the impact the variables had on each other.  
 
Author, year Study Dependent 
variables 
Main statement Impact of 
organizational 
slack 
Dimick and Murray, 
1978 
Correlates of Substantive 
Policy Decisions in 
Organizations: The Case 
of Human Resource 
Management 
Human 
Resource 
Management 
Slack creates 
conditions that allow 
an organization to 
conduct projects that 
would otherwise be 
too costly. 
Positive 
Marino and Lange, 
1982 
Earnings Variation, 
Inventory Growth, and 
Cost Behavior under 
Slack Resource 
Conditions 
Earnings 
variation; 
Inventory 
growth; Cost 
behavior 
Organizational slack 
does not lead to higher 
inefficiency. 
Not negative 
Bourgeois and 
Singh, 1983 
Organizational Slack and 
Political Behavior Among 
Top Management Teams  
Political 
Behavior 
Recoverable slack 
decreases political 
behavior; potential 
slack increases 
political behavior. 
Positive/negative 
Wally et al., 2000 Effects of firm 
performance, 
organizational slack, and 
debt on entry timing: A 
study of ten emerging 
product markets in the 
USA 
Entry timing Slack makes firms 
enter into new markets 
earlier. 
Positive 
Sharma, 2000 Managerial 
Interpretations and 
Organizational Context as 
Predictors of Corporate 
Choice of Environmental 
Strategy 
Environmental 
strategy 
decisions 
Slack makes managers 
interpret their 
environmental 
conditions in a more 
positive way and leads 
to lower threat 
interpretations. 
Positive 
King, 2000 Organizational Response 
to Environmental 
Regulation: Punctuated 
Change or Autogenesis? 
Response to 
environmental 
regulations 
Slack leads to 
incremental innovation 
in responses to 
environmental 
regulations. 
Positive 
Florida et al., 2001 What Makes Companies 
Green? Organizational 
and Geographic Factors 
in the Adoption of 
Environmental Practices 
Organizational 
greening 
Slack helps 
organizations adopt 
green technologies . 
Positive 
Bowen, 2002 Organizational Slack and 
Corporate Greening 
Corporate 
Greening 
Available slack 
supports 
organizational 
adaptation, while 
absorbed slack fosters 
Positive/negative 
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organizational inertia. 
Seifert et al., 2004 Having, Giving, and 
Getting: Slack Resources, 
Corporate Philanthropy, 
and Firm Financial 
Performance 
Corporate 
philanthropy 
and firm 
performance 
Available slack 
positively influences 
corporate 
philanthropy. 
Positive 
Kmetz, 1980 A Preliminary Test of 
Relationships between 
Organizational Slack and 
Theoretically Related 
Variables 
Organization 
design and 
information 
processing 
Slack assists an 
organization in its 
information 
processing. 
Positive 
Barker III and 
Duhaime, 1997 
Strategic Change in the 
Turnaround Process: 
Theory and Empirical 
Evidence 
Strategic 
Change 
Processes  
Slack enables strategic 
change processes in 
organizations. 
Positive 
Miller et al., 1996 The Evolution of 
Strategic Simplicity: 
Exploring Two Models of 
Organizational 
Adaptation 
Strategy Available slack lowers 
and absorbed slack 
broadens the strategic 
repertoire of an 
organization. 
Positive/negative 
Cheng and Kesner, 
1997 
Organizational Slack and 
Response to 
Environmental Shifts: 
The Impact of Resource 
Allocation Patterns 
Strategy Slack makes 
organizations 
reinvigorate their 
strategic focus. 
Positive 
Meyer, 1982 Adapting to 
Environmental Jolts 
Strategic 
challenges 
Slack helps buffer 
external shocks. 
Positive 
Daniel et al., 2004 Slack resources and firm 
performance: a meta-
analysis  
Performance Slack impacts 
positively on firm 
performance. 
Positive 
Chakravarthy, 1986 Measuring Strategic 
Performance 
Performance Excellent firms have 
higher slack and use 
the slack for 
innovation. 
Positive 
Hambrick and 
D’Aveni, 1988 
Large Corporate Failures 
as Downward Spirals  
Performance Bankrupt companies 
had lower slack levels . 
Positive 
Gary, 2005 Implementation strategy 
and performance 
outcomes in related 
diversification 
Performance Higher probability of 
failure in diversifying 
without slack. 
Positive 
George, 2005 Slack Resources and the 
Performance of Privately 
Held Firms  
Performance Slack impacts 
positively on firm 
performance. 
Positive 
Su, et al., 2009 Organizational slack and 
firm performance during 
institutional transition 
Performance Slack is positively 
related to performance 
up to a certain point, 
from which it turns 
negative (Inverse U-
shaped relation). 
Positive/negative 
Tan, 2003 Curvilinear Relationship 
between Organizational 
Slack and Firm 
Performance: Evidence 
from Chinese State 
Enterprises 
Performance Slack is positively 
related to performance 
up to a certain point, 
from which it turns 
negative (Inverse U-
shaped relation). 
Positive/negative 
Tan and Peng, 2003 Organizational Slack and 
Firm Performance during 
Economic Transitions: 
Two Studies from an 
Emerging Economy  
Performance Slack is positively 
related to performance 
up to a certain point, 
from which it turns 
negative (Inverse U-
shaped relation). 
Positive/negative 
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Miller and Everett, 
1996 
Slack and performance in 
health care delivery 
Performance Positive impact of 
slack on performance. 
Positive 
Love et al., 2005 Reducing Slack: The 
Performance 
Consequences of 
Downsizing by Large 
Industrial Firms, 1977-93 
Performance Slack increases post-
downsizing 
performance. 
Positive 
Bromiley, 1991 Testing a Causal Model 
of Corporate Risk-taking 
and Performance 
Risk-taking; 
performance 
Organizational slack 
reduces risk-taking. 
Negative 
Singh, 1986 Performance, Slack, and 
Risk-taking in 
Organizational Decision 
Making 
Risk-taking Absorbed slack induce 
higher risk-taking. 
Positive 
Wiseman and 
Bromiley, 1996 
Toward a Model of Risk 
in Declining 
Organizations: An 
Empirical Examination of 
Risk, Performance and 
Decline 
Risk-taking Absorbed slack and 
partly potential slack 
decrease risk-taking. 
Negative 
Deephouse and 
Wiseman, 2000 
Comparing alternative 
explanations for 
accounting risk-return 
relations 
Risk-taking No support for 
assumption that slack 
makes firms conduct 
risky projects. 
Negative 
Miller and Leiblein, 
1996 
Corporate ris k-return 
relations: Returns 
variability versus 
downside risk 
Risk-taking No evidence could be 
found that slack 
impacts on risk-taking 
at all. 
No relationship 
Palmer and 
Wiseman, 1999 
Decoupling risk-taking 
from income stream 
uncertainty: A holistic 
model of risk 
Risk-taking Higher slack resources 
lead to lower risk-
taking. 
Negative 
Martinez and Artz, 
2006 
An Examination of Firm 
Slack and Risk-taking in 
Regulated and 
Deregulated Airlines 
Risk-taking Available slack either 
is negatively or in a U-
shaped way related 
with risk-taking. 
Potential slack is 
positively or in a U-
shaped way related 
with risk-taking. 
Positive, 
negative, U-
shaped 
Aiken and Hage, 
1971 
The organic organization 
and innovation 
Innovation Organizational slack 
and innovation are 
positively related. 
Positive 
Miller and Friesen, 
1982 
Innovation in 
Conservative and 
Entrepreneurial Firms: 
Two Models of Strategic 
Momentum 
Innovation Organizational slack 
and innovation are 
positively related. 
Positive 
Nystrom et al., 2002 Organizational context , 
climate, and 
innovativeness: Adoption 
of imaging technology 
Innovation Organizational slack 
and innovation are 
positively related. 
Positive 
Greve, 2003 A Behavioral Theory of 
R&D Expenditures and 
Innovations: Evidence 
from Shipbuilding 
Innovation Organizational slack 
and innovation are 
positively related. 
Positive 
Barrett and Sexton, 
2006 
Innovation in Small, 
Project-Based 
Construction Firms  
Innovation Organizational slack 
and innovation are 
positively related. 
Positive 
Geiger and Makri, 
2006 
Exploration and 
exploitation innovation 
Innovation Organizational slack 
and innovation are 
Positive 
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processes: The role of 
organizational slack in 
R&D intensive firms  
positively related. 
Ruiz-Moreno et al., 
2008 
The moderating effect of 
organizational slack on 
the relation between 
perceptions of support for 
innovation and 
organizational climate 
Innovation Organizational slack 
and innovation are 
positively related. 
Positive 
Damanpour, 1991 Organizational 
Innovation: A Meta-
Analysis of Effect of 
Determinants and 
Moderators  
Innovation Organizational slack 
and innovation are 
positively related. 
Positive 
Katila and Shane, 
2005 
When does the lack of 
resources make new firms 
innovative? 
Innovation Organizational slack 
and innovation are 
negatively related. 
Negative 
Zajac et al., 1991 New Organizational 
Forms for Enhancing 
Innovation: The Case of 
Internal Corporate Joint 
Ventures 
Innovation Organizational slack 
and innovation are 
negatively related. 
Negative 
Manns and March, 
1978 
Financial Adversity, 
Internal Competition, and 
Curriculum Change in a 
University 
Innovation Organizational slack 
and innovation are 
negatively related. 
Negative 
Bolton, 1993 Organizational innovation 
and substandard 
Performance: When is 
necessity the mother of 
innovation? 
Innovation Organizational slack 
and innovation are 
negatively related. 
Negative 
Nohria and Gulati, 
1996 
Is slack good or bad for 
innovation? 
Innovation Organizational slack 
and Innovation are 
positively related up to 
a certain point, from 
which the relation 
turns negative (inverse 
U-shaped). 
Positive, 
negative, inverse 
U-shaped 
Nohria and Gulati, 
1997 
What is the Optimum 
Amount of 
Organizational Slack? A 
Study of the Relationship 
between Slack and 
Innovation in 
Multinational Firms  
Innovation Organizational slack 
and Innovation are 
positively related up to 
a certain point, from 
which the relation 
turns negative (inverse 
U-shaped). 
Positive, 
negative, inverse 
U-shaped 
Geiger and Cashen, 
2002 
A Multidimensional 
Examination of Slack and 
its Impact on Innovation  
Innovation Organizational slack 
and Innovation are 
positively related up to 
a certain point, from 
which the relation 
turns negative (inverse 
U-shaped). 
Positive, 
negative, inverse 
U-shaped 
Herold et al., 2006 What is the Relationship 
between Organizational 
Slack and Innovation 
Innovation Organizational slack 
and Innovation are 
positively related up to 
a certain point, from 
which the relation 
turns negative (inverse 
U-shaped). 
Positive, 
negative, inverse 
U-shaped 
Kim et al., 2008 Ownership Structure and 
the Relationship between 
Innovation Organizational slack 
and Innovation are 
Positive, 
negative, inverse 
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Financial Slack and R&D 
Investments: Evidence 
from Korean Firms  
positively related up to 
a certain point, from 
which the relation 
turns negative (inverse 
U-shaped). 
U-shaped 
Table 3.5: Summary of organizational slack as an independent variable. 
 
What does the bulk of empirical studies tell us about organizational slack? First, 
organizational slack has been related with an extensive range of different dependent variables, 
be it political behavior, corporate greening, strategy, risk-taking, performance or innovation. 
Interestingly, in most cases organizational slack plays a positive role in affecting the 
dependent variable. Second, and this refers particularly to the studies dealing with risk, 
performance, and innovation, an important observation is that these dependent variables are 
not separated very precisely. Often, studies talking about innovation cite research results that 
are true for performance relations in order to establish literature-based arguments for their 
proposed slack- innovation relation. The same is true for risk and innovation: frequently risk 
and innovation results are replaced by each other without further comments. Therefore, in this 
endeavor more emphasis is put on a clear distinction between risk, performance, and 
innovation studies. Third, generally speaking, a positive impact of organizational slack is 
reported in the majority of the results. Especially in studies dealing with either risk, 
performance, or innovation, organizational slack seems to play a predominantly positive role. 
This is true in spite of sharp theoretical arguments that speak out against a positive impact of 
organizational slack in organizations. Forth, it is obvious that a lot of studies apply different 
slack concepts and differently operationalized dependent variables are tested with different 
methods for a huge body of different samples, which, however, in most cases result in 
positive slack-dependent variable relations. This delivers a strong argument for the impact of 
slack being very robust over very different measures.  
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4. Innovation 
 
The present chapter is dedicated to specific innovation issues related to this study. It is 
important to mention that in this study the level of analysis is the organization, and not 
individuals, which has severe consequences for researching innovation since a huge body of 
literature on individual, group level, and macro level9 studies is not reviewed here. Also, the 
more current research on entrepreneurship is not part of this study. However, in this chapter 
innovation research is discussed from various angles referring to questions such as which is 
the research perspective of this piece of work, what is the state of the art knowledge of 
innovation research, and finally, what is the innovation concept applied in this study.  
 
4.1. Perspectives in Innovation Research 
 
Over the past decades innovation research has flourished tremendously with different foci 
over the years (Anderson et al., 2004: 149). While initially the individual was the centre of 
interest, subsequently organizations became the major concern. Simultaneously, also 
economists got interested in innovation research on industry and national levels (Slappendel, 
1996: 108). To digest the current state of the art in innovation research, Slappendel (1996) 
proposed to distinguish among three different research perspectives, namely the individualist, 
the structuralist, and the interactive process perspective, since each of them delivers particular 
assumptions, research questions, concepts and so forth. A summary of these is provided in 
table 4.1.  
The individualist perspective assumes that the individual is the crucial element in 
organizational innovation and does not recognize potential limiting external factors. The 
individual, instead, is portrayed as to be a self-determined agent who is led by the goals set by 
him- or herself. Additionally the individual is perceived to be a rational utility maximizer. 
Consequently, the individualist perspective innovation literature aims to identify individual 
level parameters of innovation which mostly refer to individual characteristics. Studies in this 
area involve variables such as age, sex, education level, values, personality, goals, creativity, 
and cognitive approaches (Slappendel, 1996: 110). 
 
                                                 
9 For a literature review see: Anderson, N., De Dreu, C. K. W., & Nijstad, B. A. 2004. The routinization of 
innovation research: a constructively critical review of the state-of-the-science. Journal of Organizational 
Behavior, 25(2): 147-173. 
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Category/Perspective Individualist Structuralist Interactive Process 
Basic assumptions Individuals cause 
innovation 
Innovation determined by 
structural characteristics 
Innovation produced by 
the interaction of 
structural influences and 
the actions of individuals  
Conceptualization of an 
innovation 
Static and objectively 
defined objects and 
practices 
Static and objectively 
defined objects and 
practices 
Innovations are subject to 
reinvention and 
reconfiguration. 
Innovations are perceived 
Conceptualization of the 
innovation process 
Simple linear, with focus 
on the adoption stage 
Simple linear, with focus 
on the adoption stage 
Complex process 
Core concepts Champion 
Leaders 
Entrepreneur 
Environment 
Size 
Complexity 
Differentiation 
Formalization 
Centralization 
Strategic type 
Shocks 
Proliferation 
Innovative capability 
Context  
Research methodology Cross-sectional survey Cross-sectional survey Case studies  
Case history 
Table 4.1: Perspectives in innovation research (Source: Slappendel, 1996: 109) 
 
This literature suggests that certain individuals who show specific characteristics are more 
prone to innovative behavior than those who do not share these traits.  
Although recently this literature regained popularity through the entrepreneurship and the 
social entrepreneurship literature, a number of shortcomings come along with the individualist 
perspective.  
On the one hand, focusing on individuals conveys the notion that innovative decisions are 
based on a single individual, which is hardly the case in organizational settings (Van de Ven, 
Angle, & Poole, 1989). Moreover, it is well established knowledge that individual 
characteristics easily interfere with, and may be overshadowed by role specific behaviors, 
which is very likely in organizational settings where individuals permanently adhere to certain 
roles (Baldridge & Burnham, 1975).  
 
The structuralist perspective seems to be similarly deterministic in its view as the individualist 
one, since it assumes that innovation is to a great extent shaped by organizational 
characteristics. Also, the structuralist tradition ho lds that organizations are goal-driven actors, 
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with the most important goal with respect to innovation of organizational survival. The major 
function of an organization and its sub-systems is to concentrate all activities towards goal 
achievement.  
Despite its caveats, which will be mentioned shortly, the advantages of the structuralist 
perspective lie in its broadened view that not only organization- internal factors are relevant 
for innovation but also an organization’s interrelation with its environment, e.g. customers, 
suppliers, competitors, and government. Referring to the structuralist perspective’s main 
disadvantage certainly involves the hardly reflected assumption of organizational features 
(e.g. technology, strategy, differentiation, etc.) as objectively given realities (Slappendel, 
1996: 114).  
 
Finally, the interactive process perspective tends to increase in terms of publications. Of 
particular interest for this research stream is the process aspect inherent in innovation which 
refers to the temporal sequences of actions that are conducted in creating and implementing 
innovations. In contrast to the previous approaches, which are the individualist and the 
structuralist perspectives, the interactive process perspective aims at combining these two by 
overcoming the dichotomy of action and structure (Giddens, 1986). Due to its relatively new 
approach of attempting to reconcile action and structure, which results in more complex 
models, mostly the longitudinal case study method is applied to research these interrelations 
over an extended time period. One of the first and most comprehensive endeavors in this 
direction was the Minnesota Innovation Research Program, which investigated fourteen 
innovations with respect to four central concepts: new ideas, people, transactions, and 
contexts (Van de Ven, 1993: 274).  
Also in contrast to the two previous approaches, the interactive process perspective rejects the 
objective reality model and rational decision makers. Rather, non-rational influences are 
emphasized, for instance the political environment which clearly determines the adoption of a 
specific innovation.  
 
Having introduced these three potential research approaches, the perspective of this study 
mainly follows the structuralist tradition in several ways, with some differences, though. 
Organizational slack clearly represents an organization-structural variable. Consequently, the 
unit of analysis here is the organization. However, this study does not entirely agree with the 
assumption that the structuralist approaches necessarily need to be in line with the objective 
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paradigm in social sciences. The constructive power of human minds is recognized and a 
leading principle of this study (Weick, 1995).  
 
4.2. State of the Art in Innovation Research 
 
The vast literature published on innovation over the last 30 years or so has certainly advanced 
our knowledge on innovation-specific issues with research endeavors focusing on three levels 
of analysis as described above. These three levels are the individual, the work group, and the 
organization levels (Anderson et al., 2004: 149). The industry and macro levels are not 
mentioned here since this review concentrates on organization-internal innovation topics. 
Table 4.2 provides an extensive, though not exhaustive, overview of variables investigated on 
the three previously mentioned levels of analysis.  
 
Level of analysis Characteristic Dimension 
Individual Personality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Motivation 
 
 
Cognitive ability 
 
 
 
Job characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mood states  
Tolerance of ambiguity 
Self-confidence 
Openness to experience 
Unconventionality 
Originality 
Rule governed (negative relation) 
Authoritarianism (negative relation) 
Independence 
Proactivity 
Intrinsic (vs. extrinsic) 
Determination to succeed 
Personal initiative 
Above average general intellect 
Task-specific knowledge 
Divergent thinking style 
Ideational fluency 
Autonomy  
Span of control 
Job demands 
Job dissatisfaction 
Support for innovation 
Mentor guidance 
Appropriate training 
Negative moods 
Work group Team structure 
 
 
Team climate 
 
 
 
 
Team member 
characteristics 
 
Minority influence 
Cohesiveness 
Longevity 
Participation 
Vision 
Norms of innovation 
Conflict 
Constructive controversy 
Heterogeneity of members 
Education level 
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Team processes  
 
 
 
Leadership style 
 
Reflexivity 
Minority dissent 
Integration skills  
Decision-making style 
Democratic style 
Participative style 
Openness to idea proposal 
Leader-member exchange 
Expected evaluation 
 
Organizational Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategy 
 
Size 
 
Resources 
 
Culture 
 
Specialization 
Centralization (negative relation) 
Formalization (negative relation) 
Complexity 
Stratification (negative relation) 
Matrix principles 
Prospector type 
Organicity 
Number of employees 
Market share (negative relation) 
Annual turnover 
Slack resources 
Support for experimentation 
Tolerance of idea failure 
Risk-taking norms  
Table 4.2: Variables in innovation research (Source: Anderson et al., 2004: 150p) 
 
Unless indicated otherwise through the expression “negative relation” attached to some of the  
enlisted variables in table 4.2, all have consistently shown to facilitate innovation at the three 
levels of analysis. Among them, not really surprisingly, slack resources can be found as well.  
Apart from identifying a number of positively and negatively influencing factors on 
innovation, another valuable contribution from innovation research is to model the 
organizational process of innovation. Early models assumed the innovation process to be a 
straight, linear process which is initiated through some kind of problem perception, advances 
to a conceptualization stage and finally gets implemented (Van de Ven, 1993: 271). Zaltman 
and his colleagues (1973: 62) for instance created a model with the following, sequential 
stages: 
 
I. Initiation stage 
1. Knowledge-awareness substage 
2. Formation of attitudes toward the innovation substage 
3. Decision substage 
II. Implementation stage 
1. Initial implementation substage 
2. Continued-sustained implementation substage 
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Nevertheless, research has advanced and gained additional knowledge and insight over the 
years, with the result that nowadays it is established knowledge that the innovation process is 
not as linear as the prior models suggest. Developed both theoretically and/or empirically and 
continuously confirmed empirically, new approaches suggest that innovation processes are 
“iterative, non-linear, disjunctive, cyclical, and often stressful to those involved either as 
initiators or being affected by their implementation” (Anderson et al., 2004: 152). Also, 
taking advantage of social psychological contributions, innovation goes hand in hand with 
social restructuring, i.e. restructuring of cognitions, perceptions, expectations, and behavioral 
repertoires for individuals.  
 
These findings are of particular relevance for slack research. Conceptualizing innovation as an 
iterative, cyclical process, which is hardly predictable and cannot be planned entirely 
demands from an organization to bring along a resource outfit which allows for detours and 
deviations. These extra resources necessary might be provided through organizational slack.  
 
To present a more advanced innovation process model which emphasizes the cyclical, non-
linear path, the findings of Van de Ven and his colleagues (Van de Ven, 1993; Van de Ven et 
al., 1989) are introduced which were generated out of a comprehensive research project 
named the “Minnesota Innovation Research Program” (MIRP). The model actually comprises 
six areas in the innovation process (Van de Ven, 1993: 289p): 
 
1. To facilitate and support organizational innovation, the organization needs to create an 
atmosphere which enables and motivates innovation. Unfortunately, it is known that 
creating such an atmosphere is not easily possible but requires a period of gesture over 
a couple of years.  
2. To provoke and activate attention for innovation from individuals, shocks are an 
appropriate measure. By shock it is understood to confront an individual directly with 
needs and problems which create a sufficiently high level of dissatisfaction so the 
person takes measures to overcome this perception. 
3. However, once the innovation process is initiated it must not be expected to develop in 
a linear sequence of steps and stages. Rather, innovation processes get permanently 
challenged through alternative ideas, diverging concepts and so forth from different 
organizational units.  
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4. Certainly, setbacks and pitfalls accompany the innovation process from the very start 
because unexpected organizational or environmental alterations occur. These setbacks 
can affect the innovation process in two ways: Either as learning opportunities leading 
to reinvention, or as rejection triggers leading to the termination of the innovation 
processes.  
5. The adoption phase of the innovation can be facilitated by adapting the innovation to 
local organizational contingencies. This can be achieved by involving and committing 
the relevant management teams.  
6. The complexity of an innovation process is correlated to the novelty, size, and 
temporal duration of the innovation. 
 
Although these recommendations are formulated in a quite hands-on fashion, they convey 
valuable theoretical knowledge in that they acknowledge and describe the non- linear 
innovation process in organizations. Additionally, although the primary concern in this 
research is not organizational innovation as such but product and service innovation, it is still 
important to learn about innovation processes on an organizational level, since these 
innovations may be important prerequisites for product and/or service innovations.  
 
Attempting to provide a model that makes innovation processes somewhat easier to calculate 
in that the presumably cyclical process is forced into a linear pathway10, Cooper (1990; 2008, 
2009a) proposes that innovation processes can be effectively managed by juxtaposing stage-
gate systems. A stage is an area of creativity, idea generation and lax discipline where new 
ideas may emerge. To guarantee an efficient flow of resources and prevent the organization 
from wasting inputs, gates are introduced which are areas with stringent screenings, go or no-
go decisions and rigid discipline.  
Consequently, this model suggests alternating phases featuring slack resources for creativity 
and experimentation with phases of stringency where decisions have to be made on which 
innovation projects will be continued and which are terminated.  
To go into more detail, the preliminary stage-gate model as designed by Cooper (1990: 46, 
52p) suggests a typical process to be as follows:  
 
                                                 
10 In a later article Cooper (2008: 216) argues that the stage-gate model is not a linear system but allows for 
looping, iterations, back-and-forth play within a stage and over the project duration. He concludes “so the 
process is anything but linear, even though the traditional graphics depict a neat, linear, and logic process.” 
Cooper, R., G. . 2008. Perspective: The Stage-Gate® Idea-to-Launch Process - Update, What's New, and 
NexGen Systems. The Journal of Product Innovation Management, 25(3): 213. 
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Idea: The innovation process starts off with a new product or service idea, which has 
to make its way through gate 1. 
 
Gate 1: Initial Screen: This gate is the first opportunity to decide whether to dedicate 
resources to the new product process. In the case of “go”, the project moves on to 
stage 1, which is the “preliminary assessment” stage. The initial screen should signal a 
first though tentative commitment to the project. Assessment in this gate is made 
based upon “must have” and “should have” criteria which refer to overall strategic 
alignment, feasibility, synergies etc. However, financial considerations are not yet part 
of the decision.  
 
Stage 1: Preliminary Assessment: Aim of this stage is to evaluate the new product’s 
technical and market merits and should deliver a cost and time schedule which are the 
basis for decision upon in gate 2. 
 
Gate 2: Second Screen: Here, the project gets reevaluated also considering the 
additional information concerning time, costs, and opportunities of the new product. 
Again, “must have” and “should have” criteria are applied to set up a scorecard against 
which the evaluation is carried out.  
 
Stage 2: Definition: This stage is the last one before product development is initiated. 
Therefore, this stage must assess the project’s potential to become successful through 
market research and so forth. Also, a detailed feasibility plan must be designed which 
incorporates customers’ needs and translates them into a technically and economically 
viable proposal.  
 
Gate 3: Decision on Business Case: This is the last opportunity to terminate the 
project before heavy spending starts. Going beyond this gate means dedicating 
substantive financial resources to the new product project. In addition to the “must 
have” and “should have” criteria from gate 2, here a qualitative perspective of the 
review undertaken in stage 2 is considered. Moreover, a clear project definition is 
created, as well as a plan that describes the path to go.  
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Stage 3: Development: This stage essentially involves all activities associated with 
product development, marketing planning, and so forth. 
 
Gate 4: Post-Development Review: This gate intends to continually check and 
update the product development process and assures the project is aligned with the 
needs specified. The quality, financials, and economic pillars of the project are 
revisited.  
 
Stage 4: Validation: At this stage the overall viability of the project is tested, 
evaluating customer acceptance, production process, and the economics by conducting 
a number of activities: product tests, user field trials, pilot production, test markets, 
revised financial analysis.  
 
Gate 5: Pre-Commercialization Decision: The final gate at which the project can 
still be killed, it opens the door for full commercialization. A diligent examination of 
the new product, the marketing, and financial projections are the main determinants 
for decision-making.  
 
Stage 5: Commercialization: The point of no return initiates the marketing launch 
and the operations plan.  
 
Post-Implementation Review: Some time after having launched the new product, the 
project team needs to be dissolved and the products becomes a regular product in the 
firm. At this point, the new product and its performance get reviewed, and through an 
assessment of the project procedure learnings for future projects are discerned.  
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The process is depicted in figure 4.1 with G standing for gate and S for stage.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Stage-Gate model. Adapted from Cooper (1990: 46) 
 
Although the stage-gate model has been refined over the years by incorporating feedback 
loops, stressing the cyclical character of an innovation process, etc. (cf. Cooper, 2008; 
Cooper, 2009a, 2009b; Cooper & Edgett, 2008), it still owes an answer to the question how 
the initial idea gets generated which then triggers the stage-gate process. Also, in NPOs the 
innovation process hardly follows the technical and prescribed paths as outlined in the stage-
gate model. Very often, identifying a need which has not been catered for is the trigger to 
develop a new product, or in most cases service, to overcome the problem (Zimmermann, 
1999).  
 
Having discussed potential innovation process paths identified in the literature, the following 
section finally clarifies which innovation concept is applied in this study. 
 
 
 
S1 
 
G1 
 
 
S2 
 
G2 
 
 
S3 
 
G3 
 
Idea 
Initial 
Screen 
Preliminary 
Assessment 
Second 
Screen 
Definition 
Decision 
On Business 
Case 
Development 
 
 
S4 
 
G4 
 
 
S5 
 
G5 
Post- 
Development 
Review 
Testing & 
Validation 
Pre-Commercialization 
Business  
Analysis 
Product & 
Market Launch 
 
Review 
Organizational Slack and Innovation  From Theory to Empirics 
 
 133 
4.3. The Innovation Concept of this Study 
 
With the concept of organizational slack being largely established by Cyert and March 
(1963), referring to their innovation concept would be a sensible step to take. The 
problemistic and slack search approaches have been introduced in chapter 2.1.3 which is why 
they are not described repeatedly here. However, while the problemistic and the slack search 
models do explain why organizations initiate innovation projects, either because of a specific 
problem situation or because of slack resources, these concepts do not explicitly define 
innovation itself. Therefore, clarifying the innovation concept which underlies this research is 
done here. 
 
Mostly, innovation theories refer to the process of “creative destruction” as put forward by 
Schumpeter (1934). The discourse therefore seems to adopt the same logic for innovative 
behavior in the nonprofit sector as it is theorized in the commercial sector (Osborne, 1998; 
Osborne & Brown, 2005). In the nonprofit sector the mechanism of competition and therefore 
the motivation to innovation might be different, however. It is not to argue that also NPOs 
compete for several resources such as funding or clients. Nevertheless, their underlying 
engine is supposedly not equivalent to market-driven organizations that finally need to 
achieve financial superiority. NPOs are led by their mission to provide certain services to 
constituencies, while at the same time balancing their financials in a way that supports their 
mission fulfillment (McDonald, 2007: 258). Zimmermann (1999: 597) argues that it is not the 
competition itself that makes NPOs innovate but rather the strong motivation, the freedom of 
ideas and, if competition at all, then competition among ideas. Research on innovation is 
widespread and focuses on a variety of approaches such as (i) the individualist, (ii) the 
structuralist, and (iii) the interactive process perspective. For a couple of reasons discussed 
also in chapter 4.1, this research follows the structuralist perspective, an approach which is 
also supported by Gatignon et al. (2002: 1105). The structuralist perspective supposes 
innovation to be largely influenced and shaped by organizational characteristics (Baldridge et 
al., 1975), such as organizational slack (Slappendel, 1996: 112).  
 
Innovation, as defined by Gemünden and Salomo (2004), is the outcome of a creative process 
involving different actors which results in a qualitatively new means-end combination that is 
new to the market or the firm. This research adopts the definition of innovation from Zaltman 
et al. (1973: 10) which maintains that innovation is “any idea, practice, or material artifact 
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perceived to be new by the relevant unit of adoption”. Especially important here is the fact 
that Zaltman focuses on the “relevant unit of adoption” to define an innovation as such. Since 
the study relies on self-report measures when it comes to innovation, the definition of 
innovation is in the hand of the interviewees. One crucial difference, however, is that here the 
focus is on product and service innovations only, which neglects other potential spheres of 
innovation such as process innovation. A more in-depth discussion on this topic is provided in 
chapter 6.2., where measurement issues are dealt with. Apart from different approaches to 
innovation, another relevant issue is the level of innovativeness (Hauschildt & Salomo, 2007: 
16). Since the idea is not only to count the number of innovations stated by a specific 
organization, but also to capture their innovativeness, the literature on innovativeness levels is 
referred to. A very comprehensive work is provided by Salomo (2003), who summarizes and 
structures the relevant articles and aligns different approaches to one homogenous concept of 
innovativeness. In doing so, Salomo responds to the problem in innovativeness research that a 
huge variety of definitions, concepts, and operational solutions exists that complicates a 
comparison of different empirical studies (Salomo, 2003: 400)11. Kock (2007) conducted a 
meta analysis to answer the question in which ways the degree of innovativeness influences 
the success of an innovation, with the result that the positive or negative impact can only be 
assessed when taking into account the different dimensions underlying innovativeness. 
Innovativeness turns out to be a complex construct that measures the newness of a new 
product, service or process (Garcia et al., 2002: 112). To conceptualize differences among 
innovations according to their innovativeness, categories such as radical innovation and 
incremental innovation have been introduced (Ettlie, Bridges, & O'Keefe, 1984: 683). 
Although the differentiation between incremental and radical innovation was a first step into 
considering the complexity of innovativeness, more recent studies operationalize 
innovativeness as a multidimensional concept consisting of market- and technology 
dimensions, organizational change and environmental shifts (Kock, 2007: 3). However, the 
problem remains that these categorizations are used very differently by almost each 
researcher, which does not allow for a comparison of most of the empirical studies conducted 
(Garcia et al., 2002; Salomo, 2003). Nevertheless, all these investigations have in common 
that they conceptualize the innovativeness of an innovation in relation to their discontinuity in 
either a technological or marketing or both perspectives.  
                                                 
11 For an overview see also: Danneels, E. & Kleinschmidt, E. J. 2001. Product innovativeness from the firm's 
perspective: Its dimensions and their relation with project selection and performance. The Journal of Product 
Innovation Management, 18(6): 357, Garcia, R. & Calantone, R. 2002. A critical look at technological 
innovation typology and innovativeness terminology: A literature review. The Journal of Product Innovation 
Management, 19(2): 110. 
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5. Refining the Research Question and Discerning the 
Hypotheses 
 
When summarizing the literature on organizational slack and innovation, one emerging 
pattern of the ongoing discussion reflects the question whether slack impacts on innovation in 
a positive or a negative way. As has been shown in this research so far, these two 
contradicting positions are rooted either in theoretical propositions, with the negative effect 
proponents referring primarily to agency theory and the positive effect proponents referring 
preferably to behavioral theory.  
Apart from theoretical considerations, empirical studies have brought forward ambiguous 
evidence. On the one hand there is a whole bulk of results showing a positive relation 
between slack and innovation (Barrett et al., 2006; Damanpour, 1991; Geiger et al., 2006; 
Greve, 2003; Nystrom et al., 2002; Ruiz-Moreno et al., 2008). On the other hand there is 
similarly striking evidence for a negative relationship between slack and innovation. These 
authors advocate that slack resources impede innovation because it leads organizations to 
follow dubious projects, unrelated acquisitions or pet R&D projects. The basic argument is 
that through slack resources control mechanisms are so much relaxed that managers tend to 
follow projects that align with their own interests rather than with economic considerations  
(Bolton, 1993; Child, 1972; Jensen, 1993; Katila et al., 2005; Manns et al., 1978; Zajac et al., 
1991).  
 
Since both approaches are based on thorough theories and conclusive empirical results, 
another option is to recognize these two research streams to contain some degree of reliability 
and synthesize the results. With the positive approach as the thesis, and the negative approach 
as the antithesis, the synthesis of the two is to propose an inverse U-shaped model assuming a 
positive relationship up to a certain level of slack resources above which the influence on 
innovation turns negative. Empirical evidence for the synthesis is provided by a number of 
studies (Geiger et al., 2002; Herold et al., 2006; Kim et al., 2008; Nohria et al., 1996; Nohria 
et al., 1997). 
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Consequently, the research question of this study is as follows:  
“Against the theoretical and empirical background reviewed above, this thesis inquires about 
the relationship between organizational slack and innovation in nonprofit organizations. 
More precisely it is of interest to find out how these two concepts are related, positively, 
negatively, or inversely U-shaped.”  
 
The following hypotheses are tested:  
 
· H1: All organizational slack dimensions and innovation are positively associated. 
(Mod 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) 
· H2: All organizational slack dimensions and innovation are negatively associated. 
(Mod 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) 
· H3: All organizational slack measures and innovation are inversely U-shaped associated. 
(Mod 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) 
· H4: The distinction between available, recoverable, and potential slack leads to different 
impacts of these three slack dimensions on innovation. 
(Mod 1) 
 
Referring back to chapter 1.3., which outlines specifics of NPOs as compared to for-profit 
organizations, the one criterion dealing with HR is of peculiar relevance for slack research. 
Since organizational slack manifests itself in different types of resources, e.g. physical 
resources, financial resources, human resources, etc., and literature suggests that human 
resources are the most important asset of nonprofits (Akingbola, 2006: 1708; Brown et al., 
2003: 14), the following hypothesis 5 is established: 
 
· H5: HR related slack in NPOs is more important than financial slack in impacting 
innovation. 
(Model 2, 3, 4, 5) 
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6. What Shall (Not) be Seen. And How to Proceed 
 
It is not to argue that the research method which is applied determines to a considerable 
extend what will be seen and where blind spots will remain (Titscher, Meyer, & Mayrhofer, 
2008: 68). For this research endeavor a quantitative approach has been opted for. Researching 
the hypothetical construct of organizational slack could have been done in a number of ways. 
Even when studying the interplay between organizational slack and innovation, contemporary 
methodology for social scientists offers an ample range of tools and methods to choose from. 
Objective, statistical analysis can be found on the one end of the method continuum, 
interpretative, hermeneutical approaches on the other end.  
Reciting the methodological dispute over the question of the correct way to generate 
knowledge is not the aim of this section, since this question has more wisely been referred to 
elsewhere (for an overview see: Musgrave, 1988; Popper, 1959; Schülein & Reitze, 2005; 
Stadler, 2001). 
Nevertheless, what should be discussed here is the question why a specific method has been 
opted for, which alternatives would have been available, and why they have been foregone.  
Clearly, each approach has its advantages but also its shortcomings; therefore basing the 
decisions that have been made on methodologically discernable arguments may help retrace 
the reasons for the finally applied method. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Research Model 
 
As this thesis examines organizational slack and innovation, both of which analyzed on an 
organizational level, the unit of analysis is the organization, and neither the individuals within 
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the organization, nor the macro structures surrounding the organization. Additionally, this 
research is interested in identifying causal relationships between these two construc ts, 
illustrated in figure 6.1.  
 
Having clarified the research interest, subsequently the question arises which approach allows 
for unveiling causal relationships between two concepts. Methodologically, this question has 
not been answered unambiguously, but a certain tendency is evident. Representatives of the 
qualitative paradigm assume that causal relationships are mostly studied by quantitatively 
oriented researchers who initially explicitly formulate hypotheses which are then tested 
statistically. Qualitative approaches usually object to explicitly formulating hypotheses 
through causal relationships (Opp, 1999: 43). Nevertheless, Opp (1999: 44) refuses the 
traditional argument and holds that also qualitative approaches construct causal relationships, 
leaving this research area open to both, quantitative and qualitative designs. The important 
difference is supposed to be the fact that while quantitative representatives formulate their 
hypotheses explicitly, the qualitative school of thought applies them rather implicitly or even 
does not unveil them at all.  
 
Consequently, instead of going for a statistical analysis, a qualitative approach would have 
been another option. Applying hermeneutical techniques would have some major advantages 
for researching organizational slack. Since the concept of slack has originally been introduced 
as a theoretical construct to explain certain organizational phenomena12 (cf. Cyert et al., 
1963), its operationalization has been a major challenge for empirical studies ever since13. 
Recognizing these problems, a qualitative approach could have helped establish a clearer 
picture of organizational slack in Austrian nonprofit organizations. Additionally, another 
potential advantage of a hermeneutical approach would be its technique of the hermeneutic 
circle, which is the movement back and forth in the text to eventually get to the core meaning 
(Bortz & Döring, 2006: 303; Gadamer, 1972). Applied to the research of slack and 
innovation, the hermeneutic circle could deliver a more concise understanding of the question 
whether slack triggers innovation, or, vice versa, innovation triggers slack. Theoretically, and 
also practically it is  conceivable that additional revenues generated through a product or 
service innovation are the antecedent to slack accumulation. Therefore the question has to be 
tackled what was first, the chicken or the egg? The hermeneutic circle would be a suitable tool 
to uncover the hidden mechanisms, which is a bigger problem with a quantitative approach.  
                                                 
12 For a detailed discussion please refer to chapter 2.6. of this research.  
13 See chapter 6.2.1 for a detailed discussion. 
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Another alternative would have been to go for an in-depth case study analysis, a method 
thought to be very fruitful for innovation research because it allows better for exploring the 
processes underlying an innovation project (Slappendel, 1996: 124; Van de Ven et al., 1989).  
Nevertheless, for a couple of reasons it was sensible to apply a quantitative method for this 
research endeavor: 
First, investigating causal relationships between organizational slack and innovation can be 
based on a rich literature background, which has been introduced extensively in chapter 3.2. 
Since there are convincing theoretical concepts, and numerous empirical studies examining 
this topic, there exists a background to reliably discern hypotheses from, which can then be 
tested quantitatively. This means for instance that it is not necessary anymore to confront the 
“chicken and egg” problem, because it has already been proven that the cyclical relationship 
between slack and innovation has to be incorporated into the research design, which is also 
possible with quantitative studies (cf. Herold et al., 2006).  
Second, maybe the more important argument for choosing the quantitative approach was that 
there had been no prior studies on slack and/or innovation in the Austrian nonprofit sector. 
Consequently it would have been impossible to commence a reliable sampling process, i.e. 
where to start searching for a suitable case organization? Which organizations to select for 
qualitative investigations? 
In response to these two conditions and due to the strengths of quantitative approaches 
(representative, hypotheses testing, etc) a survey with subsequent statistical analysis has been 
chosen.  
 
The following chapters describe in greater detail the survey design, the sampling strategy and 
the dataset of this study. Then, the variables which are applied to capture organizational slack 
on the one hand and innovation on the other hand are established. Finally, the statistical 
methods are introduced. 
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6.1. Sampling and Dataset 
 
A sample of 250 randomly selected Austrian nonprofit organizations is the data basis for the 
investigation14. In generating the data pool, WU-Wien cooperated with Statistik Austria15, 
which has a comprehensive address pool at hand to draw from. However, one major problem 
is that the Statistik Austria address pool only considers NPOs that have at least one paid 
employee, a considerable drawback when taking into account the vast number of nonprofits 
operating exclusively on a voluntary basis. The tremendous gap between the number of NPOs 
considered by Statistik Austria and the number of officially registered associations in the 
Austrian register of associations amounts to 97,995 NPOs (Neumayr, Schneider, Meyer, & 
Haider, 2007: 4). To counteract the frequently observed shortcoming of samples biasing 
towards bigger NPOs, this sample is split in a way that 200 NPOs are taken from Statistik 
Austria and another 50 NPOs –those with volunteers only- are self-generated. According to 
each federal country’s population density and their respective frequency of huge, middle and 
small sized communities16, a number is calculated that indicates how many NPOs will have to 
be drawn. Through community homepages and/or Herold’s telephone directory specific NPOs 
are randomly selected for the dataset after having the NPO cross-checked for their existence 
with the Austrian register of associations.  
 
In order to react to an increasingly diminishing response rate in postal surveys the 
questionnaire is split in two parts. The one set of questions which is more complicated to 
answer and is therefore likely to produce a high number of missing values is asked via a 
phone survey, while a second set of questions which is supposed to be easily answerable is 
submitted through a postal-based questionnaire.  
This thesis  investigates organizations and therefore CFOs or CEOs are targeted to respond on 
behalf of their NPO. The rationale is that these persons have the best overview of both, the 
resource base and the innovation activities in their organization. To counteract the common 
method bias (Podasakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003; Podsakoff & Organ, 1986; 
Spector, 2006) and key informant bias (Hurrle & Kieser, 2005) there are two arguments at 
hand. The questionnaire consists of two separated parts (the phone and the postal-based 
parts), with the independent and dependent variables split between these two parts. Therefore, 
                                                 
14 The questions for this thesis were part of a survey for the research project New Orientations for Democracy in 
Europe (NODE) investigating different societal functions carried out by NPOs. 
15 Statistik Austria is the Austrian Statistics Office. See www.statistik.at. 
16 The classification of huge-middle-small is based on the number of inhabitants per community. >10,000 are 
huge, 10,000 to 2,000 are middle, and <2000 are small sized communities. 
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a very high probability exists that either (i) two different respondents complete each of these 
two parts, or (ii) alternatively, the time gap between completing these two parts by the same 
respondent makes it highly unlikely that the answers are biased consciously. There is, 
however, one exception to the split of the dependent and independent variables between the 
two questionnaires. The slack variable Recoverable slack payment (for details see chapter 
6.2.1) is part of the same questionnaire where the innovation variables are placed, which 
means that the first of the two counterarguments is not true in this case. In spite of this 
shortcoming, this slack variable is calculated from two separate questions, which means that 
there is no single item asking for the RecSlackPay answers. Hence it is supposed that a 
conscious bias does not occur to an extent that would decrease the reliability of this measure.  
In spite of the increasingly negative reputation of self-report measures, their data quality is 
not necessarily worse than that of more objective surveys (cf. Spector, 1994).  
From the 250 NPOs finally 234 are considered for the analysis. This reduction relates to the 
fact that only those NPOs are valid which indicated that their resource base had not changed 
over the last five years. The rationale behind the question is to approximate a time gap 
variable between slack measures and innovation measures (for a discussion see: Daniel et al., 
2004; Herold et al., 2006). It is assumed that a constant resource base over a certain period 
guarantees that it is not the innovation itself which created the slack resources measured, but 
vice versa.  
 
6.2. Measures of Organizational Slack, Innovation, and Controls 
 
Since measurement of both constructs organizational slack and innovation is a crucial topic in 
this study, the different measures and the corresponding variables are described in greater 
detail. The questionnaires can be found in appendix I.  
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6.2.1. Measures of Organizational Slack 
 
The following table 6.2 provides an overview of variables used in prior empirical studies to 
measure organizational slack.  
 
Authors/Variables Available Slack/high 
discretion/unabsorbed 
Recoverable 
Slack/absorbed 
Potential Slack/low 
discretion 
Dimick et al., 1978  Average profit over last 
five years 
  
Bourgeois et 
al.,1983 
(Net profits – 
dividends)/sales 
dividends/net worth 
(cash&securities-
Curr.Liab.)/sales 
Accounts 
receivable/sales 
Inventory/sales 
(Gen’l&admin.exp.)/sales 
Long term debt/net 
worth 
Price/earnings ratio 
Sharfman et al., 
1988 
Cash, cash equivalents, 
credit lines, raw materials 
inventory, low skilled 
labor, highly flexible 
machine capacity 
 Processed 
inventory, skilled 
labor, low flexible 
machine capacity 
Duizenstraal 1994 X-Efficiency measures   
Nohria et al., 1997 Self-reporting measure 
10% less budget 
Self-reporting measures: 
10% less time 
 
Bowen, 2002 Qualitative Measures: 
Keywords: excess 
resources, excess 
performance, resource 
requirements, managerial 
time, cost-benefit 
consideration 
  
Geiger et al., 2002 Quick ratio  Debt/equity ratio 
Nystrom et al., 2002 Scarcity of resources 
Availability of skilled labor 
Managerial talent 
Amount of funds already 
committed to projects 
  
Tan, 2003a Capital depreciation Retained earnings  
Bowman et al., 2005 Current assets/current 
liabilities 
“Liquidity” 
Admin.expenses/total 
expenses 
“Overheads” 
Total assets/total 
liabilities 
Total debt 
capacity/tot. liab. 
“Solvency” 
Herold et al., 2006 Quick ratio = (curr.assets-
inventories)/curr. liabilities 
  
Table 6.1: Variables applied to measure organizational slack. Authors are in chronological 
order 
 
The first period of measurement instruments (end of 1970s) mainly concentrated on very 
rough measures such as average profit over the last five years. At the beginning of the 1980s, 
the concept of slack got more elaborate. Particularly the work of Bourgeois (1981) brought 
forward the debate and contributed a measurement tool for organizational slack that 
concentrates on financial figures. Additionally, a more differentiated approach toward 
organizational slack was launched that differentiated between available, recoverable and 
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potential slack (Bourgeois et al., 1983). At the end of the 1980s Sharfman (1988) 
concentrated also on the antecedents of organizational slack and identified variables that 
influence the accumulation of slack resources. Since the 1990s empirical studies on 
organizational slack have applied very different variables from financials, self-report 
measures to qualitative measures (Bowen, 2002; Herold et al., 2006; Nohria et al., 1997). 
For this research project not only financial measures are involved, since especially in the 
nonprofit framework other resources must be taken into account as well. Therefore, a 
measurement instrument is constructed that considers two different resource dimensions. (i) 
First, a set of items targets financial resources of an NPO; (ii) Second, another pool of 
questions will capture resources that are related to HR issues specifically relevant in a 
nonprofit framework, such as volunteering, motivation, qualification, working hours etc.  
 
Against the above backdrop this thesis bases its quantitative study on the following slack 
variables: 
Referring to the literature suggesting a more complex slack model through the distinction 
between available, recoverable, and potential slack (Bourgeois et al., 1983; Geiger et al., 
2002; Sharfman et al., 1988; Singh, 1986), these three measures are discussed first. 
Additionally, for all composite slack variables the corresponding reliability measure 
Cronbach’s Alpha is mentioned in parantheses next to the variable. Although all Cronbach’s 
Alpha figures are relatively low, indicating that the composition does not focus on the same 
item, theoretical arguments are thought to overrule the empirical test. 
Available Slack (.331): This slack category is the most flexible slack resource in an 
organization and consists primarily of financial resources. Therefore, available slack is 
operationalized by two questions targeting financial information: (i) We permanently enjoy a 
high amount of liquidity (cash/current account/etc.); (ii) We permanently face problems in 
balancing our financial liabilities on time. The final available slack variable is a composite 
measure of these two questions.  
Recoverable Slack Multi (.250): Recoverable slack is characterized as being already more 
incorporated into the organizational structures and routines, which leads to the following 
operationalization. “Multi” in the variable’s name stands for the different resources this slack 
variable is composed of:  
(i) In the case of financial distress we can sell real estate, motor pool, etc.; (ii) The level of 
qualification of our employees exceeds by far the minimum necessary to correctly carry out 
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the task. (iii) Our employees are highly motivated and would deliver additional performance 
in times of stress.  
Here, two specific variables for the nonprofit sector come into play. While the first 
recoverable slack measure targets financial resources, the latter two capture soft factors. 
Qualification is shown to be a crucial topic for nonprofit leaders. It has been shown that 
careers in the nonprofit sector are highly dependent on a rich base of complementary 
education and qualification (Aghamanoukjan, Eikhof, Leitner, & Meyer, 2007a).  
Motivation is another highly relevant variable in researching NPOs, since the emphasis of the 
mission is supposed to induce an increased level of motivation, given that the value base 
which underlies the mission is consistent with that of the employee (Eckardstein, 2007: 274; 
Simsa, 2007: 128). In combining these three questions, the variable RecSlackMLT is created.  
Potential Slack (.245): Potential slack is the third dimension proposed in the distinction and 
refers to slack resources that are not yet part of the organization but can easily be acquired. 
Hence, three potential slack questions are in the questionnaire: (i) In the case of financial 
distress we can easily obtain additional financial resources through donations/grants/etc.; (ii) 
In the case of financial distress we can easily obtain additional financial resources through 
credits/loans/etc.; (iii) If necessary we can easily recruit additional volunteers.  
These questions again take into account specific resource categories such as donations and 
volunteers.  
Financial Slack (.492): This variable consists of five questions which have been used for the 
above variables but  are combined in a different way here. Consequently, a combination of the 
following questions synthesizes the financial slack variable: (i) In the case of financial 
distress we can easily obtain additional financial resources through donations/grants/etc.; (ii) 
In the case of financial distress we can easily obtain additional financial resources through 
credits/loans/etc.; (iii) We permanently enjoy a high amount of liquidity (cash/current 
account/etc.); (iv) We permanently face problems in balancing our financial liabilities on 
time.  
The rationale to introduce an alternative distinction for organizational slack to available, 
recoverable, and potential slack is that in NPOs human resources are a highly important 
resource category which needs to be specifically addressed. Apart from human resources the 
second major resource stock concerns financial resources, and therefore a separate slack 
variable is constructed which captures the financial dimension.  
Recoverable Slack HR (.316): This variable combines all measures related to HR issues and 
comprises these questions : (i) The level of qualification of our employees exceeds by far the 
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minimum necessary to correctly carry out the task; (ii) Our employees are highly motivated 
and would deliver additional performance in times of stress; (iii) If necessary we can easily 
recruit additional volunteers.  
Recoverable Slack Qualification: This variable intends to capture the slack which might exist 
in education and qualification levels. Participants were asked to answer the question: The 
level of qualification of our employees exceeds by far the minimum necessary to correctly 
carry out the task.  
Recoverable Slack Payment: Finally, the slack variable RecSlackPay should after all represent 
a hard variable which delivers additional information for the slack level in the NPO. Relating 
to the very early works on organizational slack by Cyert and March (1963), where they 
developed the idea of measuring the level of slack by individual payments, this thought  has 
been adopted for the current study. Consequently, the variable RecSlackPay is constructed by 
dividing the average personnel expenditure the NPO indicated by the number of FTE the NPO 
stated.  
 
Another peculiarity needs to be addressed when discussing the above slack variables. 
Although the intention is to provide a distinction of slack apart from available, recoverable, 
and potential slack, all the HR related slack variables are labeled with “recoverable” before 
the specification which kind of recoverable slack is talked about. Thus, for instance the 
variables are named RecSlackPay, RecSlackHR, RecSlackQual, etc. The reason for the 
labeling strategy is to conform to the current literature on slack, according to which all these 
variables represent recoverable slack categories since these resources are enmeshed into the 
structures, routines and procedures of the NPO. However, differentiating more clearly among 
the various recoverable slack variables contributes to the transparency and to the 
comprehensiveness of this study. Additionally, it is shown in the empirical analysis that these 
different recoverable slack measures have different impacts on innovation (see chapter 7.4.), 
which casts doubt on the traditional distinction (see also: Cheng et al., 1997).  
 
6.2.2. Measures of Innovation and Innovativeness 
 
In measuring innovation and innovativeness of NPOs the survey is limited to product and 
service innovations and therefore neglects process innovations. Two reasons exist to proceed 
in this way. (i) This study wants to find out about innovations that directly address NPOs’ 
constituencies’ and clients’ needs, not innovations internal to the organizations with only 
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indirect or no external effects. (ii) This research relies on self- report statements by nonprofit 
managers which are checked for reasonability ex post. From experience with a prior study, 
where a similar method was applied but where also process innovations were included, the 
stated process innovations were highly arguable and difficult to validate ex post, and therefore 
a quite unreliable source of information (Aghamanoukjan et al., 2007b).  
Consequently, to measure (i) the frequency of innovations, the number of innovations that are 
described by the respondents in the questionnaire is counted.  
Literature shows a variety of different instruments to measure (ii) product innovativeness. An 
extensive overview is provided by Garcia et al. (2002: 114pp), who cite 22 different studies 
using fifteen constructs and more than 51 scale items related to product innovativeness. 
Responding to the problem of diversity in approaches to measure innovativeness, Salomo 
(2003) creates and validates a measurement instrument that aligns relevant variables found in 
the literature. This instrument is the basis for extracting those variables which will be applied 
in the survey and comprises the following items: (i) In order to get an idea of the innovation, 
the respondent is asked to (a) provide a brief description of the innovation, (b) name the target 
group, (c) indicate the date of introduction, and (d) explain who named the new 
product/service an innovation. (ii) A second set of items aims at defining the innovativeness 
of the product/service using 5 items and Likert-type17 scales ranging from 1=correct to 5=not 
correct. The five items are: (1) the innovation addresses totally new clients, (2) the innovation 
provides unique advantages to existing stakeholders, (3) the innovation requires a 
reorganization of internal structures/processes etc., (4) the innovation requires changes in 
behavior/attitudes from the targeted clients, and finally (5) for our organization the innovation 
was very costly.  
These five questions cover areas regarded most relevant for this research, with the first two 
questions pointing at the new product/new client perspective, the third question aiming at 
internal changes provoked through the innovation, the fourth question covering external 
changes through the innovation, and with the last question considering organization- internal 
financial issues coming along with innovations (Salomo, 2003). Consequently, the data about 
different product/service innovations are analyzed with the aim to construct a continuum from 
less to more innovative services and products (Garcia et al., 2002). 
 
To construct the final innovation measure Innovation, the innovativeness and the quantitative 
measures are combined by adding up the ir scales. Accordingly, Innovation not only reflects 
                                                 
17 For additional information on Likert scales see: Bortz, J. & Döring, N. 2006. Forschungsmethoden und 
Evaluation für Human- und Sozialwissenschaftler (4. ed.). Heidelberg: Springer Medizin Verlag. 
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the frequency of innovations but also their “newness” as captured through the questions on 
innovativeness.  
 
Finally, if it is assumed that slack resources do influence the innovation behavior of NPOs, 
then it must be guaranteed that slack resources have existed prior to the innovation. 
Conceptually it seems to be clear that a time lag has to be considered that models the fact that 
transforming slack resources into innovation takes time (Herold et al., 2006). Therefore also a 
variable is introduced that asks whether the resource situation has changed considerably in the 
last five years. 
 
6.2.3. Control Measures 
 
In addition to the different independent variables and the dependent variable the model is only 
capable of delivering reliable results if control variables are included. These control variables 
are theoretically discerned from prior empirical research results or stem from arguments 
which emphasize the peculiarities of NPOs.  
 
Degree of Control: The organization- internal degree of control variable is supposed to impact 
innovation significantly. Jensen (1993) discussed consistently that strong internal control 
systems aiming to ensure that R&D and other capital allocations lead to innovations are 
theoretically important. The organization- internal degree of control variable has also been 
included in empirical studies investigating the effect of slack on innovation (Nohria et al., 
1996; Nohria et al., 1997).  
 
Legal form: Since NPOs may choose among a set of different types of legal forms 
(Eilmansberger et al., 2006), it is important to consider them as control variables, otherwise 
possible influencing effects would remain unseen. It might be that associations systematically 
show a different innovation behavior than corporations, for instance. Dummies have been 
created to operationalize the different legal forms possible, with the legal form “association” 
as the reference category.  
 
Function of NPO: A similar argument is true for including the societal function of an NPO as 
a control variable. Since NPOs may carry out activities which can be attributed either to the 
service function, the advocacy function, or the community building function (cf. Neumayr & 
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Schneider, 2008), it might occur that they significantly impact the innovation behavior of 
NPOs. The service function for instance might come along with different implications for an 
NPO’s innovation management than does the advocacy or the community building function.  
 
Size of NPO: Since organizational size has often shown to be a major predictor for innovation 
(Damanpour, 1992), size is included as a control variable. It is measured by the annual 
income an NPO generates. The final variable IncomeLog is the logarithmized value of the 
actual variable that asked for annual income figures.  
 
Competition: Finally, competition is often referred to as a variable impacting innovation 
because it is supposed to exert pressure on managers to search for new means-ends 
combinations in order to guarantee organizational survival (Leibenstein, 1969; Nohria et al., 
1996; Nohria et al., 1997; Schumpeter, 1934). Consequently, competition has been adopted as 
a control variable in this study as well by asking how many (i) profit seeking organizations, 
(ii) nonprofit organizations, (iii) public organizations which offer similar services or products 
are active in the NPO’s closer environment.  
 
Volunteers: Since volunteers (Volunteer_dum) are expected to influence the innovation 
behavior of NPOs due to their relative freedom in performing their activities, which might 
lead to more space for experimentation and trying new things, a control variable is introduced. 
Since the question for volunteers asked only for the number of volunteers active on average 
over one month, the variable has been introduced as a dummy with the reference category “no 
volunteers”. However, since the variable has not shown any significant impact in the 
regression models, it has not been considered in the final calculations.  
 
6.3. Statistical Analysis 
 
The statistical analysis is done with the SPSS computer package. In a first step descriptive 
statistics are delivered with the aim to introduce and characterize the variables which are then 
applied in further testing. Also, prior to more advanced statistical analysis the innovations 
described by the respondents are illustrated.  
In a subsequent second step, correlation results are presented in order to provide a preliminary 
insight into the data and to get a first idea about which variables are more or less associated 
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with each other, and to further hypothesize about the relation between the dependent, the 
control, and the independent variables. 
Finally, multivariate OLS regression models are calculated which serve to answer the 
research question by deciding about rejecting or accepting the hypotheses constructed above 
in chapter 5. However, since the regression models assume a linear relationship which 
contradicts some of the hypotheses proposing a non-monotonic association between 
organizational slack and innovation, additional variables are introduced. Following the 
techniques frequently applied to model an inversely U-shaped relationship between the 
dependent and the independent variable, the squared terms of the independent variables are 
added to the model (cf. Herold et al., 2006; Nohria et al., 1996; Nohria et al., 1997; Tan, 
2003a; Tan et al., 2003b). Therefore, for some of the regression models the squared term of 
the organizational slack variable is considered in order to examine the inverse U-shaped 
relation hypothesis. If the non-monotonic pattern is valid, then the ordinary slack term needs 
to show a significant, positive beta coefficient and the corresponding squared slack term needs 
to show a significant, negative beta coefficient (cf. Herold et al., 2006; Nohria et al., 1996; 
Nohria et al., 1997; Tan, 2003a; Tan et al., 2003b).  
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7. The Empirical Story of Organizational Slack and 
Innovation 
 
Following the theoretical and literature-based discussions in prior chapters, results of the 
empirical study are presented in this chapter, which is organized as follows. First, a 
quantitative and qualitative description of the innovations provided by the sample 
organizations is given. Second, a more in-depth analysis through descriptive statistics is 
delivered for the dependent and independent variables. The descriptive analysis is guided by a 
number of organization-demographic variables comprising organizational age, key activity, 
main societal function, size of the organization, and the legal form of the organization 
(Titscher et al., 2008: 48pp.), along which the dependent and independent variables are 
introduced. Finally, correlation analyses and regression models are presented which are 
intended to provide the evidence for answering the research question and testing the 
hypotheses of this thesis.  
 
7.1. Sharpening the Picture of Innovations  
 
The survey asked respondents to indicate how many innovations their organization had 
introduced from 2004 to 2006. Additionally, respondents were also asked to briefly describe 
the innovation they had indicated. Additionally the questionnaire requested information on 
who defined the innovation as an innovation. In the majority of the cases, an external 
stakeholder (e.g. clients, partners, funding-agency, etc.) was the reference group to qualify the 
innovation. In some cases, however, organization-internal decision makers were to qualify the 
innovation as an innovation. The study does not distinguish between service and product 
innovation due to the typical characteristic s of most innovations in the nonprofit sector, which 
do not allow for an exact distinction (see table 7.1).  
As a first glimpse, these descriptions are summarized according to the categories (i) product 
or service innovation, (ii) which key activity these innovations refer to – social/health 
services, education, recreation/culture, not elsewhere classified. Finally, typical innovations 
for each category are stated to exemplify the answers given.  
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Figure 7.1: Distribution of innovation among main activities 
 
Altogether, 211 innovations are examined in this research, the vast majority of which are 
service innovations amounting to 85% of the total, leaving 15% product innovations. When 
splitting the innovations among the main activities, which are social/health services, 
education, recreation/culture, and not elsewhere classified (n.e.c.), somehow surprisingly 
most innovations are introduced in the field of education with 39%, followed by social/health 
services with 36%, recreation/culture with 16%, and finally the category not elsewhere 
classified with 9%, as illustrated in figure 7.1. This is surprising insofar, as the social and 
health services field is the most important and biggest nonprofit subsector in Austria. 
In table 7.1 an overview of typical examples is provided for each of the different innovation 
categories but not elsewhere classified since the innovations from this field are too diverse to 
be exemplified.  
 
Innovation/key 
activity 
Social/health 
services 
Education Recreation/Culture  
Example 1 Counseling 
services in mother 
tongue for 
immigrants 
Western Balkan 
Democracy Project 
– capacity building  
Special theatre 
performance for 
breastfeeding mums 
Example 2 High resolution 
scanning electron 
microscope 
A publication that 
informs about 
procedures in grant 
making policies  
Publication of a 
pamphlet on 
measures for cultural 
and educational 
policy 
Table 7.1: Examples of innovations by category 
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7.2. Establishing the Map – Descriptive Analysis of the Variables 
Innovation and Organizational Slack 
 
The description of the sample and the variables of interest is organized as follows. First, basic 
characteristics of the sample are illustrated and the organization-demographic variables are 
analyzed. Second, the innovation measures are introduced and their distribution among the 
organization-demographic variables is analyzed. Third, organizational slack variables are 
described. Fourth,  sample characteristics of the relevant control variables for the subsequent 
multivariate analysis are introduced.  
 
7.2.1. Basic Sample Description and Organization-demographic Variables 
 
The 234 NPOs analyzed show an average age of 37.28 (std. deviation 43.47) years, with the 
youngest organization being one year and the oldest organization more than 400 years old.  
 
40% of the sample NPOs are active in the field of education and research, followed by 22.2% 
engaged in social services and 9.8% active in culture and arts18. A comprehensive illustration 
of the NPOs’ key activities is provided in figure 7.2.  
Since Austria still lacks a satellite account for comprehensively capturing the nonprofit sector 
in quantitative terms, exact figures regarding the population of Austrian NPOs do not exist, 
which complicates the assessment whether the sample drawn is biased into the one or the 
other direction. However, to get a rough idea about the Austrian nonprofit sector, results of 
the study “The Non-profit Sector in Austria – An economic, legal and political appraisal” 
(Neumayr et al., 2007) are presented. It is important to be aware that the data are estimates 
calculated on the basis of the Austrian workplace and business census from 2001. According 
to the parameters employment and spending, the Austrian nonprofit sector is structured. 
Calculations show that according to the relative share of employees, the subsectors health 
and social work (33.1%) and education (22.9%) are the biggest subsectors. When taking a 
look at spending, the social services sector shows the highest total amount with €1,545.2 
million, followed by health with €894.3 million in spending. Of course, expenditure is heavily 
triggered by relatively high personnel costs in social and health services. This picture already 
shows that the high number of education and research NPOs in the sample (see figure 7.2) 
                                                 
18 The categorization follows the international classification of nonprofit organizations (ICNPO). For details 
see: Salamon, L. M., Anheier, H., List, R., Toepler, S., Sokolewski, W., & Associates. 2004. Global Civil 
Society. Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press. 
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does not comply with the results from the above study. Still, one must consider that the above 
data are approximations via employees and spending figures. On the other hand, the high 
number of education NPOs in the sample may be explained through a high number of 
kindergardens. 
 
Figure 7.2: Main field of activities of NPOs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3: Share of NPOs by societal functions  
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When taking a look at the societal functions19 performed by NPOs, the data show that 71% of 
the organizations are active in service delivery, 54% are active in advocacy and another 47% 
of the total sample performs community building (see figure 7.3).  
 
Obviously, the answers to the question about which functions an organization carries out are 
not mutually exclusive. Consequently, most organizations perform all three functions to a 
more or less extent. Only 25 (11%) out of a total of 234 NPOs are exclusively active in 
service delivery, another 6 (2.6%) NPOs are solely active in advocacy, and not more than 
three (1.3%) NPOs do only carry out community building activities.  
 
Concerning the numbers of employees the picture is as follows. On average the NPOs have 
31.6 (std. deviation 184.2) full time equivalent employees (FTE) comprising full time 
employees, part time employees and marginally employed. However, while the biggest NPO 
employs up to 2664 people, the other extreme is one paid employee. While 50% of the NPOs 
do not have more than four full time equivalent employees, and 90% do not employ more 
than 30 FTE, only 5% have a workforce of more than 100 FTE employees. This shows that 
the sample is definitely not biased towards bigger organizations in terms of employees. 
Excluded here is the number of volunteers for each organization. 
Volunteering is an interesting figure as well when talking about the size of an NPO (Salamon 
et al., 2004: 469). The average number of volunteers per organization amounts to 325.52 (std. 
deviation 3414.85). The highest number of volunteers in an organization is 50,979 while on 
the other hand 31.6% of the NPOs do not have any volunteers. 80% do not count more than 
10 volunteers, and 90% not more than 30. Finally, 5% of the NPOs say they have more than 
100 volunteers. This again indicates that in terms of workforce the sample contains mainly 
small NPOs, which reflects the structure of the Austrian nonprofit sector well (cf. Schneider 
et al., 2007).  
 
Other measures determining the size of an organization are financial input and output figures. 
In the year 2006 the sample NPOs showed an average income of € 3,365,600 (std. deviation € 
18,423,500). However, the dispersion is enormous, ranging from NPOs with no or almost no 
income at all to NPOs generating an income of up to € 204,000,000. A closer look at the data 
reveals that 10% had an annual income of less than € 8,000, after which the income figures 
                                                 
19 For details see: Neumayr, M. & Schneider, U. 2008. Nonprofit Organisationen - mehr als nur Dienstleister? 
Empirische Befunde zu den Funktionen von Nonprofit Organisationen in Österreich und der Tschechischen 
Republik. In R. Schauer & B. Helmig & R. Purtschert & D. Witt (Eds.), Steuerung und Kontrolle in Nonprofit-
Organisationen. Linz: Trauner Verlag. 
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rise sharply. 50% of the sampled NPOs say their annual income in 2006 amounted to € 
210,000 and 80% claim their income to be less than € 1,300,000. The highest 5% of the NPO 
income range generate amounts above € 10,000,000 per organization.  
On the other hand there is the financial output measure indicating expenditures of the NPOs. 
The sample organizations show an expenditure mean value of € 2,547,700 (std. deviation € 
15,477,200), again with highly dispersed extreme figures. On the lower edge there are NPOs 
claiming they had no expenditures at all and on the upper edge the maximum expenditure 
equals € 204,000,00020. While the lower 10% of the NPOs indicate expenditures of not more 
than € 4,000 and 50% had expenditures of less than € 210,000 the upper 10% say they spent 
over € 3,400,000 and the highest 5% spent more than € 8,900,000 in the year 2006.  
 
Referring to the funding sources of the NPOs, the questionnaire distinguishes between public 
funding (e.g. federal government, provincial governments, communities, European Union), 
private sources (e.g. private individuals, corporations, other NPOs), and churches. Of the 234 
NPOs 64% receive public funding, 69% receive private funding, and 5% receive funds from 
the church, as illustrated in figure 7.4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Share of NPOs by different funding sources 
 
                                                 
20 Somewhat surprisingly the highest amount of income equals the highest amount of expenditures, leaving room 
for the assumption that the figures are partly biased towards socially desirable answers. Since NPOs are not 
expected to make profits, some organizations might tend to overstate their expenditures. However, on an 
aggregated level the difference between financial input and output is positive, which means that the NPOs 
generate a collective surplus. Thus, there is evidence for slack creation. 
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Unfortunately, one third of the responding organizations gave answers which did not pass 
plausibility tests and that is why this variable is not considered for the following two chapters, 
where the dependent and independent variables are introduced. However, the 66% (156 
NPOs) of the NPOs whose answers seem to be reliable show that 56.34% of the cumulative 
income stems from private sources and 43.56% of the aggregated income is granted by public 
sources. The church accounts for not more than 0.11% of the cumulative income in the 
sample. Therefore, figure 7.5 shows only the share of private and public sources.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5: Aggregated share of public and private funding sources of total income 
 
Finally, NPOs may appear in very different legal forms, be it associations, corporations, 
partnerships, foundations, cooperations, etc. (cf. Eilmannsberger et al., 2006). As expected, 
the vast majority of the NPOs are associations with 75% of the total, followed by another 
17% of public law organizations (e.g. church) as shown in figure 7.6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.6: Share of NPOs by legal form 
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The picture given by the sample organizations represents the heterogeneity of the Austrian 
nonprofit sector in terms of activities, societal functions, legal forms, and particularly in terms 
of size indicators. Additionally, it is also shown that a bias towards bigger organizations 
cannot be observed in the sample.  
 
7.2.2. The Dependent Variable Innovation 
 
Now, the innovation measure is introduced along the organization demographic variables (i) 
key activity according to ICNPO; (ii) societal function; (iii) size of NPO in terms of FTE; (iv) 
legal form of NPO. To proceed this way, in a first step the innovation variable, which actually 
is a metric variable, was recoded and categorized into four different categories according to an 
NPO’s level of innovation, ranging from “no innovation”, “low innovation”, “medium 
innovation”, to “high innovation”.  
 
When examining innovation along the ir key activity according to ICNPO (see table 7.1), the 
quantitative data confirm the impression from the qualitative innovation description that most 
NPOs are found in the education and research cluster. Also, in the education and research 
pool the relatively highest amount of high- innovator NPOs is found (33.3%). Social services 
accounts for the second highest relative share of high- innovator NPOs with 26.7%, followed 
by health and culture and arts with 10% of the high- innovator NPOs. On the other hand it is 
also the education and research pool which shows the highest relative amount of NPOs 
without any innovations (44.6%). Second with 20.7% is the social services sector and third 
with 10.9% culture and arts NPOs.  
 
The innovation variable analyzed along the different societal functions needs a more 
differentiated approach. Since not only the Austrian nonprofit sector is known to be 
diversified in terms of the societal functions service delivery, advocacy, and community 
building, but also single NPOs frequently perform either all three or a combination of two of 
the three functions and perform comparatively rarely only one single function (cf. Neumayr et 
al., 2008), in a first step the innovation variable is described along the dimension of multi-
function, dual- function and single-function NPOs. Then, the dual- function NPOs are 
investigated more closely, as are the single function NPOs.  
 
 
 
Organizational Slack and Innovation  From Theory to Empirics 
 
 158 
 
   InnovLevel 
   None Low Mid High Total 
Count 10 4 6 3 23 Culture and arts  
% within InnovLevel 10,9% 6,8% 11,5% 10,0% 9,9% 
Count 6 9 3 1 19 Sports and recreation 
% within InnovLevel 6,5% 15,3% 5,8% 3,3% 8,2% 
Count 41 22 20 10 93 Education and research 
% within InnovLevel 44,6% 37,3% 38,5% 33,3% 39,9% 
Count 5 2 2 3 12 Health 
% within InnovLevel 5,4% 3,4% 3,8% 10,0% 5,2% 
Count 0 3 0 1 4 Employment and training 
% within InnovLevel 0,0% 5,1% 0,0% 3,3% 1,7% 
Count 19 10 15 8 52 Social services  
% within InnovLevel 20,7% 16,9% 28,8% 26,7% 22,3% 
Count 1 1 1 1 4 Regional development 
% within InnovLevel 1,1% 1,7% 1,9% 3,3% 1,7% 
Count 1 1 1 0 3 Business and prof. assoc., 
unions  % within InnovLevel 1,1% 1,7% 1,9% 0,0% 1,3% 
Count 1 2 0 0 3 Religion 
% within InnovLevel 1,1% 3,4% 0,0% 0,0% 1,3% 
Count 4 2 1 2 9 Environment 
% within InnovLevel 4,3% 3,4% 1,9% 6,7% 3,9% 
Count 4 3 3 1 11 Law, advocacy, and politics  
% within InnovLevel 4,3% 5,1% 5,8% 3,3% 4,7% 
Count 92 59 52 30 233 
ICNPO 
Total 
% within InnovLevel 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 7.2: Innovation by ICNPO 
 
The sample of this study shows that most high- innovator NPOs are found among the multi-
function NPOs. These nonprofits carry out the service, the advocacy, and the community 
building function simultaneously. However, single-function NPOs feature more high-
innovator NPOs than do dual- function NPOs. Not surprisingly, the category multi- function 
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NPOs also shows the highest amount of none- innovators, followed by the single-function and 
the dual- function categories (see table 7.3).  
 
 
   InnovLevel 
   None Low Mid High Total 
Count 25 16 15 9 65 Single 
% within InnovLevel 26,9% 27,1% 28,8% 30,0% 27,8% 
Count 23 15 10 6 54 Dual 
% within InnovLevel 24,7% 25,4% 19,2% 20,0% 23,1% 
Count 45 28 27 15 115 Multi 
% within InnovLevel 48,4% 47,5% 51,9% 50,0% 49,1% 
Count 93 59 52 30 234 
Function diversification 
Total 
% within InnovLevel 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 7.3: Innovation by function diversification 
 
Within the category dual- function NPOs there is still the distinction between NPOs 
combining the service and the advocacy functions, the service and the community building 
functions, and the advocacy and the community building functions. 
 
 
   InnovLevel 
   None Low Mid High Total 
Count 9 7 7 0 23 Serv. Advoc. 
% within InnovLevel 39,1% 46,7% 70,0% 0,0% 42,6% 
Count 10 7 1 3 21 Serv. Comm. build. 
% within InnovLevel 43,5% 46,7% 10,0% 50,0% 38,9% 
Count 4 1 2 3 10 Advoc. Comm. Build. 
% within InnovLevel 17,4% 6,7% 20,0% 50,0% 18,5% 
Count 23 15 10 6 54 
Function 
dual 
Total 
% within InnovLevel 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 7.4: Innovation by dual-function NPOs 
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Even though most NPOs combine the service and the advocacy functions, there is no high-
innovator NPO in this category. The categories service & community building, and advocacy 
& community building have the same number of high- innovators of 3 NPOs each. The sample 
size for dual- function NPOs shrinks to only 54 NPOs, as shown in table 7.4. 
 
Finally, the single-function NPO subsample comprises 65 NPOs, of which most are service 
providers (74%). Also, across all innovation categories the service delivery function counts 
the highest amounts of NPOs (see table 7.5).  
 
 
   InnovLevel 
   None Low Mid High Total 
Count 18 13 10 7 48 Service 
% within InnovLevel 72,0% 81,2% 66,7% 77,8% 73,8% 
Count 5 1 2 0 8 Advocacy 
% within InnovLevel 20,0% 6,2% 13,3% 0,0% 12,3% 
Count 2 2 3 2 9 Comm. build. 
% within InnovLevel 8,0% 12,5% 20,0% 22,2% 13,8% 
Count 25 16 15 9 65 
Function single 
Total 
% within InnovLevel 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 7.5: Innovation by single-function NPOs 
 
Differentiating the innovation variable by the size of a nonprofit organizations measured by 
its number of FTE employees reveals the following picture (see table 7.6). Due to the 
disparate distribution of NPOs across the variable size by FTE, most high- innovator NPOs are 
found in the two categories very small and small. However, the data also show that 46.7% of 
the high- innovator NPOs are small NPOs and not very small NPOs. Additionally, most non-
innovator NPOs are very small organizations, which indicates human resources might 
somehow play an important role in the innovation game. Three out of eight NPOs in the 
category very big are high- innovator NPOs. 
 
 
 
 
Organizational Slack and Innovation  From Theory to Empirics 
 
 161 
   InnovLevel 
   None Low Mid High Total 
Count 53 31 30 10 124 Very small 
% within InnovLevel 57,0% 52,5% 57,7% 33,3% 53,0% 
Count 34 19 14 14 81 Small 
% within InnovLevel 36,6% 32,2% 26,9% 46,7% 34,6% 
Count 2 5 6 2 15 Medium 
% within InnovLevel 2,2% 8,5% 11,5% 6,7% 6,4% 
Count 2 2 1 1 6 Big 
% within InnovLevel 2,2% 3,4% 1,9% 3,3% 2,6% 
Count 2 2 1 3 8 Very big 
% within InnovLevel 2,2% 3,4% 1,9% 10,0% 3,4% 
Count 93 59 52 30 234 
Size by FTE 
Total 
% within InnovLevel 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 7.6: Innovation by FTE 
 
A final organization demographic variable of interest here is the legal form of the NPO. Table 
7.6 illustrates that in the sample a majority of 175 NPOs are associations which also account 
for the highest relative and absolute amount of NPOs across all innovation categories.  
 
Legal form * InnovLevel Crosstabulation 
   InnovLevel 
   None Low Mid High Total 
Count 18 6 13 3 40 Publ. law 
% within InnovLevel 19,6% 10,5% 25,0% 10,0% 17,3% 
Count 66 50 35 24 175 Assoc. 
% within InnovLevel 71,7% 87,7% 67,3% 80,0% 75,8% 
Count 2 0 2 2 6 Foundation 
% within InnovLevel 2,2% 0,0% 3,8% 6,7% 2,6% 
Count 6 1 2 1 10 Corporation 
% within InnovLevel 6,5% 1,8% 3,8% 3,3% 4,3% 
Count 92 57 52 30 231 
Legal form 
Total 
% within InnovLevel 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 7.7: Innovation by legal form of NPO 
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A considerably high number of non- innovator NPOs can be found among corporations with 
six out of ten NPOs. In contrast, four out of six NPOs among the foundation sample is either a 
mid- or a high- innovator NPO.  
 
7.2.3. Organizational Slack Variables 
 
This chapter serves to introduce the organizational slack measures along the already known 
organization demographic variables (i) key activity according to ICNPO; (ii) societal 
function; (iii) size of NPO in terms of FTE; (iv) legal form of NPO. Since in this research 
there is not only one organizational slack variable but six different  measures, all these six 
slack variables are examined separately, starting with (a) recoverable slack payment by FTE; 
(b) recoverable slack HR; (c) recoverable slack MLT; (d) recoverable slack Qual; (e) 
available slack; (f) potential slack. However, before discussing the slack measures along the 
organization demographic variables, distribution charts for the slack measures are presented.  
 
The following figure 7.7 depicts the distribution of recoverable slack payment by FTE and 
illustrates that most NPOs have medium slack when neglecting those without any slack in 
payment by FTE.  
 
 
Figure 7.7: Distribution of recoverable slack payment by FTE 
 
Referring to the slack measure recoverable slack HR, figure 7.8 tells a similar picture, which 
is that most organizations feature medium slack levels.  
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Figure 7.8: Distribution of recoverable slack HR 
 
Subsequently, the distribution for recoverable slack MLT is illustrated and again shows that 
the medium slack measure is the one to find most NPOs.  
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Figure 7.9: Distribution of recoverable slack MLT 
 
Turning to the recoverable slack qualification variable shows a distribution where the high 
slack category is very close to the medium slack category.  
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Figure 7.10: Distribution of recoverable slack qualification. 
 
When taking a look at the available slack variable one can see that once again the medium 
slack category pools the highest amount of NPOs, followed by the high slack category.  
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Figure 7.11: Distribution of available slack 
 
Finally, the potential slack variable shows a different pattern, with a high amount of low slack 
NPOs and the medium slack category ranking second behind the low slack category.  
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Figure 7.12: Distribution of potential slack 
 
Having illustrated the distribution for each of the relevant slack measures, now these slack 
variables are presented in combination with the organization-demographic variables. 
 
Recoverable Slack Payment by FTE 
 
Organizational slack operationalized by annual expenditure for an FTE shows that, within the 
ICNPO category education and research, most high-slack NPOs can be found but this 
category also features the highest amount of no-slack organizations. As with the innovation 
variable, the education and research field pools the biggest relative share of NPOs with 40%. 
22.3% of the organizations are found in the social service field, with the highest amount of 
medium-slack NPOs (41.4%) and the second-highest number of high-slack NPOs (19.4%). 
The culture and arts field ranks third with 12.9% of the high-slack organizations and 12.1% of 
medium-slack organizations. More details can be looked up in table 7.8.  
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   RecSlackPay 
   No slack Low slack Medium slack High slack Total 
Count 10 2 7 4 23 Culture and arts  
% within RecSlackPay 8,6% 7,1% 12,1% 12,9% 9,9% 
Count 14 1 2 2 19 Sports and recreation 
% within RecSlackPay 12,1% 3,6% 3,4% 6,5% 8,2% 
Count 57 14 15 7 93 Education and research 
% within RecSlackPay 49,1% 50,0% 25,9% 22,6% 39,9% 
Count 6 1 2 3 12 Health 
% within RecSlackPay 5,2% 3,6% 3,4% 9,7% 5,2% 
Count 1 0 3 0 4 Employment and training 
% within RecSlackPay ,9% 0,0% 5,2% 0,0% 1,7% 
Count 15 7 24 6 52 Social services  
% within RecSlackPay 12,9% 25,0% 41,4% 19,4% 22,3% 
Count 1 0 1 2 4 Regional development 
% within RecSlackPay ,9% 0,0% 1,7% 6,5% 1,7% 
Count 2 0 0 1 3 Business and prof. assoc., 
unions  % within RecSlackPay 1,7% 0,0% 0,0% 3,2% 1,3% 
Count 2 0 1 0 3 Religion 
% within RecSlackPay 1,7% 0,0% 1,7% 0,0% 1,3% 
Count 4 2 1 2 9 Environment 
% within RecSlackPay 3,4% 7,1% 1,7% 6,5% 3,9% 
Count 4 1 2 4 11 Law, advocacy, and 
politics  % within RecSlackPay 3,4% 3,6% 3,4% 12,9% 4,7% 
Count 116 28 58 31 233 
ICNPO 
Total 
% within RecSlackPay 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 7.8: Recoverable slack payment by FTE by ICNPO 
 
Examining this slack variable by the degree of diversification of the NPO, the data unveil that 
the single and dual function NPOs have an equal share of high-slack nonprofits, while the 
multi- function NPOs rank first among the no-slack organizations. However, within the multi-
function category most medium-slack NPOs are counted, resulting in a relative share of 
51.7% (see table 7.9). 
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   RecSlackPay 
   No slack Low slack Medium slack High slack Total 
Count 28 8 18 11 65 Single 
% within RecSlackPay 23,9% 28,6% 31,0% 35,5% 27,8% 
Count 27 6 10 11 54 Dual 
% within RecSlackPay 23,1% 21,4% 17,2% 35,5% 23,1% 
Count 62 14 30 9 115 Multi 
% within RecSlackPay 53,0% 50,0% 51,7% 29,0% 49,1% 
Count 117 28 58 31 234 
Function  
diversification 
Total 
% within RecSlackPay 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 7.9: Rec. slack payment by FTE by function diversification 
 
Within the dual- function NPOs those organizations that combine the service and the advocacy 
functions feature the highest share of high-slack (63.6%) and medium-slack (60%) 
organizations.  
 
 
   RecSlackPay 
   
No slack Low slack 
Medium 
slack High slack Total 
Count 7 3 6 7 23 Serv. Advoc. 
% within RecSlackPay 25,9% 50,0% 60,0% 63,6% 42,6% 
Count 14 2 3 2 21 Serv. Comm. build. 
% within RecSlackPay 51,9% 33,3% 30,0% 18,2% 38,9% 
Count 6 1 1 2 10 Advoc. Comm. build. 
% within RecSlackPay 22,2% 16,7% 10,0% 18,2% 18,5% 
Count 27 6 10 11 54 
Function dual 
Total 
% within RecSlackPay 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 7.10: Recoverable slack payment by FTE by dual-function NPOs 
 
NPOs performing service and community building rank first among the no-slack 
organizations and those NPOs doing advocacy and community building rank third across all 
slack categories, as illustrated in table 7.10.  
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Going deeper into single-function NPOs reveals that service organizations rank first across all 
slack categories and that advocacy and community building organizations show almost 
similar slack- level patterns (see table 7.11).  
 
 
   RecSlackPay 
   
No slack Low slack 
Medium 
slack High slack Total 
Count 18 6 16 8 48 Service 
% within RecSlackPay 64,3% 75,0% 88,9% 72,7% 73,8% 
Count 5 1 0 2 8 Advocacy 
% within RecSlackPay 17,9% 12,5% 0,0% 18,2% 12,3% 
Count 5 1 2 1 9 Comm. build. 
% within RecSlackPay 17,9% 12,5% 11,1% 9,1% 13,8% 
Count 28 8 18 11 65 
Function single 
Total 
% within RecSlackPay 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 7.11: Rec. slack payment by FTE by single-function NPOs 
 
If the recoverable slack variable is analyzed by the size of the NPO, the interesting results 
show that particularly very small and small NPOs show the highest numbers of medium- and 
high-slack organizations. 
 
 
   RecSlackPay 
   No slack Low slack Medium slack High slack Total 
very small % within RecSlackPay 63,2% 53,6% 29,3% 58,1% 53,0% 
small % within RecSlackPay 27,4% 35,7% 50,0% 32,3% 34,6% 
mid % within RecSlackPay 5,1% 3,6% 10,3% 6,5% 6,4% 
big % within RecSlackPay 2,6% 0,0% 5,2% 0,0% 2,6% 
very big % within RecSlackPay 1,7% 7,1% 5,2% 3,2% 3,4% 
Size by FTE 
Total % within RecSlackPay 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 7.12: Recoverable slack payment by FTE by size of NPO 
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However, this category also pools the highest shares of no-slack and low-slack NPOs. Not 
surprisingly, the very small and the small NPOs together account for 87.6% of all NPOs in 
this subsample, as illustrated in table 7.12.  
 
 
   RecSlackPay 
   
No slack Low slack 
Medium 
slack High slack Total 
Count 26 4 8 2 40 Publ. law 
% within RecSlackPay 22,8% 14,3% 13,8% 6,5% 17,3% 
Count 81 23 43 28 175 Assoc. 
% within RecSlackPay 71,1% 82,1% 74,1% 90,3% 75,8% 
Count 3 1 1 1 6 Foundation 
% within RecSlackPay 2,6% 3,6% 1,7% 3,2% 2,6% 
Count 4 0 6 0 10 Corporation 
% within RecSlackPay 3,5% 0,0% 10,3% 0,0% 4,3% 
Count 114 28 58 31 231 
Legal form 
Total 
% within RecSlackPay 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 7.13: Recoverable slack payment by FTE by legal form 
 
Regarding to the legal form of the NPO there are no surprising results given the fact that the 
vast majority of NPOs appears in the legal form of an association. Consequently, across all 
slack levels associations rank first, which is described in table 7.13. 
 
To continue describing each slack variable along each organization-demographic variable 
means producing another 30 crosstabs, which would not boost the readability of this chapter. 
Therefore, to guarantee transparency on the one hand and text fluency on the other hand the 
remaining variables are described in the text, but the corresponding crosstabs are to be found 
in appendix III to this thesis. Since the main patterns of the recoverable slack payment by 
FTE are reflected also by the remaining slack variables, a more prominent examination is not 
thought to be fruitful.  
 
The remaining recoverable slack variables basically repeat the story from above when 
analyzed along the key activity (ICNPO). Education and research features most high-slack 
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NPOs but has also the highest amount of no-slack organizations. However, in contrast to the 
prior slack variable, all of the remaining recoverable slack indicators  show a very low 
number of no-slack NPOs. Again, similarly to the innovation variable, the education and 
research field pools the biggest relative share of NPOs for almost all slack variables with 
around 40%. The only exception to the rule is the slack variable RecSlackMLT, which pools 
most high-slack NPOs in the field of social services with a relative share of 30% as compared 
to 23.5% in the education and research field. For all other slack indicators, however, it is true 
that the social service field ranks second for high-slack NPOs. The culture and arts field ranks 
third across almost all recoverable slack variables, again with the exception of RecSlackMLT, 
where sports and recreation is found in third place.  
A somewhat different picture is presented by the available and potential slack variables. 
NPOs with the highest available slack score are mostly social service organizations (31.2%), 
followed by education and research NPOs (26.6%), and culture and arts NPOs, as well as law, 
advocacy,  and politics NPOs (7.8%). Among medium-slack NPOs, however, most are found 
in the education and research field (44.8%), then social services field (17.9%), and culture and 
arts (10.3%).  
Even more interesting is the pattern created by potential-slack NPOs. NPOs featuring high 
potential slack are equally distributed among the education and research, the social services, 
and the religion fields with 33.3% each. With medium-slack NPOs the picture is again more 
consistent with the usual evidence, with the education and research field ranking first, the 
social services field second, and the culture and arts as well as the sports and recreation fields 
in third place. No-slack organizations are rare among the available-slack sample with a total 
of only three NPOs. For the potential slack sample a mere 18% said they had no potential 
slack. 
 
Concerning the societal functions , the recoverable slack variables RecSlackHR and 
RecSlackQual show that the multi function NPO category yields the highest share of high-
slack NPOs, followed by single-function NPOs and dual- function NPOs. With the 
recoverable slack variable RecSlackMLT, however, single-function NPOs with 47.1% account 
for most of the high-slack organizations. But when taking a look at the medium-slack NPOs it 
becomes clear that a vast majority is found in the multi- function NPO pool. Also, in terms of 
actual figures the high-slack NPOs amount only to 17 altogether, out of which 8 are in the 
single-function category. Medium-slack NPOs add up to 198 organizations, of which 102 are 
multi- function NPOs.  
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Available slack adheres to the above-presented picture, with multi- function NPOs featuring 
most high-slack NPOs. Potential slack on the other hand follows the pattern, with the single-
function category having the highest amount of high-slack NPOs but when taking a look at 
medium-slack NPOs again the multi- function category yields most organizations.  
In all cases, no-slack NPOs either do not exist or appear very rarely.  
Within the dual-function category the service-advocacy combining NPOs mostly have high 
slack across all recoverable slack variables; only the RecSlackMLT has the most high-slack 
NPOs in the service-community building category. The same is true for the available slack 
sample. Surprisingly, there is no high-slack NPO in the potential slack sample.  
Finally, for all single-function NPOs it can be observed that the highest share of high-slack 
NPOs can be found among service organizations.  
 
If the slack variables are analyzed aga inst the size of an organization measured by FTE, a 
very consistent pattern emerges across all slack indicators. Due to the overwhelming majority 
of small and very small NPOs, for all slack levels the highest shares and numbers of NPOs are 
found in these two categories. Put differently, small and very small NPOs add up to almost 
90% of the NPOs in this sample  and therefore they show the highest numbers across all slack 
categories and levels.  
 
A comparable situation is true when analyzing the slack variables against the legal form of an 
organization. Since associations are the most prominent legal form across all slack variables, 
associations show the highest actual and relative figures across all slack levels. Similarly 
consistent ly public law NPOs rank second, with a huge distance though between associations 
and public law NPOs.  
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7.3. Which Variables Go Together? First Insights from Correlation 
Analyses 
 
Following the descriptive picture provided in the previous chapter, correlation analyses 
should now deliver a first insight into dependencies among the different variables. These 
analyses serve also as a preparation for the multivariate steps taken in the subsequent chapter.  
 
Since the one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test for normal distribution provides 
evidence that almost none of the variables follow a normally distributed pattern, with the only 
exception being the variable measuring advocacy (see appendix II), Spearman’s rank-order 
correlation (2-tailed) is applied (cf. Diamantopoulos & Schlegelmilch, 2000; Härdle & Simar, 
2007). 
 
The correlation matrix21 which is attached to the  thesis in appendix II reveals that innovation 
is positively correlated with all recoverable slack measures but one. To go into more detail, 
the variable RecSlackPay is highly significant at the 0.01 level, with a correlation coefficient 
of 0.265. Further highly significant variables are RecSlackHR (0.169), the slack variable 
RecSlackMLT (0.130), and finally Financial slack (0.301) which also significantly correlate 
with innovation. The only slack variable showing no significant correlation is RecSlackQual, 
which is significant at the 0.1 level, though, or at the 0.05 level if a one-tailed analysis is 
applied.  
 
The recoverable slack variables and their correlations among each other show the expected 
picture that due to variable constructs using overlapping measures RecSlackHR, 
RecSlackMLT, and RecSlackQual are all significantly, positively correlated. This is why these 
variables cannot be used in the same regression analysis due to the problem of 
multicollinearity (Backhaus, Erichson, Plinke, & Weiber, 2008: 87). Nevertheless, one of the 
recoverable slack variables, RecSlackPay, is measured independently from the other 
indicators and shows no significant correlations with them.  
Available slack is significantly positively correlated with potential slack (0.163) for 
measurement reasons again. Nevertheless, available slack also has a positive significant 
correlation with the dummy variable volunteering (0.152) and a highly significant positive 
correlation with the income variable (0.274) - correlation coefficients in parentheses.  
                                                 
21 The term highly significant refers to the 0.01 level and significant indicates a 0.05 level. 
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Potential slack on the other hand shows highly significant correlations with a couple of other 
slack variables, which can be explained once again with measurement issues. Moreover, 
potential slack has a highly significant positive correlation with the competition variable 
Comp_npo (0.185). Highly significant positive correlations appear for the variables Comp_fpo 
(0.161), Voldum (0.144), and IncomeLog (0.153).  
Financial slack shows highly significant correlations with RecSlackMLT (0.218); as well as 
with potential slack (0.434), with Comp_npo (0.194), with Volunteer_dum (0.168), and 
Innovation (0.301). Significant correlations are illustrated for Comp_fpo (0.159), and 
Comp_publ (0.148).  
 
Finally, an examination of the control variables unveils that the measure for the freedom of 
internal decision making (Degree of control) is significantly and positively correlated with 
RecSlackHR with a coefficient of 0.14322.  
The dummy variable foundation shows a significant positive correla tion (with a coefficient 
of 0.194) with the public competition variable Comp_publ.  
The variable measuring the degree of the advocacy function for an NPO is significantly and 
positively correlated with the two variables RecSlackPay (0.147) and Innovation (0.151).  
The control and proxy variable for the size of the NPO is measured through the 
organization’s income and is logarithmized. It is highly significantly and positively correlated 
with the variables Comp_npo (0.170), RecSlackPay (0.702), and Innovation (0.241), as well 
as significantly correlated with RecSlackQual (0.131).  
The three variables capturing the degree of competition, Comp_npo, Comp_fpo, and 
Comp_publ, are certainly highly significantly correlated with each other. Apart from that, 
Comp_npo is also highly significantly correlated with IncomeLog, as has been described just 
above. Additionally, the variable Comp_publ shows a significant correlation with the dummy 
variable foundation (0.194).  
Finally, the control variable volunteering is a dummy variable (Voldum) and does not show 
any significant correlations with other variables.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 The negative sign in the correlation matrix is due to the inverse measurement of the variable. 
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7.4. Going Deeper into the Data – Generating Multivariate Models 
 
Although the K-S test for normal distribution revealed that except for the advocacy variable 
all others are not normally distributed, it is common technique to apply OLS multiple 
regression models if the sample size is big enough, which is the case here (n=234).  
 
The procedure in generating the different multivariate models is as follows. The point of 
departure is an initially constructed base model (model 0) which serves as a baseline from 
which the analysis advances forward by introducing different slack variables. Constructing 
the baseline model follows two conditions. First, all variables included in model 0 are part of 
a more comprehensive  set of theoretically discerned control variables. Second, not all of these 
control variables have finally been considered for the baseline model. Third, regression 
models should always adhere to the principle of parsimonity, which means to explain as much 
variance as possible with as few variables as possible. Since the aim of the regression model 
is to identify significantly impacting variables, in a couple of pre-steps most of the non-
significant variables were exc luded, as long as there were no strong theoretical arguments for 
keeping them in the model. Three variables have not been dismissed for theoretical 
considerations: (i) Freedom of decision making (FreedDec) was left in the model since the 
results of Nohria and Gulati (1996; 1997) strongly and plausibly advocate for their relevance. 
(ii)Within the set of the three competition variables, only Comp_fpo shows a significant 
influence. However, since competition would not be comprehensively captured were the other 
two variables Comp_npo and Comp_publ excluded, they have been kept in the baseline 
model.  
 
Apparently, model 0 (F-test: 5.191; significant at: .00) indicates that the legal form foundation 
has a significant positive impact on innovation in NPOs, as has the societal function 
advocacy. Also as expected, income significantly impacts on the innovation in NPOs in a 
positive way and the higher the competition from for-profit organizations the higher the 
innovation of the NPO. Interestingly, additional competition from public organizations 
negatively affects innovation in NPOs.  
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Predictor Variable  Std. error Beta t-Test p-Value 
(Constant) 7,619  -0,165 0,87 
Degree of control 1,67 -0,119 -1,537 0,127 
Legal form (foundation) 13,205 0,235 2,865 0,005 
Function of NPO (advocacy) 1,98 0,159 2,063 0,041 
Size of NPO (income log) 0,842 0,251 3,218 0,002 
Competition (NPO) 
1,955 0,168 1,644 0,102 
Competition (FPO) 2,308 0,165 2,031 0,044 
Competition (PO) 2,206 -0,095 -0,89 0,375 
Adjusted R2 0,17    
Dependent Variable: Innovation 
        
Table 7.14: Regression Model 0 
 
Departing from the baseline model 0, the coming models contain different slack measures to 
examine the diverse effects of slack on innovation. Following the study design of Geiger and 
Cashen (2002), model 1 (F-test : 4.307; significant at: .00) adds the following variables: (i) 
available slack, (ii) available slack squared, (iii) recoverable slack, (iv) recoverable slack 
squared, and (v) potential slack. 
It appears that the control variables do not change considerably in their effects on innovation 
when the additional slack variables are introduced. However, none of the slack variables 
shows a significant impact on innovation. Going into detail reveals that neither the linear, nor 
the squared term of available slack result in significant coefficients. Nevertheless, the 
available slack terms show the expected signs, i.e. the linear term a positive and the squared 
term a negative sign. This indicates an inverse U-shaped association with innovation, if the 
coefficients were significant. Recoverable slack measures do not meet significance 
requirements either, moreover its linear and squared terms show counterintuitive signs, i.e. the 
linear term a negative and the squared term a positive sign, which would indicate a U-shaped 
association with innovation. Finally, also the potential slack term which is expected to show a 
positive linear relation with innovation shows a negative and insignificant association instead. 
Despite the fact that model 1 (adj. R2= .217) has a higher explanation power than model 0 
(adj. R2= .170), model 1 is not trusted for three reasons. First, none of the slack variables 
shows significant coefficients, while the control variables retain their impact. Second, 
recoverable slack and potential slack measures do not adhere to the expected patterns which 
have repeatedly appeared in other empirical studies. Assuming a U-shaped relationship 
between recoverable slack and innovation is neither empirically justified since the relevant 
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terms are insignificant, nor is there any literature support for a result like that. On the other 
hand, the data do definitely not confirm the assumption that innovation in NPOs is similarly 
influenced by slack as it is shown for profit-seeking firms. Third, the higher explanatory 
power of model 1 is artificially boosted through the multicollinearity effect caused by the 
linear and its squared term. These results give reason for further investigation by entering 
other slack variables as is done in model 2.  
 
Predictor Variable  Std. error Beta t-Test p-Value 
(Constant) 28,977   -0,81 0,42 
Degree of control 1,636 -0,09 -1,186 0,238 
Legal form (foundation) 13,035 0,26 3,21 0,002 
Function of NPO (advocacy) 1,934 0,162 2,158 0,033 
Size of NPO (income log) 0,869 0,273 3,38 0,001 
Competition (NPO) 1,919 0,175 1,749 0,083 
Competition (FPO) 2,307 0,189 2,335 0,021 
Competition (PO) 2,176 -0,135 -1,275 0,204 
Available slack 5,997 0,6 1,321 0,189 
Available slack squared 0,426 -0,692 -1,519 0,131 
Recoverable slack multi 4,227 -0,223 -0,608 0,544 
Recoverable slack multi squared 0,225 0,478 1,306 0,194 
Potential slack 0,849 -0,067 -0,82 0,414 
Adjusted R2 0,217    
Dependent Variable: Innovation 
        
Table 7.15: Regression Model 1 
 
The quantitative studies explicitly distinguishing between available slack, recoverable slack 
and potential slack have focused very much on financial slack measures, which has two 
implications. On the one hand the focus on financial slack measures only has made it 
reasonable to differentiate among the three slack measures since this enables a comparability 
of the results. On the other hand, the focus on financial measures again produces a quite 
narrow picture of organizational slack in organizations, much more so when talking about 
NPOs. Therefore, model 2 (F-test : 4.836; significant at: .00) introduces another differentiation 
of slack measures, financial slack and human resources (HR) slack. 
Having entered the linear terms of financial slack and HR slack, one of the control variables 
seems to alter its impact. The advocacy variable loses its significant impact on a .05 level, 
however, it remains significant on a 0.1 level. Turning to the slack variables uncovers that 
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financial slack shows a negative but far from significant effect on innovation, which somehow 
repeats the insignificant available slack results (which are financial measures) from the prior 
model 1. HR slack, instead, seems to influence innovation in a positive manner, since the 
corresponding linear coefficient is positive and highly significant. Therefore, model 2 with an 
adj. R2 of .194 has gained explanatory power as compared to model 0.  
 
Predictor Variable  Std. error Beta t-Test p-Value 
(Constant) 12,519   -1,412 0,16 
Degree of control 1,656 -0,097 -1,267 0,207 
Legal form (foundation) 13,086 0,256 3,14 0,002 
Function of NPO (advocacy) 1,965 0,136 1,784 0,077 
Size of NPO (income log) 0,877 0,264 3,242 0,001 
Competition (NPO) 1,933 0,162 1,603 0,111 
Competition (FPO) 2,296 0,18 2,237 0,027 
Competition (PO) 2,181 -0,111 -1,049 0,296 
Financial slack 
0,58 -0,056 -0,698 0,487 
Recoverable slack HR 0,793 0,185 2,403 0,018 
Adjusted R2 0,194    
Dependent Variable: Innovation 
        
Table 7.16: Regression Model 2 
 
Having learned that HR related slack can be assumed to be an important influencing variable 
for innovation in NPOs, the subsequent model 3 (F-test: 5.794; significant at: .00) introduces 
yet another slack variable which relates to the level of qualification of the staff. Since 
qualification and education are important issues in the nonprofit sector (Aghamanoukjan et 
al., 2007a), this measure has been introduced. The resulting model 3 reaches an adj. R2 of 
.211, with the known control variables keeping their significant impacts. Advocacy almost 
regains its prior significance with .054. The linear slack measure coefficient is highly 
significant and positive. A squared term has not been entered for the reason that qualification 
itself is a variable with a quite narrow range of variance meaning so that it is almost 
impossible to gain too much education or qualification which could negatively impact 
innovation. In contrast to financial indicators, which theoretically and empirically are argued 
to adversely affect innovation, there are no such arguments for qualification and education 
levels.  
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Predictor Variable  Std. error Beta t-Test p-Value 
(Constant) 9,15   -1,801 0,074 
Degree of control 1,631 -0,106 -1,393 0,166 
Legal form (foundation) 12,887 0,225 2,802 0,006 
Function of NPO (advocacy) 1,934 0,146 1,942 0,054 
Size of NPO (income log) 0,821 0,244 3,207 0,002 
Competition (NPO) 1,911 0,147 1,473 0,143 
Competition (FPO) 2,264 0,19 2,388 0,018 
Competition (PO) 
2,151 -0,085 -0,819 0,414 
Recoverable slack qualification 1,451 0,215 2,849 0,005 
Adjusted R2 0,211    
Dependent Variable: Innovation 
        
Table 7.17: Regression Model 3 
 
In order not to entirely neglect financial measures, model 4 (F-test : 4.963; significant at: .00) 
tests yet another slack measure related to HR which is the level of annual income of a paid 
employee (on the basis of FTE), or put differently, the annual mean HR expenditure per FTE 
in an NPO. Since this variable is expected to adhere to the inverse U-shaped patterns of 
financial slack variables from other studies, not only a linear term but also a squared term is 
entered. 
 
Predictor Variable  Std. error Beta t-Test p-Value 
(Constant) 7,601   0,3 0,764 
Degree of control 1,67 -0,13 -1,68 0,095 
Legal form (foundation) 12,992 0,224 2,767 0,006 
Function of NPO (advocacy) 1,999 0,115 1,476 0,142 
Size of NPO (income log) 1,041 0,107 1,108 0,27 
Competition (NPO) 1,933 0,146 1,447 0,15 
Competition (FPO) 2,268 0,16 2,006 0,047 
Competition (PO) 2,181 -0,063 -0,593 0,554 
Recoverable slack payment 0 2,059 2,329 0,021 
Recoverable slack payment squared 0 -1,942 -2,211 0,029 
Adjusted R2 0,2    
Dependent Variable: Innovation 
        
Table 7.18: Regression Model 4 
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Model 4 leads to alterations with the control variables. Only the foundation dummy and the 
competition variable Comp_npo are similar to the prior models, while the other formerly 
significant variables turn insignificant. The slack variables indicate highly significant 
coefficients for both, the linear and the squared terms. Additionally, the linear and the squared 
term show the correct sign, which is positive for the first and negative for the latter. This 
means that there is strong evidence for the assumption that slack in remuneration has an 
inverse U-shaped relation with innovation in NPOs. Not only are the coefficients significant, 
but also the adj. R2 with .200 is among the highest of all models above.  
 
The final model 5 (F-test : 5.557; significant at: .00) combines two of the slack variables by 
entering the hard variable slack in payments and the soft variable slack in qualification and 
education. While the control variables did not severely change as compared to model 3, the 
slack variables show the expected directions.  
 
Predictor Variable  Std. error Beta t-Test p-Value 
(Constant) 9,072   -1,428 0,156 
Degree of control 1,629 -0,115 -1,523 0,13 
Legal form (foundation) 12,66 0,213 2,701 0,008 
Function of NPO (advocacy) 1,95 0,101 1,336 0,184 
Size of NPO (income log) 1,014 0,098 1,042 0,299 
Competition (NPO) 1,887 0,124 1,262 0,209 
Competition (FPO) 2,221 0,185 2,37 0,019 
Competition (PO) 2,125 -0,053 -0,512 0,61 
Recoverable slack payment 0 2,098 2,438 0,016 
Recoverable slack payment squared 0 -1,987 -2,324 0,022 
Recoverable slack qualification 1,424 0,215 2,903 0,004 
Adjusted R2 0,242    
Dependent Variable: Innovation 
        
Table 7.19: Regression Model 5 
 
The slack in payment variable has been considered with its linear and its squared term, and 
the slack in qualification measure has been recognized with its linear term only, which has 
been suggested by the results from the preceding regression models. With all of the slack 
variables showing highly significant coefficients and the confirmation of the inverse U-
shaped pattern of the slack in payment measure, model 5 reaches an adj. R2 of .242.  
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8. Discussion 
 
After having presented the results of different regression models, now their implications and 
meanings are discussed by relating them to prior theoretical and empirical literature findings. 
In doing so, the results of the thesis are embedded into the current research discourse on 
organizational slack.  
 
The analysis of organizational slack and its impact on innovation focuses on the 
organizational level. Therefore, factors such as the individual and its personal characteristics, 
motivation, cognitive abilities of the individuals, job characteristics, etc (see chapter 4.2) are 
neglected. Even at the organizational level innovation literature has identified a number of 
further influencing variables besides organizational slack, such as structure, strategy, size, or 
culture. Assuming that one single influencing variable explained how innovation emerges 
would be far too simplistic. On the other hand, innovation research has not yet come up with a 
comprehensive model considering all different levels of analysis and variables simultaneously 
(Damanpour, 1991). Thus, it is safe to say that innovation seems to be a highly complex 
process. Therefore, the argument of this thesis is to focus on the concept of organizational 
slack, which is theoretically supposed either to establish (e.g. behavioral theory) or impede 
(e.g. agency theory) conditions within the organization in favor of innovation.  
Now, is it that scarcity is the mother of innovation? Or do the results support the notion that a 
certain amount of fat -colloquial for organizational slack- within the organization enables 
promising innovations? And if the latter should be the case, what about disciplining factors 
inside the organization or in its environment? 
What can be learned from these results is that nonprofit organizations need to be well 
equipped with resources to stay competitive through being innovative. Staying competitive 
relates to the fact that in all regression models the control variable competition shows a 
significant and positive influence on the dependent variable innovation. Moreover, each of the 
five models reveals that particularly the competition with for-profit enterprises makes NPOs 
innovate more, or put differently, the more competition from for-profit organizations, the 
higher the rate of innovation of the NPO. When neglecting the results relating to the slack 
variables one might argue that the competition results provide empirical evidence for the 
assumption: “necessity is the mother of innovation”, since conventional wisdom predicts that 
competition makes organizations get rid of waste –yet another colloquial expression for 
organizational slack- and innovative. However, the overall picture delivered by the regression 
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models recommends a more differentiated relation: It is exactly the presence of organizational 
slack which provides the resource outfit to withstand the external pressures through 
competition also from for-profit enterprises, because these slack resources enable an NPO to 
innovate. And these new solutions, services, and products put the NPO in an advantageous 
position. This basic interpretation of the results is consistent with prior findings according to 
which organizational slack enables innovation (cf. Geiger et al., 2006; Greve, 2003; Herold et 
al., 2006; Kim et al., 2008; Nohria et al., 1997; Ruiz-Moreno et al., 2008).  
However, discipline seems to be an important variable in funneling slack resources into 
innovation. With reference to theoretical considerations and empirical results yielded by 
Nohria and Gulati (1996; 1997), arguing for the considerable effect discipline exerts on the 
relation between slack and innovation, in the case of NPOs the disciplining external influence 
seems to stem from competition. The insignificant effects in all five regression models of the 
variable degree of control, which was introduced to represent organization- internal 
disciplining mechanisms, supports the above argument.  
In view of the empirical results generated in this study there is still the question which 
mechanisms are at work to make slack impact on innovation. First, on a theoretical level these 
mechanisms have been outlined in the theory chapter (see chapter 2) and in the literature 
review chapter (see chapter 3). Additionally, recalling Nohria and Gulati (1997: 609), they 
suggest the following, “We propose two underlying mechanisms to explain the relationship: 
(1) the effect of slack on the process of experimentation, and (2) the effect of slack on the 
discipline exercised over experiments.” They argue that on the one hand organizational slack 
enables creativity and experimentation, the probability of which to result in innovation is 
higher when simultaneously disciplinary forces are present as well. Otherwise, so the 
suggestion, slack resources would indeed increasingly be used for unproductive behavior. 
Adopting this mechanism to this thesis explains that competition is the disciplinary variable 
which guarantees that slack resources are deployed properly to result in innovation.  
This interplay between slack resources on the one hand and a certain degree of discipline on 
the other hand is also reflected in the stage-gate model presented in chapter 4.2. The model 
proposes a sequence of stages enabling creativity and experimentation and gates, where 
thorough discipline is intended to streamline the innovation process (Cooper, 2008: 214p).  
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8.1. Positive or Negative Relationship (H1 and H2)? 
 
The results of the empirical research provide thorough evidence that the long lasting 
discussion concerning the positive or negative impact of organizational slack on innovation 
can be answered quite clearly for nonprofit organizations. All four regression models 
containing slack variables yielded results in support of hypothesis H1, which supposes that all 
organizational slack dimensions and innovation are positively associated, rather than H2 
which assumes the contrary. However, the findings need to be discussed a little more in-depth 
because a range of different slack variables has been analyzed. 
Model 1 containes available slack, recoverable slack, and potential slack to examine the 
influence on innovation. The linear and the squared terms of the first two slack variables are 
included to approximate the inverse U-shaped pattern. For potential slack only the linear term 
is considered. The model leads to insignificant coefficients for all slack variables and 
therefore the only conclusion which can be drawn from model 1 is that neither H1 nor H2 is 
confirmed.  
In contrast, model 2 contains a financial slack measure and an HR related slack measure and 
shows that financial slack seems to be negatively associated with innovation. The coefficients 
are far from significant, though. On the other hand, the HR related slack measure is positive 
and highly significant, which supports H1 and gives no reason to support H2. Similar results 
can be discerned from the remaining models, where in all instances the slack variables are 
positively related with innovation. The only minor exception is the slack variable recoverable 
slack payment, which indicates an inverse U-shaped association with innovation (model 4). 
Nevertheless, also recoverable slack payment is partly positively associated with innovation 
and highly probably not monotonously negatively related.  
Coming back to H1 and H2 it is safe to say that the current data widely confirm a positive 
relationship between organizational slack and innovation in NPOs. There is no convincing 
empirical evidence in support of H2, which expects a negative relationship between 
organizational slack and innovation.  
The results echo findings from a comprehensive literature which has come to the conclusion 
that after all organizational slack has a monotonic positive effect on innovation (see chapter 
3.2.8).  
For NPOs the results convey major implications concerning their innovation management. 
While financials do not seem to be the crucial resource to create an atmosphere which fosters 
innovation, human resources are much more likely to be the strategic variable. More 
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specifically the data suggest that employees with a “more than necessary” education outfit 
have a strong positive impact on innovation. A possible explanation for this finding is that 
innovations require a deep understanding of and the capability to reflect on the issue where 
the innovation should take place. Since education enhances the repertoire of reflective 
capacity and insight into the processes and mechanisms, it fosters innovation.  
Also it is not surprising that there is no inverse U-shaped association between the slack 
variable recoverable slack qualification and innovation, since qualification can hardly be too 
much for a complex process like innovation. Normally, the qualification level of any person is 
confined by his/her cognitive capabilities, therefore limiting the extent to which slack might 
occur.  
The positive relation of variable recoverable slack HR which is a composite measure 
containing qualification, motivation, and potential volunteers, can also be explained. While 
motivation is also a naturally confined variable which prevents a person from showing too 
much of it, the potential to recruit additional volunteers would be a potential slack dimension 
which is known to show a linear and positive association with innovation (cf. Geiger et al., 
2002). 
 
8.2. What About the Inverse U-shaped Relation? (H3) 
 
Somehow surprisingly, the inverse U-shaped relationship between the slack variables and  
innovation has not been supported for the majority of the slack measures. While the two 
measures recoverable slack qualification and recoverable slack HR show a positive 
relationship with innovation, as has been discussed above, only recoverable slack payment 
yielded convincing results in support of an inverse U-shaped relationship. 
On the other hand when taking a closer look at the different slack variables, differences 
emerge which might explain the diverging behavior of the measures, as has been discussed 
above for recoverable slack qualification and recoverable slack HR. The slack variable 
recoverable slack payment is not so much automatically limited as the other two, therefore 
conveying the probability of reaching and even surpassing a limit above which the positive 
impact on innovation finally turns negative. For NPOs the results indicate that there is an 
optimal level of payment for employees in relation to establishing a supporting organizational 
environment or innovation.  
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8.3. Which Differentiation of Slack for NPOs? (H4) 
 
A whole bulk of literature advocates distinguishing between available, recoverable and 
potential slack. Even empirically it has been shown that these different slack dimensions 
impact differently on innovation. Despite the convincing arguments there is still room to 
doubt the relevance of this distinction in the case of NPOs. First, the empirical results of this 
investigation show that model 1, which includes the literature based slack dimensions, does 
not provide significant results. On the other hand, models 2 to model 5 introduce a distinction 
between different sets of resources. It was distinguished between financial slack and HR 
slack, which led to intriguing results because model 2 shows that financial slack does not 
significantly impact innovation, while HR slack seems to be highly relevant. A conclusion 
therefore is that in NPOs it is more relevant to differentiate between resource categories than 
between available, recoverable, and potential slack.  
The point here is that recoverable slack is a highly underspecified category since it might 
include financial slack, HR slack, etc. Thus, in the case of NPOs, where a lot of relevant 
variables are per se in the recoverable slack pool, as is the case with all HR related slack 
variables, the difference has vanished and has moved to another level. This means, a look into 
the category recoverable slack has to be made to identify where again differences emerge 
between the various slack measures, which allows for a more fine-grained analysis. The 
empirical results suggest that the difference emerges between financial and HR related slack 
in the case of NPOs.  
 
8.4. The Prominent Role of HR Related Slack in NPOs (H5) 
 
The results of model 2 to model 5 provide thorough evidence for the suggestion that HR 
related slack is more important for innovation in NPOs than is financial slack. While none of 
the pure financial slack measures (avaiable slack, financial slack) reach significance for their 
coefficients, HR related slack variables are significant in all models.  
A potential explanation is that the skills and motivation which are brought into the 
organization via its employees are key resources for NPOs. Additionally, due to the multiple 
goal systems typical for NPOs, it is likely that employees are confronted with ambiguous 
requirements to their skill and knowledge base (Aghamanoukjan et al., 2007a). Therefore, 
employees equipped with both high motivation and a superior qualification and education 
background may contribute not only to routinized operations but to innovation as well.  
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However, the financial measure recoverable slack payment seems to play a crucial role for 
innovation in NPOs. Interestingly, this measure is not purely financial, since it relates to 
employees as well, but it also makes clear that an NPO needs to earn the money first before it 
can be distributed. Additionally it is important to consider that organizations operating on a 
voluntary basis only are not included here since their staff does not receive any financial 
compensation.  
The role of volunteers in NPOs concerning innovation therefore seems to be an interesting 
question for future research. Results from this thesis suggest that their contribution is 
insignificant  for innovation, as has been explained above in chapter 6.2.3. introducing control 
variables. 
 
8.5. Surprising Results 
 
One of the most striking results of the statistical analysis is actually a non-result and relates to 
measures of organizational slack. Besides the measures of organizational slack as introduced 
in chapter 6.2.1., the survey also contained two questions relating to financial and HR slack 
which were adopted from Nohria and Gulati’s 1997 study. These two questions (see also 
appendix I): 
(i) “Stellen Sie sich vor, aufgrund eines unvorhersehbaren Ereignisses würden die 
Mitarbeiter/innen Ihrer Organisation dauerhaft mit völlig neuen Aufgaben 
belastet…–um wie viel Prozent würde sich (a) der Output, (b) die Qualität der 
Leistung verändern, wenn plötzlich 10% der Arbeitszeit ihrer Mitarbeiter/innen 
wegfallen?”23 
(ii) “Stellen Sie sich vor, aufgrund eines unvorhersehbaren Ereignisses würde ihre 
Organisation finanziell dauerhaft schwer belastet…-um wie viel Prozent würde 
sich (a) der Output, (b) die Qualität der Leistungen verändern, wenn plötzlich 10% 
des Budgets ausfallen würde?”24 
were thought to yield valuable measures for organizational slack. But the regression model 
including these slack measures did not produce any interpretable results (see appendix iv). 
                                                 
23 “Assume that due to some sudden development, from now on your employees have to spend their time on 
totally new work. How seriously –measured in per cent- would (a) the output, (b) the outcome of your 
organizations be affected if suddenly your employee’s time is reduced by 10%?” 
24 “Assume that due to some sudden development, from now on your organization suffers financial drawbacks. 
How seriously –measured in per cent- would (a) the output, (b) the outcome of your organization be affected if 
suddenly your budget is reduced by 10%?” 
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This is interesting insofar as these measures have led to unprecedented results showing 
empirically the inverse U-shaped relation between organizational slack and innovation.  
An explanation for this could be found in the specific goal-structure of NPOs, which is highly 
diversified (see chapter 1.3.). Since NPOs in contrast to the one-dimensional profit goal in 
for-profit organizations have ambiguous goals which are sought to be followed 
simultaneously, it is difficult to assess clearly the effects of more or less slack and outputs and 
outcomes of the organization. It might be that the organization does not even know clearly 
which of the goals is preferred and should be more important than other goals. Therefore, 
these questions may not be capable of capturing organizational slack in nonprofit 
organizations since respondents are unable to properly assess the consequences of reduced 
resource levels.  
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9. Conclusion and Outlook 
 
The intention of the current study has been to examine the relationship that exists between 
organizational slack and innovation in NPOs. The research has been guided by the assumption 
that organizational slack impacts mainly either in a positive way or in an inverse U-shaped 
way on innovation in NPOs. Having recited both, theoretical and empirical state of the art in 
slack and innovation research, a research gap has been identified which exists for nonprofit 
organizations.  
 
To summarize, the empirical results of the thesis provide strong evidence that organizational 
slack resources positively impact innovation in NPOs. But the picture needs to be 
differentiated and a distinction needs to be made between various slack resources. The 
regression models as well as theoretical considerations suggest rejecting the distinction 
between available slack, recoverable slack, and potential slack and instead differentiating 
between financial slack and HR-related slack. The different HR-related slack variables show 
that they impact innovation differently. While slack in qualification and motivation describe a 
monotonic positive relation with innovation, the slack variable capturing the level of payment 
per employee illustrates an inverse U-shaped pattern as illustrated in figure 9.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.1: Organizational slack and innovation 
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A revised model of slack and innovation in NPOs is therefore suggested: 
 
Figure 9.2: Revised research model for the impact of organizational slack on innovation 
in NPOs 
 
Nevertheless, this thesis clearly is limited through some shortcomings which are addressed 
here. The creativity in capturing organizational slack and innovation variables was limited by 
the fact that the survey was part of another research project that investigated the societal 
functions performed by Austrian and Czech NPOs, which resulted in reduced space for 
questions. The project named New Orientations for Democracy in Europe (NODE) was 
funded by the Austrian Federal Ministry for Science and Research and provided a unique 
opportunity to carry out the survey. These research findings though, generated with a sample 
of Austrian NPOs, are supposed to be generalizable since the underlying principles which 
guide NPOs in their operations such as mission orientation, profit distribution constraint, 
reliance on HR, recruiting volunteers, etc. are universal characteristics. Consequently, they 
determine an NPO’s behavior much more than potential country-specific differences, which 
mostly refer to the composition of the sector in terms of e.g. legal form of the NPOs, funding 
structure, governmental-nonprofit sector collaboration regime, and so forth.  
Partly due to the predetermined survey design it was not possible to accordingly tackle the 
time- lag issue when researching organizational slack and innovation. Since there are 
convincing arguments that organizational slack is transformed into innovation only after a 
certain time lag, slack variables should be collected earlier than innovation variables. 
However, there is also empirical evidence showing no difference in results with and without 
considering a time-lag, according to a meta-analysis by Daniel and his colleagues (2004). In 
Austria neither a longitudinal database that includes relevant slack and innovation variables 
exists, nor has this research had the chance to generate its own survey at two different points 
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in time and so the finally applied design is a viable compromise. A proxy variable has been 
introduced to make sure that the resource level of the NPOs has not undergone a severe 
change over the last five years.  
Finally, the survey design which has been applied here actively counteracts the common 
method bias and the key informant problem since the questionnaire is split in two parts with 
the dependent variables in the one and the independent variables in the other part (for details 
see chapter 6.1.).  
 
In spite of the above caveats, this research contributes to the academic world in that it has 
shown that the distinction along the dimensions available, recoverable, and potential slack is 
questionable for NPOs. Secondly, it has revealed that NPOs need slack resources to operate 
innovatively. Beyond these findings future research could tackle more qualitative questions 
and investigate how NPOs transform organizational slack into innovation. How exactly is the 
process of gaining, transforming, and exploiting slack managed in NPOs? Also, a longitudinal 
design either quantitatively or qualitatively would provide valuable insight by including time 
as a relevant variable. 
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11. Appendix I: Questionnaire 
11.1. Postal Questionnaire 
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11.2. Phone Questionnaire 
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12. Appendix II: Details Correlation Analysis 
12.1. K-S Tests 
 
 
  Deg. control Function Legal form Size of NPO 
N 234 233 151 234 
Mean 2,2991 2,2558 ,0265 4,1391 Normal Parameters a 
Std. Deviation 1,18839 ,97103 ,16112 2,43828 
Absolute ,189 ,068 ,539 ,233 
Positive ,189 ,068 ,539 ,182 
Most Extreme Differences  
Negative -,137 -,066 -,435 -,233 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 2,893 1,045 6,621 3,562 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,225 ,000 ,000 
 
 
  Comp_npo Comp_fpo Comp_publ Voldum 
N 231 230 229 234 
Mean 1,8442 1,2783 1,590 ,6838 Normal Parameters a 
Std. Deviation 1,24480 ,83638 1,1344 ,46600 
Absolute ,286 ,478 ,366 ,435 
Positive ,286 ,478 ,366 ,249 
Most Extreme Differences  
Negative -,249 -,370 -,302 -,435 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 4,342 7,251 5,546 6,655 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
 
 
  RecSlackPay AvailSlack RecSlackMLT Innovation 
N 234 234 234 234 
Mean 35332,2740 7,1709 9,4872 1,0812 Normal Parameters a 
Std. Deviation 1,77194E5 2,03316 2,22786 1,06335 
Absolute ,421 ,136 ,146 ,243 
Positive ,388 ,136 ,146 ,243 
Most Extreme Differences  
Negative -,421 -,133 -,144 -,157 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 6,440 2,088 2,233 3,714 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
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  FinancialSlack RecSlackHR PotSlack RecSlackQual 
N 234 234 234 234 
Mean 12,6325 10,9957 6,9701 3,6667 Normal Parameters a 
Std. Deviation 3,66657 2,43102 2,50046 1,30696 
Absolute ,118 ,110 ,111 ,203 
Positive ,118 ,068 ,111 ,154 
Most Extreme Differences  
Negative -,080 -,110 -,086 -,203 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1,808 1,687 1,692 3,109 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,003 ,007 ,007 ,000 
Table 12.1: K-S test for normal distribution 
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12.2. Correlation Matrix 
Table 12.2: Spearman rank-order correlations  
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Correlation 
Coefficient 1 ,094 ,163
* -,029 ,756** -,046 ,121 ,080 ,033 -,013 ,067 -,028 ,152* -,003 ,017 ,274** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,151 ,012 ,656 ,000 ,480 ,065 ,227 ,623 ,842 ,311 ,733 ,020 ,964 ,793 ,000 
Available 
slack 
N  234 234 234 234 234 234 231 230 229 234 151 234 233 234 234 
Correlation 
Coefficient  1 ,218
** ,695** ,272** ,727** ,039 ,005 ,065 ,090 -,089 -,113 ,113 ,014 ,130* ,131* 
Sig. (2-tailed)   ,001 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,556 ,942 ,329 ,173 ,177 ,166 ,084 ,827 ,047 ,045 
Recoverable 
slack multi  
N   234 234 234 234 234 231 230 229 234 151 234 233 234 234 
Correlation 
Coefficient   1 ,434
** ,618** ,014 ,009 ,119 ,161* ,185** -,027 ,032 ,144* ,037 ,085 ,153* 
Sig. (2-tailed)    ,000 ,000 ,828 ,893 ,072 ,015 ,005 ,682 ,701 ,027 ,571 ,194 ,019 
Potential slack 
N    234 234 234 234 231 230 229 234 151 234 233 234 234 
Correlation 
Coefficient    1 ,049 ,658
** -,005 -,057 ,051 ,068 -,143* -,087 ,121 ,078 ,169** ,045 
Sig. (2-tailed)     ,451 ,000 ,937 ,388 ,443 ,309 ,029 ,286 ,064 ,234 ,009 ,496 
Recoverable 
slack HR 
N     234 234 234 231 230 229 234 151 234 233 234 234 
Correlation 
Coefficient     1 -,034 ,091 ,194
** ,159* ,148* ,085 ,029 ,168** -,025 ,077 ,301** 
Sig. (2-tailed)      ,606 ,166 ,003 ,016 ,025 ,198 ,719 ,010 ,710 ,243 ,000 
Financial slack 
N      234 234 231 230 229 234 151 234 233 234 234 
Correlation 
Coefficient      1 -,023 -,027 ,042 ,022 -,086 ,025 ,081 -,018 ,119 ,023 
Sig. (2-tailed)       ,722 ,682 ,522 ,742 ,188 ,761 ,216 ,788 ,070 ,728 
Recoverable  
slack   
qualification 
N       234 231 230 229 234 151 234 233 234 234 
Correlation 
Coefficient       1 ,094 ,097 -,006 -,060 -,029 ,016 ,147
* ,265** ,702** 
Sig. (2-tailed)        ,155 ,144 ,926 ,362 ,724 ,813 ,025 ,000 ,000 
Recoverable 
slack payment 
N        231 230 229 234 151 234 233 234 234 
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Correlation 
Coefficient        1 ,355
** ,527** ,058 ,084 ,022 ,114 ,096 ,170** 
Sig. (2-tailed)         ,000 ,000 ,382 ,309 ,741 ,085 ,147 ,010 
Competition    
NPO 
N         228 228 231 148 231 230 231 231 
Correlation 
Coefficient         1 ,244
** ,055 -,068 ,029 ,002 ,126 ,117 
Sig. (2-tailed)          ,000 ,403 ,415 ,661 ,977 ,057 ,077 
Competition    
FPO 
N          227 230 148 230 229 230 230 
Correlation 
Coefficient          1 ,049 ,194
* -,013 ,014 -,008 ,076 
Sig. (2-tailed)           ,461 ,018 ,843 ,833 ,900 ,250 
Competition       
PO 
N           229 148 229 228 229 229 
Correlation 
Coefficient           1 ,006 ,057 -,081 -,061 ,031 
Sig. (2-tailed)            ,938 ,384 ,219 ,351 ,639 
Degree of    
control 
N            151 234 233 234 234 
Correlation 
Coefficient            1 ,010 -,034 ,116 ,016 
Sig. (2-tailed)             ,900 ,680 ,156 ,844 
Legal form 
(foundation  
_dum) 
N             151 150 151 151 
Correlation 
Coefficient             1 -,041 ,041 ,045 
Sig. (2-tailed)              ,532 ,537 ,498 
Volunteer       
_dum  
N              233 234 234 
Correlation 
Coefficient              1 ,151
* ,059 
Sig. (2-tailed)               ,021 ,373 
Function                
of NPO  
(advocacy) 
N               233 233 
Correlation 
Coefficient               1 ,241
** 
Sig. (2-tailed)                ,000 
Innovation 
N                234 
Size of NPO 
(income log) 
Correlation 
Coefficient                1 
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13. Appendix III: Details Crosstabs 
13.1. Crosstabs Recovarable Slack HR 
 
 
   RecSlackHR 
   No slack Low slack Medium slack High slack Total 
Count 0 0 19 4 23 Culture and arts  
% within RecSlackHR ,0% ,0% 11,8% 6,2% 9,9% 
Count 0 0 15 4 19 Sports and recreation 
% within RecSlackHR ,0% ,0% 9,3% 6,2% 8,2% 
Count 2 2 61 28 93 Education and research 
% within RecSlackHR 100,0% 40,0% 37,9% 43,1% 39,9% 
Count 0 1 8 3 12 Health 
% within RecSlackHR ,0% 20,0% 5,0% 4,6% 5,2% 
Count 0 0 3 1 4 Employment and training 
% within RecSlackHR ,0% ,0% 1,9% 1,5% 1,7% 
Count 0 1 37 14 52 Social services  
% within RecSlackHR ,0% 20,0% 23,0% 21,5% 22,3% 
Count 0 0 3 1 4 Regional development 
% within RecSlackHR ,0% ,0% 1,9% 1,5% 1,7% 
Count 0 0 2 1 3 Business and prof. assoc., 
unions  % within RecSlackHR ,0% ,0% 1,2% 1,5% 1,3% 
Count 0 0 1 2 3 Religion 
% within RecSlackHR ,0% ,0% ,6% 3,1% 1,3% 
Count 0 1 6 2 9 Environment 
% within RecSlackHR ,0% 20,0% 3,7% 3,1% 3,9% 
Count 0 0 6 5 11 Law, advocacy, and 
politics  % within RecSlackHR ,0% ,0% 3,7% 7,7% 4,7% 
Count 2 5 161 65 233 
ICNPO 
Total 
% within RecSlackHR 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 13.1: Rec. slack HR * ICNPO 
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   RecSlackHR 
   No slack Low slack Medium slack High slack Total 
Count 2 1 42 20 65 Single 
% within RecSlackHR 100,0% 20,0% 25,9% 30,8% 27,8% 
Count 0 2 38 14 54 Dual 
% within RecSlackHR ,0% 40,0% 23,5% 21,5% 23,1% 
Count 0 2 82 31 115 Multi 
% within RecSlackHR ,0% 40,0% 50,6% 47,7% 49,1% 
Count 2 5 162 65 234 
Function diversification 
Total 
% within RecSlackHR 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 13.2: Function diversification * RecSlackHR Crosstabulation 
 
 
   RecSlackHR 
   Low slack Medium slack High slack Total 
Count 2 15 6 23 Serv. Advoc. 
% within RecSlackHR 100,0% 39,5% 42,9% 42,6% 
Count 0 16 5 21 Serv. Comm. build. 
% within RecSlackHR ,0% 42,1% 35,7% 38,9% 
Count 0 7 3 10 Advoc. Comm. Build. 
% within RecSlackHR ,0% 18,4% 21,4% 18,5% 
Count 2 38 14 54 
Function dual 
Total 
% within RecSlackHR 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 13.3: Function dual * RecSlackHR Crosstabulation 
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   RecSlackHR 
   
No slack Low slack 
Medium 
slack High slack Total 
Count 2 1 32 13 48 Service 
% within RecSlackHR 100,0% 100,0% 76,2% 65,0% 73,8% 
Count 0 0 5 3 8 Advocacy 
% within RecSlackHR ,0% ,0% 11,9% 15,0% 12,3% 
Count 0 0 5 4 9 Comm. build. 
% within RecSlackHR ,0% ,0% 11,9% 20,0% 13,8% 
Count 2 1 42 20 65 
Function single 
Total 
% within RecSlackHR 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 13.4: Function single * RecSlackHR Crosstabulation 
 
 
   RecSlackHR 
   
No slack Low slack 
Medium 
slack High slack Total 
Count 2 3 83 36 124 very small 
% within RecSlackHR 100,0% 60,0% 51,2% 55,4% 53,0% 
Count 0 1 58 22 81 small 
% within RecSlackHR ,0% 20,0% 35,8% 33,8% 34,6% 
Count 0 1 11 3 15 mid 
% within RecSlackHR ,0% 20,0% 6,8% 4,6% 6,4% 
Count 0 0 3 3 6 big 
% within RecSlackHR ,0% ,0% 1,9% 4,6% 2,6% 
Count 0 0 7 1 8 very big 
% within RecSlackHR ,0% ,0% 4,3% 1,5% 3,4% 
Count 2 5 162 65 234 
Size by FTE 
Total 
% within RecSlackHR 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 13.5: Size by FTE * RecSlackHR Crosstabulation 
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   RecSlackHR 
   No slack Low slack Medium slack High slack Total 
Publ. law % within RecSlackHR ,0% 20,0% 15,5% 21,9% 17,3%
Assoc. % within RecSlackHR 100,0% 80,0% 77,0% 71,9% 75,8%
Foundation % within RecSlackHR ,0% ,0% 3,1% 1,6% 2,6%
Corporation % within RecSlackHR ,0% ,0% 4,3% 4,7% 4,3%
Legal form 
Total % within RecSlackHR 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
Table 13.6: Legal form * RecSlackHR Crosstabulation 
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13.2. Crosstabs Recoverable Slack Multi  
 
 
   RecSlack 
   
No slack Low slack 
Medium 
slack High slack Total 
Count 1 3 18 1 23Culture and arts  
% within RecSlack 33,3% 18,8% 9,1% 5,9% 9,9%
Count 0 2 14 3 19Sports and recreation 
% within RecSlack ,0% 12,5% 7,1% 17,6% 8,2%
Count 2 5 82 4 93Education and research 
% within RecSlack 66,7% 31,2% 41,6% 23,5% 39,9%
Count 0 2 9 1 12Health 
% within RecSlack ,0% 12,5% 4,6% 5,9% 5,2%
Count 0 0 4 0 4Employment and training 
% within RecSlack ,0% ,0% 2,0% ,0% 1,7%
Count 0 3 44 5 52Social services  
% within RecSlack ,0% 18,8% 22,3% 29,4% 22,3%
Count 0 0 4 0 4Regional development 
% within RecSlack ,0% ,0% 2,0% ,0% 1,7%
Count 0 0 3 0 3Business and prof. assoc., 
unions  % within RecSlack ,0% ,0% 1,5% ,0% 1,3%
Count 0 0 2 1 3Religion 
% within RecSlack ,0% ,0% 1,0% 5,9% 1,3%
Count 0 1 8 0 9Environment 
% within RecSlack ,0% 6,2% 4,1% ,0% 3,9%
Count 0 0 9 2 11Law, advocacy, and politics  
% within RecSlack ,0% ,0% 4,6% 11,8% 4,7%
Count 3 16 197 17 233
ICNPO 
Total 
% within RecSlack 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
Table 13.7: ICNPO * RecSlack Crosstabulation 
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   RecSlack 
   No slack Low slack Medium slack High slack Total 
Count 2 3 52 8 65Single 
% within RecSlack 66,7% 18,8% 26,3% 47,1% 27,8%
Count 1 4 44 5 54Dual 
% within RecSlack 33,3% 25,0% 22,2% 29,4% 23,1%
Count 0 9 102 4 115Multi 
% within RecSlack ,0% 56,2% 51,5% 23,5% 49,1%
Count 3 16 198 17 234
Function divers ification 
Total 
% within RecSlack 
100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
100,0
%
Table 13.8: Function diversification * RecSlack Crosstabulation 
 
 
 
   RecSlack 
   
No slack Low slack Medium slack 
High 
slack 
Count 1 2 19 1 Serv. Advoc. 
% within RecSlack 
100,0% 50,0% 43,2% 
20,0
% 
Count 0 1 17 3 Serv. Comm. build. 
% within RecSlack 
,0% 25,0% 38,6% 
60,0
% 
Count 0 1 8 1 Advoc. Comm. Build. 
% within RecSlack 
,0% 25,0% 18,2% 
20,0
% 
Count 1 4 44 5 
Function dual 
Total 
% within RecSlack 
100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
100,0
% 
Table 13.9: Function dual * RecSlack Crosstabulation 
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   RecSlack 
   
No slack Low slack Medium slack 
High 
slack 
Count 2 3 38 5 Service 
% within RecSlack 100,0% 100,0% 73,1% 62,5% 
Count 0 0 7 1 Advocacy 
% within RecSlack ,0% ,0% 13,5% 12,5% 
Count 0 0 7 2 Comm. build. 
% within RecSlack ,0% ,0% 13,5% 25,0% 
Count 2 3 52 8 
Function single 
Total 
% within RecSlack 
100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
100,0
% 
Table 13.10: Function single * RecSlack Crosstabulation 
 
 
   RecSlack 
   
No slack Low slack 
Medium 
slack High slack Total 
Count 3 9 104 8 124 very small 
% within RecSlack 100,0% 56,2% 52,5% 47,1% 53,0% 
Count 0 6 71 4 81 small 
% within RecSlack ,0% 37,5% 35,9% 23,5% 34,6% 
Count 0 1 13 1 15 mid 
% within RecSlack ,0% 6,2% 6,6% 5,9% 6,4% 
Count 0 0 3 3 6 big 
% within RecSlack ,0% ,0% 1,5% 17,6% 2,6% 
Count 0 0 7 1 8 very big 
% within RecSlack ,0% ,0% 3,5% 5,9% 3,4% 
Count 3 16 198 17 234 
Size by FTE 
Total 
% within RecSlack 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 13.11: Size by FTE * RecSlack Crosstabulation 
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   RecSlack 
   No slack Low slack Medium slack High slack 
Publ. law % within RecSlack ,0% 12,5% 17,8% 18,8% 
Assoc. % within RecSlack 100,0% 87,5% 75,1% 68,8% 
Foundation % within RecSlack ,0% ,0% 3,0% ,0% 
Corporation % within RecSlack ,0% ,0% 4,1% 12,5% 
Legal form 
Total % within RecSlack 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 13.12: Legal form * RecSlack Crosstabulation 
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13.3. Crosstabs Recoverable Slack Qualification 
 
 
   RecSlackQual 
   No slack Low slack Medium slack High slack Total 
Count 5 1 6 11 23Culture and arts  
% within 
RecSlackQual 
19,2% 7,1% 5,4% 13,6% 9,9%
Count 1 2 9 7 19Sports and recreation 
% within 
RecSlackQual 
3,8% 14,3% 8,0% 8,6% 8,2%
Count 11 6 46 30 93Education and research 
% within 
RecSlackQual 
42,3% 42,9% 41,1% 37,0% 39,9%
Count 0 1 7 4 12Health 
% within 
RecSlackQual 
,0% 7,1% 6,2% 4,9% 5,2%
Count 0 0 2 2 Employment and training 
% within 
RecSlackQual 
,0% ,0% 1,8% 2,5% 1,7%
Count 7 1 29 15 52Social services  
% within 
RecSlackQual 
26,9% 7,1% 25,9% 18,5% 22,3%
Count 0 0 2 2 Regional development 
% within 
RecSlackQual 
,0% ,0% 1,8% 2,5% 1,7%
Count 0 2 0 1 Business and prof. assoc., 
unions  % within 
RecSlackQual 
,0% 14,3% ,0% 1,2% 1,3%
Count 0 0 2 1 Religion 
% within 
RecSlackQual 
,0% ,0% 1,8% 1,2% 1,3%
Count 2 1 2 4 Environment 
% within 
RecSlackQual 
7,7% 7,1% 1,8% 4,9% 3,9%
ICNPO 
Law, advocacy, and politics  Count 0 0 7 4 11
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 % within 
RecSlackQual 
,0% ,0% 6,2% 4,9% 4,7%
Count 26 14 112 81 233
 
Total 
% within 
RecSlackQual 
100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
Table 13.13: ICNPO * RecSlackQual Crosstabulation 
 
 
   RecSlackQual 
   
No slack Low slack 
Medium 
slack High slack Total 
Count 11 4 24 26 65 Single 
% within RecSlackQual 42,3% 28,6% 21,2% 32,1% 27,8% 
Count 5 2 25 22 54 Dual 
% within RecSlackQual 19,2% 14,3% 22,1% 27,2% 23,1% 
Count 10 8 64 33 115 Multi 
% within RecSlackQual 38,5% 57,1% 56,6% 40,7% 49,1% 
Count 26 14 113 81 234 
Function diversification 
Total 
% within RecSlackQual 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 13.14: Function divers ification * RecSlackQual Crosstabulation 
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   RecSlackQual 
   No slack Low slack Medium slack High slack 
Count 2 1 9 11 Serv. Advoc. 
% within 
RecSlackQual 
40,0% 50,0% 36,0% 50,0% 
Count 3 0 9 9 Serv. Comm. build. 
% within 
RecSlackQual 
60,0% ,0% 36,0% 40,9% 
Count 0 1 7 2 Advoc. Comm. Build. 
% within 
RecSlackQual 
,0% 50,0% 28,0% 9,1% 
Count 5 2 25 21 
Function dual 
Total 
% within 
RecSlackQual 
100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 13.15: Function dual * RecSlackQual Crosstabulation 
 
 
 
   RecSlackQual 
   No slack Low slack Medium slack High slack Total 
Count 8 4 17 19 48 Service 
% within 
RecSlackQual 
72,7% 100,0% 70,8% 73,1% 
73,8
% 
Count 2 0 3 3 8 Advocacy 
% within 
RecSlackQual 
18,2% ,0% 12,5% 11,5% 
12,3
% 
Count 1 0 4 4 9 Comm. build. 
% within 
RecSlackQual 
9,1% ,0% 16,7% 15,4% 
13,8
% 
Count 11 4 24 26 65 
Function single 
Total 
% within 
RecSlackQual 
100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
100,0
% 
Table 13.16: Function single * RecSlackQual Crosstabulation 
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   RecSlackQual 
   No slack Low slack Medium slack High slack Total 
Count 18 9 53 44 124 very small 
% within RecSlackQual 69,2% 64,3% 46,9% 54,3% 53,0% 
Count 6 4 47 24 81 small 
% within RecSlackQual 23,1% 28,6% 41,6% 29,6% 34,6% 
Count 1 0 5 9 15 mid 
% within RecSlackQual 3,8% ,0% 4,4% 11,1% 6,4% 
Count 0 0 3 3 6 big 
% within RecSlackQual ,0% ,0% 2,7% 3,7% 2,6% 
Count 1 1 5 1 8 very big 
% within RecSlackQual 3,8% 7,1% 4,4% 1,2% 3,4% 
Count 26 14 113 81 234 
Size by FTE 
Total 
% within RecSlackQual 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 13.17: Size by FTE * RecSlackQual Crosstabulation 
 
 
   RecSlackQual 
   
No slack Low slack 
Medium 
slack High slack Total 
Count 3 3 21 13 40 Publ. law 
% within RecSlackQual 12,0% 21,4% 18,8% 16,2% 17,3% 
Count 20 11 84 60 175 Assoc. 
% within RecSlackQual 80,0% 78,6% 75,0% 75,0% 75,8% 
Count 0 0 4 2 6 Foundation 
% within RecSlackQual ,0% ,0% 3,6% 2,5% 2,6% 
Count 2 0 3 5 10 Corporation 
% within RecSlackQual 8,0% ,0% 2,7% 6,2% 4,3% 
Count 25 14 112 80 231 
Legal form 
Total 
% within RecSlackQual 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 13.18: Legal form * RecSlackQual Crosstabulation 
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13.4. Crosstabs Available Slack 
 
 
   AvailSlackLiqu 
   
No slack Low slack 
Medium 
slack High slack Total 
Count 0 3 15 5 23 Culture and arts  
% within AvailSlackLiqu ,0% 14,3% 10,3% 7,8% 9,9% 
Count 0 3 12 4 19 Sports and recreation 
% within AvailSlackLiqu ,0% 14,3% 8,3% 6,2% 8,2% 
Count 1 10 65 17 93 Education and research 
% within AvailSlackLiqu 33,3% 47,6% 44,8% 26,6% 39,9% 
Count 0 0 9 3 12 Health 
% within AvailSlackLiqu ,0% ,0% 6,2% 4,7% 5,2% 
Count 0 0 2 2 4 Employment and training 
% within AvailSlackLiqu ,0% ,0% 1,4% 3,1% 1,7% 
Count 2 4 26 20 52 Social services  
% within AvailSlackLiqu 66,7% 19,0% 17,9% 31,2% 22,3% 
Count 0 0 4 0 4 Regional development 
% within AvailSlackLiqu ,0% ,0% 2,8% ,0% 1,7% 
Count 0 0 1 2 3 Business and prof. assoc., 
unions  % within AvailSlackLiqu ,0% ,0% ,7% 3,1% 1,3% 
Count 0 0 1 2 3 Religion 
% within AvailSlackLiqu ,0% ,0% ,7% 3,1% 1,3% 
Count 0 0 5 4 9 Environment 
% within AvailSlackLiqu ,0% ,0% 3,4% 6,2% 3,9% 
Count 0 1 5 5 11 Law, advocacy, and politics  
% within AvailSlackLiqu ,0% 4,8% 3,4% 7,8% 4,7% 
Count 3 21 145 64 233 
ICNPO 
Total 
% within AvailSlackLiqu 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 13.19: ICNPO * AvailSlackLiqu Crosstabulation 
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   AvailSlackLiqu 
   
No slack Low slack Medium slack 
High 
slack 
Count 1 2 40 22 Single 
% within AvailSlackLiqu 33,3% 9,5% 27,4% 34,4% 
Count 0 8 34 12 Dual 
% within AvailSlackLiqu ,0% 38,1% 23,3% 18,8% 
Count 2 11 72 30 Multi 
% within AvailSlackLiqu 66,7% 52,4% 49,3% 46,9% 
Count 3 21 146 64 
Function diversification 
Total 
% within AvailSlackLiqu 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 13.20: Function diversification * AvailSlackLiqu Crosstabulation 
 
 
 
   AvailSlackLiqu 
   
Low slack 
Medium 
slack High slack Total 
Count 5 13 5 23 Serv. Advoc. 
% within AvailSlackLiqu 62,5% 38,2% 41,7% 42,6% 
Count 2 13 6 21 Serv. Comm. build. 
% within AvailSlackLiqu 25,0% 38,2% 50,0% 38,9% 
Count 1 8 1 10 Advoc. Comm. Build. 
% within AvailSlackLiqu 12,5% 23,5% 8,3% 18,5% 
Count 8 34 12 54 
Function dual 
Total 
% within AvailSlackLiqu 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 13.21: Function dual * AvailSlackLiqu Crosstabulation 
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   AvailSlackLiqu 
   
No slack Low slack Medium slack 
High 
slack 
Count 1 0 33 14 Service 
% within 
AvailSlackLiqu 
100,0% ,0% 82,5% 63,6% 
Count 0 1 4 3 Advocacy 
% within 
AvailSlackLiqu 
,0% 50,0% 10,0% 13,6% 
Count 0 1 3 5 Comm. build. 
% within 
AvailSlackLiqu 
,0% 50,0% 7,5% 22,7% 
Count 1 2 40 22 
Function single 
Total 
% within 
AvailSlackLiqu 
100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 13.22: Function single * AvailSlackLiqu Crosstabulation 
 
 
   AvailSlackLiqu 
   
No slack Low slack 
Medium 
slack High slack Total 
Count 2 14 74 34 124 very small 
% within AvailSlackLiqu 66,7% 66,7% 50,7% 53,1% 53,0% 
Count 1 7 50 23 81 small 
% within AvailSlackLiqu 33,3% 33,3% 34,2% 35,9% 34,6% 
Count 0 0 12 3 15 mid 
% within AvailSlackLiqu ,0% ,0% 8,2% 4,7% 6,4% 
Count 0 0 2 4 6 big 
% within AvailSlackLiqu ,0% ,0% 1,4% 6,2% 2,6% 
Count 0 0 8 0 8 very big 
% within AvailSlackLiqu ,0% ,0% 5,5% ,0% 3,4% 
Count 3 21 146 64 234 
Size by FTE 
Total 
% within AvailSlackLiqu 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 13.23: Size by FTE * AvailSlackLiqu Crosstabulation 
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   AvailSlackLiqu 
   
No slack Low slack 
Medium 
slack High slack Total 
Count 0 3 28 9 40 Publ. law 
% within AvailSlackLiqu ,0% 14,3% 19,6% 14,1% 17,3% 
Count 3 18 102 52 175 Assoc. 
% within AvailSlackLiqu 100,0% 85,7% 71,3% 81,2% 75,8% 
Count 0 0 6 0 6 Foundation 
% within AvailSlackLiqu ,0% ,0% 4,2% ,0% 2,6% 
Count 0 0 7 3 10 Corporation 
% within AvailSlackLiqu ,0% ,0% 4,9% 4,7% 4,3% 
Count 3 21 143 64 231 
Legal form 
Total 
% within AvailSlackLiqu 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 13.24: Legal form * AvailSlackLiqu Crosstabulation 
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13.5. Crosstabs Potential Slack 
 
 
   PotSlack 
   
No slack Low slack 
Medium 
slack High slack Total 
Count 4 9 10 0 23 Culture and arts  
% within PotSlack 9,5% 8,8% 11,6% ,0% 9,9% 
Count 5 4 10 0 19 Sports and recreation 
% within PotSlack 11,9% 3,9% 11,6% ,0% 8,2% 
Count 13 47 32 1 93 Education and research 
% within PotSlack 31,0% 46,1% 37,2% 33,3% 39,9% 
Count 2 7 3 0 12 Health 
% within PotSlack 4,8% 6,9% 3,5% ,0% 5,2% 
Count 1 3 0 0 4 Employment and training 
% within PotSlack 2,4% 2,9% ,0% ,0% 1,7% 
Count 10 21 20 1 52 Social services  
% within PotSlack 23,8% 20,6% 23,3% 33,3% 22,3% 
Count 1 3 0 0 4 Regional development 
% within PotSlack 2,4% 2,9% ,0% ,0% 1,7% 
Count 0 1 2 0 3 Business and prof. assoc., 
unions  % within PotSlack ,0% 1,0% 2,3% ,0% 1,3% 
Count 1 0 1 1 3 Religion 
% within PotSlack 2,4% ,0% 1,2% 33,3% 1,3% 
Count 2 4 3 0 9 Environment 
% within PotSlack 4,8% 3,9% 3,5% ,0% 3,9% 
Count 3 3 5 0 11 Law, advocacy, and politics  
% within PotSlack 7,1% 2,9% 5,8% ,0% 4,7% 
Count 42 102 86 3 233 
ICNPO 
Total 
% within PotSlack 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 13.25: ICNPO * PotSlack Crosstabulation 
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   PotSlack 
   No slack Low slack Med. slack High slack Total 
Count 13 26 24 2 65 Single 
% within PotSlack 31,0% 25,5% 27,6% 66,7% 27,8% 
Count 9 27 18 0 54 Dual 
% within PotSlack 21,4% 26,5% 20,7% ,0% 23,1% 
Count 20 49 45 1 115 Multi 
% within PotSlack 47,6% 48,0% 51,7% 33,3% 49,1% 
Count 42 102 87 3 234 
Function diversification 
Total 
% within PotSlack 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 13.26: Function diversification * PotSlack Crosstabulation 
 
 
 
   PotSlack 
   No slack Low slack Medium slack High slack Total 
Count 10 20 16 2 48Service 
% within PotSlack 76,9% 76,9% 66,7% 100,0% 73,8%
Count 2 4 2 0 8Advocacy 
% within PotSlack 15,4% 15,4% 8,3% ,0% 12,3%
Count 1 2 6 0 9Comm. build. 
% within PotSlack 7,7% 7,7% 25,0% ,0% 13,8%
Count 13 26 24 2 65
Function single 
Total 
% within PotSlack 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
Table 13.27: Function single * PotSlack Crosstabulation 
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   PotSlack 
   No slack Low slack Medium slack High slack Total 
Count 2 21 16 1 40 Publ. law 
% within PotSlack 4,9% 20,8% 18,6% 33,3% 17,3% 
Count 37 74 62 2 175 Assoc. 
% within PotSlack 90,2% 73,3% 72,1% 66,7% 75,8% 
Count 0 4 2 0 6 Foundation 
% within PotSlack ,0% 4,0% 2,3% ,0% 2,6% 
Count 2 2 6 0 10 Corporation 
% within PotSlack 4,9% 2,0% 7,0% ,0% 4,3% 
Count 41 101 86 3 231 
Legal form 
Total 
% within PotSlack 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 13.28: Legal form * PotSlack Crosstabulation 
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14. Appendix IV: Details Regression Analysis 
 
Predictor Variable  Std. error Beta t-Test p-Value 
(Constant) 27,282   -0,215 0,830 
Degree of control 1,709 -0,111 -1,392 0,166 
Legal form (foundation) 13,488 0,229 2,728 0,007 
Function of NPO (advocacy) 2,024 0,152 1,932 0,056 
Size of NPO (income log) 0,865 0,238 2,961 0,004 
Competition (NPO) 1,993 0,168 1,612 0,109 
Competition (FPO) 2,362 0,165 1,992 0,048 
Competition (PO) 2,235 -0,090 -0,831 0,407 
HR slack (alternative) 0,870 0,083 0,205 0,838 
HR slack (alternative) squared 0,012 -0,102 -0,245 0,807 
Financial slack (alternative) slack  1,041 0,164 0,334 0,739 
Financial slack (alternative) squared 0,013 -0,227 -0,462 0,645 
Adjusted R2 0,153    
Dependent Variable: Innovation 
        
Table 14.1: Regression Model Alternative Measures 
